Economic Analysis of Neighbourhood Quality, Neighbourhood Reputation and the Housing Market by Koopman, Marnix
S U S T A I N A B L E
U R B A N  A R E A S
4 4
Economic analysis of 
neighbourhood quality, 
neighbourhood reputation 
and the housing market
Marnix Koopman

Economic analysis of 
neighbourhood quality, 
neighbourhood reputation and 
the housing market
PROEFSCHRIFT 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. ir. K.Ch.A.M. Luyben,
voorzitter van het College voor Promoties,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 10 februari 2012 om 12.30 uur
door
Marnix Johan KOOPMAN
doctorandus in de economie,
geboren te Oosterhout
Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotoren:
Prof. dr. P.J. Boelhouwer
Prof. dr. P. Rietveld
Prof. dr. ir. V.H. Gruis
Samenstelling promotiecommissie:
Rector Magnificus, voorzitter
Prof. dr. P.J. Boelhouwer, Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor
Prof. dr. P. Rietveld, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, promotor
Prof. dr. ir. V.H. Gruis, Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor
Prof. dr. ir. A.J. van der Vlist, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Prof. dr. M.K. Francke, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Prof. dr. H.J.P. Timmermans, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
Prof. dr. ir. H. Priemus, emeritus hoogleraar Technische Universiteit Delft 
Prof. dr. ir. M.G. Elsinga, Technische Universiteit Delft, reservelid
Economic analysis of 
neighbourhood quality, 
neighbourhood reputation and 
the housing market
Marnix KOOPMAN
The series Sustainable Urban Areas





Fax +31 20 6870019
E-mail: info@iospress.nl
Sustainable Urban Areas is edited by
OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment




Phone +31 15 2783005
Fax +31 15 2784422
E-mail mailbox@otb.tudelft.nl
http://www.otb.tudelft.nl
Design: Cyril Strijdonk Ontwerpburo, Gaanderen; dtp: Itziar Lasa
Printed in the Netherlands by Haveka, Alblasserdam
ISSN 1574-6410; 44 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-032-1 (print)
ISSN 1879-8330; 44 (online)  ISBN 978-1-61499-033-8 (online)
NUR 755
Legal notice
The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the fol-
lowing information.
Copyright 2012 by Marnix Koopman
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, mi-
crofilm or any other means, without written permission from the copyright-
holder.
  Contents
  Acknowledgements  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1
    1  Introduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
 1.1  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
 1.2  Economic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 1.3  Informational asymmetry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 1.4  Neighbourhood value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 1.5  Purpose of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 1.6  Outline of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 Part I  Theoretical analysis  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 17
    2  Space and the housing market  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19
 2.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 2.2  The neoclassical housing market  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
 2.3  Introducing housing quality: hedonic house prices . . . . . . . 23
 2.4  Housing demand and residential mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 2.5  Exit choice and destination choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
 2.6  Search on the housing market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
 2.7  The meaning of neighbourhood reputations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
 2.8  Informational asymmetry on the owner-occupied market. . 49
 2.9  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
 Part II  Informational asymmetry on the social rental market  .  .  .  . 59
    3  The exit choices of social tenants   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 61
 3.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
 3.2  Neighbourhood push and the likelihood to move . . . . . . . . . 62
 3.3  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
 3.4  The likelihood of social tenants to move . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
 3.5  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
    4  The demand for social rental dwellings  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 81
 4.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
 4.2  Neighbourhood pull and housing demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
 4.3  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
 4.4  Net response to social rental dwellings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
 4.5  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
    5  Waiting time for social rental dwellings .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 97
 5.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
 5.2  Neighbourhood pull and waiting time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
 5.3  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
 5.4  Bids for social rental dwellings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
 5.5  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
 Part III  Informational asymmetry on the owner-occupied market 115
    6  Boundary effects in house price  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 117
 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
 6.2  Neighbourhood reputation and house price  . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
 6.3  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
 6.4  Boundary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
 6.5  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
    7  Boundary change and house prices  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 141
 7.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
 7.2  Boundary change and repeat sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
 7.3  Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
 7.4  Repeat sales equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
 7.5  Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
    8  Summary and discussion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 149
 8.1  Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149
 8.2  Methodological insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
 8.3  Policy insights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
  Samenvatting en discussie  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 159
 Appendix  Additional results  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 169
  Glossary of terms  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 171
  List of symbols  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 175
  List of tables and figures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 177
  Literature  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 179
  Curriculum vitae   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 213
[ 1 ]
  Acknowledgements
Whereas PhD students usually pride themselves on the conciseness and orig-
inality of their thesis, they almost inevitability commence it with an overly 
lengthy acknowledgements page which is ridden with clichés. I try to refrain 
from both. 
The first ones that I wish to thank are Henk Visscher and Vincent Gruis, who 
showed enough confidence in me when I applied at OTB Research Institute 
for the Built Environment to offer me the job. Vincent became my supervi-
sor and later on one of my promotors, alongside Peter Boelhouwer and Piet 
Rietveld. I thank them for their time and effort.
Roland Goetgeluk, Jos van Ommeren and Tom Kauko had no official status 
during my PhD term, but were important to me in shaping my thoughts dur-
ing the process. Dirk Dubbeling and Itziar Lasa Epelde at the Publishing Office 
at OTB prepared the manuscript for publication.
The Rotterdam Municipal Statistics Office (COS Rotterdam), the Rotterdam 
Tax Office (Gemeentebelastingen Rotterdam) and housing association Woon-
bron Rotterdam graciously provided me with data. Financial assistance for 
my research was granted by the Corpovenista platform and the Dutch govern-
ment’s Habiforum Programme Innovative land-use.
I further wish to thank all my former colleagues at OTB, as well as those at 
my past employer (EIB) and present employer (PBL).
Finally, I wish to thank my family. 
In making all these acknowledgements, I should remind myself and others 




 1  Introduction 
 1.1  Background
Residents care about the appearance of the buildings and public spaces in 
their neighbourhoods, about the people who live there, about the proximity 
to shops, schools and parks, about access to work and about the absence of 
crime and other nuisances in the area. The quality of a neighbourhood, how-
ever, extends beyond the realm of daily living experiences. Neighbourhood 
quality plays an important role in the pursuits of developers, city officials, 
planners, realtors and researchers. In order for their construction projects to 
succeed, developers must understand the types of locations and amenities 
that are most valued by buyers. City officials sometimes view the upgrading 
of neighbourhoods as a way of combating various social ills. In order to real-
ise this goal, however, the planners who prepare the upgrades must first learn 
about the aspects of neighbourhood quality that are missing. Realtors, who 
act as intermediaries between buyers and suppliers of dwellings, must as-
sess the quality of the neighbourhood before assigning a list price to a vacant 
dwelling. Sociologists, geographers, economists and other scholars working in 
the wider field of urban studies are interested in the reasons why households 
relocate, why relocating households choose particular destinations and how 
the quality of the surrounding area figures into the price of a house. 
The societal importance that is attached to neighbourhood quality and 
the attention that it is receiving within various scientific disciplines suggest 
a high level of understanding regarding the quality and value of neighbour-
hoods. Despite the importance of this topic, such is not the case. It is obvious-
ly preferable to have some access to jobs than to have no access at all; good 
schools are obviously preferable to bad schools, parks are seen as attractive 
landscape features and nearly everyone abhors crime. Nevertheless, when 
scholars try to assess the impact of neighbourhood quality on residential 
mobility or house prices, the task proves surprisingly difficult. While invest-
ments in infrastructure can sometimes improve the accessibility of neigh-
bourhoods, the proximity of roads and railways can also depresses proper-
ty values. While ethnic enclaves have become popular tourist attractions in 
some places, buyers in other places may view them as no-go areas. While 
high-density construction still takes place in inner-city areas, residents in the 
outskirts of a city often see such developments as an invasion of their pri-
vacy. Although efforts are invested in urban restructuring, many restructured 
neighbourhoods fail to attract more affluent households, possibly reverting to 
a state of decline. 
This thesis is not intended to explain how best to improve the quality of a 
neighbourhood. Instead, I try to explain why it is so difficult to assess neigh-
bourhood quality, and I try to identify strategies that households can adopt 
to overcome these difficulties. My explanation rests on the informational 
constraints that many households face during their search for a new home. 
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Space constrains households from obtaining detailed information on the 
quality of neighbourhoods other than the ones in which they are living. The 
circumstances that residents experience in their neighbourhoods each day do 
not correspond to the notion that households in other parts of the city have 
of these areas. While house-seekers may share the same information regard-
ing the price (or rent), structural characteristics and location of dwellings 
through advertisements and inspection of vacancies, they must make individ-
ual efforts to learn about the quality of the surrounding areas. 
Some house-seekers have intimate knowledge of particular neighbour-
hoods from their own experience or that of friends, relatives or colleagues. 
Others rely on hearsay, public statistics or media reports. The use of different 
sources of information may generate divergent opinions regarding the quali-
ty of a neighbourhood. The relationship between house prices (and rents) and 
neighbourhood quality depends on the accuracy of the information that buy-
ers (and new tenants) have. Improvements in neighbourhood quality need not 
always attract more affluent households to the area, and such improvements 
do not automatically lead to increases in the price or rent, particularly if 
house-seekers are unaware of the improvements that have taken place. Like-
wise, areas can become less popular and house prices may decline, even if 
the quality of the neighbourhood has remained the same. To elaborate on this 
idea, I draw upon a broad pallet of scientific disciplines, including informa-
tion economics, queuing theory, complexity and auction theory, sociology, so-
cial psychology and geography. The core of my research is based upon main-
stream housing economics and, more specifically, the neoclassical school of 
thought.
 1.2  Economic approach
The value of objects has always been a topic of major importance to econ-
omists. Within the dominant neoclassical branch of economics, value in the 
exchange of goods is given by the equilibrium price (or the equilibrium rent, if 
the good is leased). On a free market, no rational seller (or owner) would vol-
untarily enter an exchange in which the price (rent) is less than the user val-
ue – the value of the good if the owner were to retain possession of it. No ra-
tional buyer (lessee) would willingly accept an offer if the price (rent) exceeds 
the value that the buyer attaches to the good. Neoclassical economists fur-
ther assume that sellers, owners, buyers and lessees are aware of the price, 
rent and user value of every bid or offer that is on the market. Exchanges take 
place among sellers (owners) and buyers (lessees) who cannot find another 
buyer (lessee) who bids more or another seller (owner) who offers the same 
good for a lower price (rent). Whenever a seller’s (owner’s) offer matches the 
buyer’s (lessee’s) bid, equilibrium is reached for that specific exchange of the 
[ 5 ]
good. In the aggregate, all bids and offers are balanced by equilibrium prices 
and rents, so that the market as a whole clears. 
The unlimited ability to rank all offers and bids and to select the best one 
out of the many alternatives means that agents’ preferences are revealed in 
their individual and collective choices. The revealed preference models of 
housing economists have contributed to the understanding of land-use pat-
terns (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969), residential mobility (McFadden, 
1978; Nordvik, 2001), housing demand and housing supply (Poterba, 1984; Di-
Pasquale and Wheaton, 1992 and 1994), tenure choice (Ioannides, 1999), main-
tenance levels (Arnott and Braid, 1997) and the determination of house prices 
and market rents (Colwell, 2002; Harding et al., 2003). Perhaps the single most 
important contribution of housing economics is the notion that house price 
or market rent can be explained by the attributes of the dwelling and neigh-
bourhood alone (Rosen, 1974). 
The value of the actual dwelling poses less of a problem to housing econo-
mists. Although tenants, homeowners and landlords may hold differing opin-
ions regarding the user value of a dwelling, they largely agree on the sellers’ 
and landlords’ willingness to accept and the buyers’ and tenants’ willingness 
to pay for each attribute of the actual dwelling. Researchers find it more dif-
ficult to explain how attributes of the surrounding area influence choice be-
haviour, but less so in the case of a household’s decision to leave its home. 
Although most push effects that neighbourhoods can have on households 
have been identified (e.g. Bartik et al., 1992), measurement problems can ob-
scure the exact strength and range of the effects (Openshaw, 1984). The same 
attributes that cause neighbourhood push, however, explain less when they 
are considered as pull factors in the destination choices of house-seekers. An 
increase in neighbourhood quality makes an area more attractive, and this 
should (at least in the short term) increase housing demand, house prices 
and market rents. In practice, this seemingly obvious relationship is more ob-
scure than neoclassical theory predicts it to be (Atkinson and Crocker, 1987; 
Kauko, 2002). 
The main conceptual difference between the dwelling and the neighbour-
hood is obviously related to space. The dwelling’s location is fixed in space 
and time, and the attributes of the actual dwelling collapse into this point. 
Neighbourhood quality is based on a ‘bundle of spatially-based attributes as-
sociated with clusters of residences’ (Galster, 2001), which can change their 
location in the course of time. Space has entered housing economics in two 
ways. First, the distance between the home and workplace, school and oth-
er key activity places is accompanied by travel costs, which must be incorpo-
rated into the value of the dwelling (Alonso, 1964). Second, advances in da-
ta collection and GIS technology have fuelled the development of method-
ologies that have improved the estimation of housing choices and prices or 
rents within a spatial context (Anselin, 1999). If anything, the methodological 
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advances have underlined the ambiguity of neighbourhood pull as opposed 
to neighbourhood push. My argument is that this ambiguity results from the 
subjectivity that is inherent in the assessment of neighbourhood quality. The 
perception of neighbourhood quality is defined by both the experience that a 
household has had there and, the distance between the home and the neigh-
bourhood. 
 1.3 Informational asymmetry 
Understanding why neighbourhood value can be so difficult to predict re-
quires the realisation that space imposes informational limits on the knowl-
edge that households have regarding the housing market. Existing tenants, 
homeowners or landlords know everything they need to know about circum-
stances in their own dwellings, streets, blocks and neighbourhoods. They 
should encounter few problems in assessing the user value of the neighbour-
hood and its attributes. Once they observe the sales price or rent of dwellings 
in the vicinity, they learn about the exchange value of their neighbourhood. 
These ‘insiders’ have a particular advantage over ‘outsiders’ in one domain. 
Residents experience those aspects of housing quality that are most prone to 
change, least tangible and hardest to observe. The socio-economic and demo-
graphic attributes in the area are lost on most outsiders, as are the quality 
and availability of shops, schools and other local services, all of which shape 
a large part of the living experience. 
House-seekers lack experience with the places in which their new homes 
are located, for the simple reason that they live elsewhere. They have to know 
beforehand in which areas they are going to conduct their residential search. 
Both types of information – knowledge about the experience of living in a 
particular location and knowledge about where to find a particular location 
– come at a cost. By necessity, house-seekers restrict the space within which 
they search (Huff, 1986) and the amount of information that they collect on 
various locations. They are likely to forego better options because they looked 
in the wrong place (Wolpert, 1966), and they do not enter negotiations with 
the opposite party in the exchange on the same footing (Merlo and Ortalo-
Magné, 2004). The less a house-seeker knows about the new neighbourhood, 
the greater is the risk that the buyer (or renter) will acquire a ‘lemon’ (Akerlof, 
1970) – a dwelling whose user value falls well short of its price (or rent). 
One risk-minimising strategy is to limit the search to neighbourhoods 
that have ‘prestige’ or ‘status’ (Kauko, 2007), and to shun neighbourhoods 
that are seen as ‘ethnic’ or ‘poor’ (Ellen, 2000). These labels are superficial 
‘brand names’ or reputations (Bettman, 1979), which reveal something about 
the quality (or the persistence thereof) of the area as opposed to other plac-
es (Stigler, 1961). These labels, however, do not go into detail about the exact 
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causes of differences in quality. While inspection leaves little room for disa-
greement on the quality of the dwelling and most tangible attributes of the 
neighbourhood, disagreement may arise in the assessment of unobservable 
attributes of the neighbourhood. For lack of a better measure, some house-
seekers equate such unobservable quality with the reputation of a neighbour-
hood. Others are able to improve upon this incomplete and possibly biased 
information. For example, social ties in the area can provide access to resi-
dents’ inside view of the neighbourhood. The more that is known about the 
neighbourhood, the more the house-seeker’s destination choice can converge 
on the fully informed choice of the archetypical neoclassical household.
The neoclassical assumption of full information does not account for the 
different perspectives that house-seekers have on neighbourhood quali-
ty. House-seekers are assumed to possess the same level of experience that 
residents gather in the course of time. Noting that this assumption appears 
untenable, several authors have introduced an informational asymmetry be-
tween the buyers and sellers of dwellings into search models (Pope, 2008; 
Droës and Hassink, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2009; Díaz and Jerez, 2009; De Wit and 
Van der Klauw, 2010). Others have highlighted the incomplete transmission of 
information on the quality of offers in the preceding search stage (Wheaton, 
1990, Arnott and Igarashi, 2000; Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004). This research 
focuses on buyers’ lack of knowledge regarding the user value of a dwelling 
prior to inspection, as well as on uncertainties regarding the bargaining pow-
er of the opposite party in the exchange. The propositions tested by these au-
thors concern the division of the bargaining surplus – the difference between 
the list and sales price – and the time that the offer remains on the market.1
My study does not address disagreements among buyers and sellers regard-
ing the price or rent of vacant dwellings, nor is time on the market important 
to the argument.2 The most important elements in this study are the various 
notions that house-seekers have regarding the quality of an offer. In a the-
oretical paper that is related to my work, Berliant and Yu (2009) build infor-
mational constraints into a spatial equilibrium model for the housing mar-
ket. They conclude that price reflects the buyer’s willingness to pay, assum-
ing that the buyer may not be fully informed about the quality of the offer up-
on making the purchase. Although less rigid in a theoretical sense, my work 
extends the work of Berliant and Yu by adding a spatial dimension to the in-
formational asymmetry between the suppliers of dwellings and new tenants 
or buyers. The observable quality of a dwelling yields the same price (or rent) 
in my approach as in the full information equilibrium. In contrast, its unob-
1 The bargaining surplus is defined by the difference between the seller’s reservation price and the buyer’s maxi-
mum bid. Unlike their proxies (i.e. list and sales prices), these prices are not observed. 
2 In my work, time is relevant, albeit it in a different context. Later in this study, it is shown that well-informed 
tenants or buyers can substitute gains in housing quality for shorter waiting times for their preferred dwellings.
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servable quality receives a common exchange value across a geographical 
submarket, regardless of local differences in unobservable quality. Less-in-
formed house-seekers can not distinguish between offers that are underval-
ued or overvalued on a geographical submarket of the housing market. Well-
informed house-seekers, in turn, can use their informational advantage to se-
lect the offers that yield the best user value for their money on each submar-
ket. As such, the less informed are left with offers that are more likely to be 
overpriced, thereby receiving less housing quality in return for their bids. 
In this thesis, I try to answer two questions in order to determine whether 
the neglect of an informational asymmetry in the knowledge of unobservable 
quality of neighbourhoods is indeed a shortcoming of standard housing eco-
nomics. 
Is the posited knowledge gap between residents and uninformed house-
seekers visible in their respective valuations of neighbourhoods on the social 
rental market? 
If so, does this informational asymmetry carry over to the owner-occupied 
market as well? In other words, do neighbourhood reputations affect house 
prices? 
 1.4  Neighbourhood value 
This thesis is an attempt to explain how various types of agents carry out 
their valuation of neighbourhoods and how their assessments (which could 
be erroneous) affect their housing choices. Valuation by residents serves as 
the benchmark. In accordance with neoclassical thought, existing tenants 
and homeowners are assumed to possess nearly full information on their 
home surroundings. I use a socio-psychological concept as a short-cut in or-
der to measure insiders’ user value of their surroundings: neighbourhood 
satisfaction or residents’ subjective valuation of the quality of life experi-
ence (Speare, 1974). The second variable that is used to measure neighbour-
hood quality is house price or, to be more accurate, the assessment value of 
the dwelling. The price differential between identical but spatially separated 
dwellings reflects the assessments of outsiders (i.e. realtors and buyers) re-
garding differences in the quality of locations. When applied to exits in the 
social rental sector in the city of Rotterdam (Netherlands), low neighbourhood 
satisfaction and low house price are shown to be important push factors for 
tenants. Neighbourhood satisfaction reflects the push effect of the unobserv-
able attributes of a neighbourhood on social tenants, and house price largely 
reflects the push effects of observable attributes.
Neighbourhood satisfaction and house price also figure into the selection of 
new homes by tenants on the same market. I extend the geographic account 
of the residential search process (Brown and Moore, 1970; Smith et al., 1979; 
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Huff, 1986) to include the assessment of neighbourhoods by house-seeking 
tenants. Analysis of the destination choices of tenants answers one of the 
key questions of the thesis. Upon moving to a new home, many tenants are 
only partially aware of the quality of the surrounding neighbourhood. More 
than half of all new tenants did not consider the inside view of the neigh-
bourhood held by existing tenants (as reflected in neighbourhood satisfac-
tion) in their destination choices. Throughout the thesis, I assume that house-
holds display ‘satisficing’ behaviour (Simon, 1991). Like the archetypical neo-
classical agent, satisficing agents act rationally, but when faced with informa-
tional, institutional or cognitive constraints they sometimes chose outcomes 
that are less than optimal from the viewpoint of neoclassical agents. Under 
this axiom, new tenants may overlook areas where the most preferred offers 
are found. But they must have realised that the use of inside information in 
neighbourhoods where they did search, would have resulted in gains in util-
ity. The crude destination choices made by half of all tenants must there-
fore have been the result of their relative ignorance about certain aspects of 
neighbourhood quality. 
The choice to focus on social tenants in the second part of this thesis was 
motivated by the ample availability of data on the Dutch social rental mar-
ket. More importantly, the social rental sector provides an experimental set-
ting for analysing the role of asymmetric information on the housing market. 
Although the owner-occupied market in the Netherlands is expanding, sup-
ply at the lower end of the market is dominated by not-for-profit associations, 
with a small portion of the stock in the hands of private landlords. Rent con-
trols, which apply to privately owned stock as well, and discounts provided 
by the associations yield regulated rent levels that are usually below the mar-
ket rent. The rent gap has little to do with the actual dwelling. The neighbour-
hood is most likely to be undervalued on the Dutch social rental market (Van 
Ommeren and Koopman, 2011). Because social stock remains available in at-
tractive city neighbourhoods, relocating tenants are able to realise gains in 
utility without paying additional rent.
Another interesting feature of the Dutch social rental market is the trans-
parency of the system with which dwellings are distributed. Information-
gathering is associated with the efforts of tenants to learn about the quali-
ty of offers, rather than on their efforts to find the offers. Set against the high 
potential gains in place-utility and low costs of searching within the distri-
bution system are excessive risks in the acceptance of an offer. Upon accept-
ance, a tenant must return to the end of the ‘queue’ for social rental dwell-
ings and must remain in a possibly undesirable dwelling for several years. The 
high opportunity cost of selecting a lemon should create a strong incentive to 
gather information on the new neighbourhood. The Dutch social rental sec-
tor appears to be especially suited for house-seekers who are well informed 
about their new neighbourhoods. The pool of house-seekers is supplement-
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ed by other house-seekers (e.g. inter-urban movers) who know little about the 
places in which their next homes are located. 
The segmentation of the Dutch housing market is an additional complica-
tion. Transitions between the owner-occupied and rental segments are rare on 
both the supply and the demand side. Results obtained from the social rental 
market do not necessarily carry over to the owner-occupied market. As an al-
ternative way of identifying a possible informational asymmetry on the own-
er-occupied market, the relationship between neighbourhood reputation and 
house price is investigated. Sellers in deprived areas have an incentive to over-
state the user value of their offers by increasing the price. Poorly informed 
buyers may resort to neighbourhood reputation as a simple rule of thumb for 
assessing the unobservable quality of an offer. Because overpriced dwellings 
are believed to be scarcer in areas with good reputations, ill-informed buyers 
tend to be drawn to such areas. If the demand in an area is dominated by ill-
informed buyers, the neighbourhood’s ‘name’ should affect house prices in the 
same way that ‘brand name’ adds value to PCs (Pakes, 2003), consumer elec-
tronics (Holbrook, 1992) or cars (Baltas and Saridakis, 2010). 
The analysis of spatial house-price patterns in Rotterdam answers the sec-
ond key question of the thesis: neighbourhood reputation is a relevant factor 
in the appraisal of housing quality, and by assumption, the neighbourhood’s 
name is priced accordingly on the owner-occupied market. 
 1.5  Purpose of the thesis
Housing economists could benefit from my approach, which assumes that 
addressing space in choice behaviour requires more than simply improving 
the methodology. In the same way that households optimise their choices in 
time, they optimise their choices across space. The design of spatial models 
for the housing market that go beyond a simple distance-based treatment of 
space is still in an early phase.3 Constraints that space imposes on the search 
and choice behaviour of households can be integrated into existing models, 
3 Spatial models for the housing market have not ventured far beyond the seminal work of Alonso (1964), Mills 
(1967) and Muth (1969), which generated the mono-centric city model, in which commuting time is linked to 
land rents. Some additions to this model are the inclusion of search and transaction costs (Rouwendal,1998), 
issues of control over public services and economies of scale herein (Brasington, 2004), land-use regulation (Qui-
gley and Raphael, 2005), non-residential land use (Rossi-Hansberg, 2004) and agglomeration benefits (Glaeser 
and Gottlieb, 2009). Attempts to relax the full information axiom in housing economics include search models 
(e.g. Wheaton, 1990) and the spatial equilibrium model of Berliant and Yu (2009). The development of spatial 
models for the housing market within the field of economics continues to lag behind the developments in other 
fields, as with simulation models in urban geography (see Benenson and Torrence, 2004) or regional planning 
models (see Van Oort et al., 2005). One reason is that the choice problem has to be solved in space and time, 
which makes analytical solutions harder to obtain than iterative solutions (Maier, 1991) 
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or researchers could devise clever ways of working around these constraints.4 
In this thesis, I have opted for the second approach. Despite my original focus 
on households’ perception of space, my work should not be seen as a com-
plete overhaul of standard housing economics or its methodology. It is merely 
an attempt to identify the limits that space introduces into choice behaviour 
and to clarify how these limitations affect the estimation of revealed prefer-
ence models for the housing market. 
In my approach, spatial constraints lead to the use of incomplete informa-
tion by some house-seekers. Models for the destination or residential location 
choices of households yield different results in estimation, depending upon 
the informational advantage (or disadvantage) that the sampled households 
have. Households with longer length of stay in a city and denser social net-
works, those who move over shorter distances and those who put more ef-
fort into gathering information should be able to make destination choices 
that approach the full information outcome of standard economic theory. The 
choices of less-informed households diverge from this optimal solution, as 
their perceptions of the range and strength of neighbourhood pull effects are 
less accurate than are those of well-informed households. The estimated pull 
effects of the ‘soft’ socio-economic or demographic neighbourhood variables 
in existing models of destination (and residential location) choice should be 
treated with particular scepticism, as the applications are based on indiscrim-
inate samples of households, whose information can range from the exact in-
side view to superficial reputation. 
Geographers and sociologists should not be surprised by the notion that 
households experience space in a subjective manner (Corpataux and Crevoi-
sier, 2007). This thesis might nonetheless be of interest to such scholars, as 
it introduces them to the rigorous treatment that is the mainstay of hous-
ing economists. One contribution that this study makes to the wider field of 
urban studies is of a more practical nature. The area-specific effects that are 
used to control for unobserved attributes or spatial autocorrelation are more 
than simply a methodological tool (Bourassa et al., 2003, 2007). The area dum-
mies can embody the value of a neighbourhood’s ‘name’ as a separate quality 
characteristic of a dwelling. When observations are aggregated over arbitrarily 
defined areal units, the spatial variation inside each unit is lost. This ‘modifi-
able areal unit problem’ is thought to hinder the estimation of neighbourhood 
push and pull effects (Openshaw, 1984). In drawing upon reputation, howev-
4 Several contributions in the literature do consider heterogeneous choice behaviour by differentiating between 
unanticipated and anticipated moves (Kan, 1999), between forced or voluntary moves (Timmermans et al., 1996) 
or between high and low availability of suitable offers (De Palma et al., 2007). The methodology used in these 
applications (i.e. discrete choice models with random or fixed effects in the coefficients on explanatory variables) 
could be applied to the difference between well-informed and ill-informed movers, which is prevalent throughout 
this thesis.
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er, households adopt the same aggregation bias. A simple area dummy could 
thus be better suited to explain the pull on households than are sophisticat-
ed measurements of neighbourhood attributes. My analysis also stresses the 
importance of addressing the circular relationship in house prices (or rent) 
and residential sorting.5 Mere expectations can trigger the selective arrival 
of households, a corresponding rise or fall in the price, confirmation of the 
neighbourhood’s good or bad name and further selective inflow to the area.
Planners, developers and professionals working on the broader issue of 
housing may be particularly interested in the final chapter of this thesis. In 
the epilogue, the results from the preceding chapters are used to reflect on 
the methodological issues mentioned above, as well as on several policy is-
sues that concern the housing market in the Netherlands and, by extension, 
in other developed economies. Why does urban restructuring often fail to 
change the social makeup of an area, despite a marked increase in owner-
occupation? Why does gentrification appear to emerge spontaneously, while 
purposeful attempts to gentrify an area often fail? What direction should the 
reforms of the Dutch social rental market preferably take? Given the empha-
sis on the societal benefits of mixed-income neighbourhoods, is it fair to state 
that some of the costs of residential integration have been neglected by re-
searchers and policy-makers alike? 
The answers that the standard economic treatment of the housing market 
would offer to these questions are by no means attenuated by the approach 
that I take in this thesis. The empirical results suggest that tenants exercise 
a fair degree of rationality in their decisions to leave their old homes and in 
their choices of new homes. Residential location and destination choices do 
however diverge from the outcomes predicted by neo-classical economists, as 
households face constraints in relocating and in gathering information dur-
ing the search for a new home. Improving the flow of information to tenants 
and homeowners is likely to improve their housing choices to some extent. 
The analysis asserts that it is in the best interest of both homeowners and so-
cial tenants for governments and semi-governmental bodies to increase the 
freedom of choice on the housing market by lifting restrictions on the exact 
timing and destination of relocations. 
 
5 Two-stage models that treat the pricing mechanism and residential sorting as related processes (Bayer et al., 
2004; Bayer and Ross, 2006) are better suited for addressing such ‘endogeneity’ than are standard house price 
models and destination or residential location choice models.
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 1.6 Outline of the thesis
In the first part of this thesis, I specify the theoretical framework upon which 
the five empirical chapters that follow are founded. Lay readers might want 
to skip the technical expositions in this chapter. The framework allows for the 
derivation of exit and destination choice models, aggregate demand for dwell-
ings, bid for a vacant dwelling and hedonic house price equation. The space-
imposed constraints on the ability to gather information on distant neigh-
bourhoods are discussed and incorporated into this framework. The use of in-
complete information yields several conjectures regarding the size and shape 
of the pull that the neighbourhood exerts on house-seekers. Several of these 
conjectures are validated in the regression analyses in Chapters 3 to 7. Regu-
lation on the Dutch housing market is also addressed, as are the constraints 
that households face because of such regulation, as the revealed preference 
models of standard economics are primarily designed to explain housing 
choices on a free market.
The second part of this thesis addresses residential mobility on the social 
rental market. The section begins in Chapter 3, with an investigation of the 
exit choices of social tenants in Rotterdam. Scores for neighbourhood sat-
isfaction are first ‘kriged’ in order to obtain the shared notion that all resi-
dents (including non-respondents) have of the quality of their surroundings.6 
The addition of this inside view to a discrete choice model of the likelihood to 
move yields an estimate of the neighbourhood’s user value for residents. The 
assessment value of the dwelling is used as a proxy measure for house price. 
It controls for the observable quality of the neighbourhood and brings differ-
ences in the valuation of the neighbourhood on the social rented and owner-
occupied segment of the market to the foreground. The discrepancy between 
the two factors (i.e. low willingness to pay of tenants for high-priced neigh-
bourhoods) reveals inefficiencies that the social rental market introduces on-
to the owner-occupied market. The main purpose of the regression in Chapter 
3, however, is to assess the strength and scale of neighbourhood push effects 
on the social rental market in Rotterdam.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I discuss the destination choices of tenants on the 
same housing market, although the regressions centre on their aggregate de-
mand and individual bids for dwellings. A count model for the net number of 
responses to vacancies (a proxy for aggregate demand) is estimated in Chap-
ter 4. This stated preference model tells whether tenants have extended their 
knowledge of the neighbourhood beyond its reputation. In Chapter 5, a re-
vealed preference model for the waiting time for a dwelling (a proxy for the 
6 Kriging is a geostatistical technique in which the values of observations are smoothed across the spatial plain, 
such that the unobserved value at another location can be interpolated from known values (Stein, 1999).
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tenant’s bid for the dwelling) identifies tenants who were either well or poor-
ly informed about neighbourhoods. The main purpose of the regressions is to 
compare the strength and scale of the pull effects of the neighbourhood with 
those of the corresponding push effects on the same housing market. If the 
information that the average house-seeker has is less complete than that of 
residents, the neighbourhood pull effects cover an area that is likely to ex-
tend beyond the scale that residents have in mind. Furthermore, the inside 
view is likely to play a lesser role in the destination choices of ill-informed 
tenants than it does in the exit choices of residents. The results show that 
tenants who stood to lose little by selecting a lemon (e.g. because of their low 
rank in the distribution system or their prior homelessness) acted in ways 
that suggest that they knew less about their new neighbourhoods than did 
tenants who faced riskier destination choices. 
The third part of the thesis focuses on the valuation of neighbourhoods by 
owner-occupiers. Hedonic house price and repeat sales models are the stand-
ard methodology for explaining price differentials, and I do not stray from 
this convention. An indirect method for proving that buyers make use of rep-
utations is by detecting jumps in house prices near the administrative bound-
aries of neighbourhoods. Most neighbourhood attributes work in an isotrop-
ic fashion. Their push and pull effects exhibit a smooth pattern of decay 
across the spatial plain. Sudden jumps in price that occur near neighbour-
hood boundaries could be caused by changes in the name of the area. The 
boundary analysis in Chapter 6 reveals the occurrence of many price jumps 
[ 15 ]
on the Rotterdam owner-occupied market that can be explained neither by 
improvements in housing quality nor by increases in owner-occupation. This 
constitutes proof by exclusion, as some unobserved aspect (e.g. assessors’ bi-
as) could have been responsible for the price hikes. Changes in house pric-
es in an area due to annexation by an adjacent, affluent (and better reputed) 
neighbourhood provide additional proof of the role of reputation in value as-
sessments and by assumption in price-setting. This more direct evidence of 
informational asymmetry on the owner-occupied market is offered in a case 
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                   2  Space and the housing 
market
            2.1  Introduction
Neoclassical housing economists have produced revealed preference mod-
els for nearly every conceivable relationship on the housing market. Although 
these models can be viewed in isolation, they are a part of a single, unified 
framework for the housing market. In this chapter, I show how the exit choic-
es of residents, the bids that households make for vacant dwellings, the des-
tination choices of house-seekers, the aggregate demand for dwellings and 
the hedonic house price equation can be derived from the neoclassical frame-
work. This framework is built upon the assumption that households hold full 
information on every attribute of the dwelling and the surrounding neigh-
bourhood. The empirical literature , however, contains several inconsistencies 
that suggest that many house-seekers have less than complete knowledge of 
the neighbourhood to which they move. 
I argue that the knowledge that house-seekers possess ranges from the ex-
act inside view of residents to the superficial reputation of the area. Poorly in-
formed house-seekers are at a disadvantage relative to the suppliers of dwell-
ings when assessing the quality of offers in distant neighbourhoods. The use 
of the neighbourhood reputation acts as both a simple rule of thumb for as-
sessing neighbourhood quality and a strategy for overcoming the informa-
tional disadvantage. Later in this work, this process is illustrated by a simula-
tion model in which the reputational bias in favour of or against an area pro-
duces the outcome that is implied by the area’s reputation: areas with poor 
reputations become deprived over time, while areas that are deemed attrac-
tive become just that. 
I begin by showing how the models that are estimated in the chapters that 
follow, can be derived from the neoclassical framework. I make an occasional 
reference to contributions that address some of the intricacies of the frame-
work. I then discuss how the pull effects of the neighbourhood in destination 
choice models differ from the corresponding push effects in exit choice mod-
els. The difference between neighbourhood push and pull is argued to be the 
result of the use of incomplete information by some house-seekers. A simu-
lation model and a housing transactions model illustrate how information-
al asymmetry between the participants in the exchange of dwellings affects 
residential sorting and the price-setting mechanism. According to the models, 
the use of neighbourhood reputations by tenants and buyers generates dif-
ferences in residential mobility and spatial discontinuities in house prices or 
market rent. The validity of the conjectures on the choice behaviour of house-
seekers and the spatial patterns in house prices are listed at the end of this 
chapter and tested in the regression analyses in the chapters that follow.
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 2.2   The neoclassical housing market 
Full information, arbitrage and atomistic behaviour by self-interested agents 
are the cornerstones of neoclassical thinking (Stigler, 1961). Full information 
entails that utility-maximising households and profit-maximising producers 
can recognise, rank and value all offers and bids for goods on the market. Arbi-
trage, which refers to the unlimited ability to buy a good and sell it on a differ-
ent market, guarantees that each offer or bid can be compared to other offers 
and bids, even if they are separated in space and time. Atomistic behaviour, in 
which households and producers act on their own accord, ensures that indi-
vidual exchanges lead to an equilibrium in the aggregate. Taken together, these 
axioms are so strict that critics from both within and outside the realm of eco-
nomics have stated that neoclassical economics deals with a utopian world 
(Simon, 1991; Weintraub, 2002). Although this criticism is essentially correct, it 
belittles the achievements and belies the meaning of neoclassical economics. 
First, the neoclassical approach unifies individual choices and the aggre-
gate outcome within a single framework that links the market to the rest of 
the economy. No other school of economic thought or field of study has been 
able to derive such an all-encompassing and concise description of choice be-
haviour from its axioms. Second, the critics are arguably too strict in their in-
terpretation when stating that the neoclassical framework describes the re-
al world. On most markets, at least one of the neoclassical axioms will not 
be met. Neo-classical economists describe what the outcome would be if 
their axioms did apply to the market. The discrepancy between the actual 
state and the idealised equilibrium helps to identify factors that impede the 
free exchange of goods. The framework, however, does not necessarily draw 
any normative conclusions regarding the need to remove the impediments 
when the free market outcome is deemed unacceptable from a non-econom-
ic standpoint. Finally, Neoclassicists have been reasonably successful in ex-
plaining choice behaviour in cases in which their axioms are only partially 
met. The regulated Dutch housing market, which is the subject of the empiri-
cal analysis in the second and third part of this thesis, presents such a case.
Although Mankiw and Weil (1989) laid some of the groundwork and Fisher 
(1992) reached a similar outcome independently, the neoclassical framework 
for the housing market is usually credited to DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992 
and 1994). In their approach, prices and rents adjust in time and space to cre-
ate long-run equilibrium between the supply of and demand for identical 
dwellings. On the supply side, landlords sell, buy or let property, constructors 
maintain, renovate or build dwellings and developers, who act as intermedi-
aries, sell the dwellings in order to maximise their profits. On the demand 
side, utility-maximising households remain in or leave their current homes, 
select new homes from the available vacancies, shift from renting to owner-
occupation (or vice versa) and commission constructors to maintain or reno-
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vate their homes.7 Individual housing choices add up to the supply of and de-
mand for dwellings. The equality of aggregate demand and supply yields the 
equilibrium stock, price and rent, which can be taken as given in the individu-
al choices of suppliers and households.
The unlimited ability of landlords to change from letting to selling (or to 
buy property and let it out) equalises the profits from activities on the hous-
ing market and from holding other assets (upper-left quadrant in Figure 2.1; 
Poterba, 1984).8 High prices or rent induce landlords and developers (if dwell-
ings are sold directly to households) to order contractors to construct new 
dwellings (lower-left quadrant). The addition to the housing stock is the sur-
plus of construction over demolition, the latter being a fixed depreciation rate 
on the existing stock (lower-right quadrant). Supply is fixed in the short run, 
due to the time lag in construction, but long-run supply is an upward-sloping 
function of the rent and price (upper-right quadrant). The aggregate demand 
on a housing submarket equals the number of households living in the sub-
7 Throughout this thesis, the household is considered as the unit of interest. For a discussion on the joint 
decision-making by members of the same household, see Molin (1999).
8 For landlords, the after-tax proceeds from the sale of a dwelling equal the discounted flow of rents minus taxes 
and the costs of control and maintenance. Arbitrage on the demand side entails that the rent equals the user 
costs of owner-occupation. The latter are defined as the sum of interest payments on mortgage debt, the costs of 
maintenance, repair and assurance, property taxes and the opportunity cost of holding the dwelling as an asset, 
minus subsidies and gains from the expected appreciation of the dwelling (Diewert, 2003).
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market, which can change due to household formation, mortality and chang-
es in residential location demand (Maisel, 1963). Higher rents and prices make 
entry into the submarket more difficult and exits more likely, such that ag-
gregate demand is a downward-sloping function of the rent (upper-right 
quadrant). Equilibrium conditions are given by the rent R* and price P* that 
equalise demand and supply at the stock level HS*.
Changing circumstances can make the current housing situation subopti-
mal. Suppose that large-scale demolition takes place in an area adjacent to 
the submarket depicted in Figure 2.1. This would increase the desire to en-
ter the submarket and limit the ability to leave it. Excess demand generates a 
temporary disequilibrium in which the stock remains constant, but the price 
and rent increase. If the shift in demand is transitory (because dwellings are 
being rebuilt in the adjacent area), the market will return to the old equilibri-
um (trajectory A-B-A in Figure 2.2). If the shift in demand is permanent, high-
er price will lead to new construction. The stock will increase and a new equi-
librium will emerge, in which the price and rent are higher than in the old 
equilibrium, but lower than in the disequilibrium (A-B-C in Figure 2.3). It is 
important to note that agents eventually learn what the long-run price, rent 
and stock are going to be. In applying this knowledge, agents guide the mar-
ket towards the equilibrium, precisely because they are acting on full infor-
mation and in an atomistic fashion.9
9 The time lag in construction may lead to a less-than-smooth adjustment process. If supply decisions are made 
before the new price is known, the market will oscillate towards the equilibrium (Kaldor, 1934). See also the 
discussion on overshooting.
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The framework presented in Figure 2.1 and its dynamics, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, tell only half of the story. It is not just supply that is fixed in the 
short run; rigid contract rents can make transitory vacancies more profitable 
than occupancy (Rosen and Smith, 1983). Some landlords will withhold dwell-
ings from the market if they anticipate an increase in rent (Colwell, 2002). In 
a similar vein, owner-occupiers will withhold dwellings if they anticipate an 
increase in price (Poterba, 1984). The speculative actions of owner-occupiers 
and landlords can lead to a situation in which the vacancy rate – the share of 
the stock that is put on the market – drops below its ‘natural’ level: the level 
needed to accommodate house-seekers’ search for an offer, landlords’ search 
for tenants and sellers’ search for buyers (Wheaton, 1990). Rents and prices 
tend to ‘overshoot’, even when their equilibrium values are common knowl-
edge (De Leeuw and Ekanem, 1973). In general, the house price or market rent 
will be a non-linear function of the factors shaping the supply of and demand 
for housing. Aside from this non-linearity, the possibility of speculative be-
haviour does not alter the essence of the framework developed by DiPasquale 
and Wheaton (Collwell, 2002).
 2.3  Introducing housing quality: hedonic house 
prices
Thus far, the framework has addressed only quantities: the supply of and 
demand for identical dwellings. It is physically impossible, however, for two 
dwellings to occupy the same location, if that location is defined in three-di-
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mensional space. Dwelling can thus never be identical. Furthermore, house-
holds earn different levels of income and have idiosyncratic tastes for hous-
ing (Arnott, 1989). Any realistic model of the housing market should account 
for heterogeneity in both the stock and the preferences of households. Rosen 
(1974) found an elegant solution for comparing the prices of imperfectly sub-
stitutable goods on a market with heterogeneous agents. I have adapted his 
model slightly by identifying sellers as existing homeowners rather than as 
construction firms, bearing in mind that the Dutch housing market is quin-
tessentially a ‘stock market’, in which the price of new construction is de-
fined by transactions in the much larger existing stock (Boelhouwer et al., 
2006).
Let the quality of a dwelling be defined by the bundle of attributes z of the 
actual dwelling and the neighbourhood. The greater the quantity of an at-
tribute, the better is the specification of dwelling. If a household enters the 
market for the first time, it spends its income y on housing – through the pur-
chase of a dwelling with price p(z) – and on the consumption of other goods 
x. Homeowners remaining on the submarket have the option of remaining in 
their current home with specification ż and spending their entire income on 
other goods, or selling their dwelling at price p(ż) and buying a new one at 
price p(z), while spending the remainder on other goods. Households must 
maximize their concave utility with respect to the housing bundle and other 
goods.10 Prices of other goods are normalised to unity, such that the maximi-
sation problem of a homeless person who becomes a first-time buyer reads as 
follows:
(2.1a) xzpytszxUMax zx += )(  ..  ),( ,  
and that of a homeowner who decides to move as follows:
(2.1b) xzpzpytszxUMax zx +=+ )()(    ..  ),( , &
The solution to this problem is obtained by substituting y-p(z) or y+p(ż)-p(z) 
for x and taking the derivative of (2.1a) and (2.1b) with respect to z, and then 

















The first-order condition in formula (2.2) states that housing consumption 
10 Concavity means that the first derivative of the utility function is positive and the second derivative negative.
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must be increased until the marginal utility of a higher housing consumption 
(second term) is offset by the marginal disutility from a lower consumption 
of other goods (first term). The first-order condition (and second-order con-
dition, which is omitted for the sake of brevity) solves the optimal consump-
tion path for the household. Along this path, the consumption of housing and 
of other goods decreases with house price, increases with income and, in the 
case of a seller, increases with the endowment from the sale of the old home. 
The household’s bid function θ is defined as the expenditure on housing for 
every level of income at the highest attainable utility level u*. 
(2.3a) * ),( uzyU =−θ
(2.3b) * )),(( uzzpyU =+− &θ  
The bid function is a concave function of the housing bundle z. A household 
is willing to pay more for higher housing quality, albeit at a decreasing rate: 
greater consumption of housing means less consumption of other goods. In 
equilibrium, the willingness to pay for the dwelling equals the price request-
ed by the seller:
(2.4a) )(   ),,( * zpyuz ≡θ
(2.4b) )(   ))(,,( * zpzpyuz ≡+ &θ
In the model, all vacancies are filled instantaneously, as the number of 
households is assumed equal to the stock. Room for relocation is made by the 
exogenous exits from the submarket and the offers of homeowners who are 
exchanging dwellings.11 Arbitrage ensures that sellers leaving the market can 
ask the same price as transferring homeowners. Sellers take the bid price for 
their offers as given, provided that it exceeds the endowment needed for a 
homeowner to consider a move in the first place (i.e. p(ż)≥ p where p is the 
price that makes him indifferent between staying or moving:
U(y-θ + p ,z)=U(y,ż)). In equilibrium, the value of the offer ϕ(ż) equals sales 
price for specification ż:
(2.5)  pzpzpz ≥≡ )( if  )()( &&&ϕ   
By keeping all other attributes z* in the housing bundle fixed, the quality of a 
dwelling can be defined by the quantity of attribute z1. The response of buy-
11  In an inter-temporal model, vacancies are needed to allow for movements into and out of dwellings, making 
it necessary to solve for the ‘natural’ vacancy rate (1-N/HS) first (Wheaton, 1990).
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ers and sellers to slight changes in housing quality is depicted in Figure 2.4. 
The bid functions θi and θj of two buyers are shown as dotted curves. In this 
example, household i has a lower income (or lesser taste for z1) than does 
household j. Each household’s bid is optimised at the point where the willing-
ness to pay for the attribute equals its ‘shadow price’: the implicit exchange 
value on the market. The envelope P(z1,z*) connects the bids for every quan-
tity of z1. The figure also shows the offers ϕm and ϕn, in which seller n is en-
dowed with a higher-quality dwelling than seller m.12
Whenever the bid of a buyer matches a seller’s offer, equilibrium is reached 
for that specific exchange of the attribute.13
The two-dimensional envelope depicted in Figure 2.4 exists in as many di-
mensions as there are housing attributes, plus one. The multi-dimensional 
envelope P(z1,z2,…zK) is called the ‘hedonic house price function’: the sched-
ule that balances the exchange of housing attributes. One important conclu-
sion from Rosen’s work is that the prices of heterogeneous dwellings can be 
combined into a single equation. The most common formulation for the he-
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where Log(P) denotes the logarithm of the price, β0 is the constant term, βk are 
the coefficients on each of the K attributes of the dwelling proper and δl are 
the coefficients on the L attributes of the neighbourhood. Housing preferenc-
es are embedded in the market’s implicit valuation of each attribute, which is 
measured by the relevant coefficient in the equation. As such, the research-
er need not observe the characteristics of individual buyers and sellers in or-
der to estimate the model: all households must pay the same amount for an 
attribute, regardless of their idiosyncratic taste for housing, their income or 
wealth and their other characteristics.14
A bid function is estimated in an alternative setting (i.e. the social rental 
market) in Chapter 5. The waiting time for an offer is substituted there for 
12 In Rosen’s formulation, suppliers (i.e. firms) face increasing costs of construction. The offer curves will then 
be concave functions of housing quality rather than being the fixed points in Figure 2.4.
13 Matters on the housing market are more complicated than this. Buyers usually attach a higher user value to a 
good when they become the owners of it (Hanemann, 1991), the price equals the willingness to pay of the second 
bid in auction-type exchanges (Klemperer, 2003), and the sales price depends on the bargaining power of the 
seller relative to that of the buyer in negotiation-type exchanges (Albrecht et al., 2009). In cases in which several 
identical dwellings are offered at once, all buyers except for the marginal buyer will bid less than their user value 
(Bayer and Ross, 2006). 
14 This is yet another simplification of the actual pricing mechanism. Differences in search costs among buyers 
allow for the discriminatory pricing of dwellings with the same user value (Diamond, 1987). In Section 2.9, I 
discuss the role of informational asymmetries, which lead to the exact opposite case: a common price for offers 
with a different user value.
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price; social tenants bid their registration time or duration of stay. A hedonic 
price function is estimated in Chapter 6. It underlies the analysis of the push 
effects and pull effects of the neighbourhood on social tenants in Chapters 3 
to 5, whenever mention is made of the house price residual. The house price 
residual is defined as the share of the price that is explained by attributes 
other than those of the actual dwelling (i.e. log(P)-β0-∑kβkzk). The house price 
residual conforms to the valuation of the neighbourhood by buyers and sell-
ers, but it may contain other effects as well (see Chapter 6). 
 
 2.4  Housing demand and residential mobility
Rosen’s work has led to an innovation in thinking about the housing mar-
ket. The fact that a dwelling can be treated as a bundle of attributes, each of 
which has an equilibrium price, ensures that the optimality of the decision to 
buy or rent a dwelling carries over to the choice of specification of dwelling 
as well. This notion simplifies the construction of revealed preference mod-
els, as well as their interpretation. The aggregate demand for dwellings is de-
rived in a manner similar to that of Rosen (1974). For convenience, I suppress 
the different notation for attributes of the actual dwelling and of the neigh-
bourhood. Given that each attribute has an equilibrium price, expenditure on 
goods can be defined as follows for first-time buyers and homeowners:
(2.7a) )),(()),(()),;(( yzpxyzpzpynbhzpe k
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In these equations, zk is the consumption of each of the K attributes of the 
dwelling and neighbourhood, pk is the shadow price of attribute k and x is the 
consumption of other goods. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that house-
holds do not save, hence expenditure e equals income y. I further assume 
that dwellings differ in the quantity of z1, while the other attributes z* are the 
same. By using x=y-p(z) and taking the first derivative of household’s utility 
at the optimal level u* with respect to shadow price p1, the amount of income 
needed to keep utility at a constant level follows from: 






















































The rise in income needed to keep the household on its optimal consumption 
path is equal to the quantity demanded of attribute z1 (i.e. ∂e(p(z);y)/∂p1= z1 or 





























The quantity demanded of attribute z1, and by extension of overall housing 
quality, equals the drop in utility due to the rise in the attribute’s shadow 
price, divided by the rise in utility due to the compensatory rise in income. 
This result could have been reached immediately by maximizing utility with 
respect to the attribute, subject to the constraints (2.7a) and (2.7b). The so-
lutions in formulas (2.9a) and (2.9b) are better known as Roy’s identity (Var-
15 The indirect effects of prices and income on utility (through z1 and x) cancel each other out on the optimal 
consumption path.
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ian, 1992). They can be extended to a situation in which all attributes are al-
lowed to vary.16 Individual housing demand depends on the shadow prices of 
the housing attributes, the price (or rent) of the dwelling and the characteris-
tics of the household (Ioannides and Zabel, 2003). 
Households’ individual demand for housing must still be converted into the 
aggregate demand for dwellings. If the specification of dwelling is denoted 
as (z1,z*), then households who consume z1 make up the target group for this 
specification. Let n(z1) denote the fraction of households who demand z1. The 
aggregate demand for this type of dwelling is given by:17
(2.10) NzhhpzpzpyyMaxznzzD ))),,),()},(,{((),( *11
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In this equation, N denotes the total number of households and hh the char-
acteristics of the buyer that define his housing taste. Different combinations 
of hh and y can produce the same demand z1. Again, one might allow the oth-
er attributes z* to vary. In general, the demand for a specification of dwelling 
is a function of the house price, the shadow prices of the structural character-
istics of the dwelling and the characteristics and income of the target group 
for this type of dwelling. A demand equation for social rented dwellings simi-
lar to equation (2.10) is estimated in Chapter 4.
An equilibrium relationship must now be defined in order to close the 
framework. Equilibrium prices are set in order for supply to meet demand for 
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In this equation, hs(ż1,z*) denotes the fraction of the housing stock HS whose 
specification conforms to a specific level of z1. The equality of supply and de-
mand in turn defines the equilibrium price and equilibrium shadow pric-
es as functions of the housing attributes (through the supply side) and buy-
ers’ characteristics (through the demand side). The aggregate demand for and 
supply of dwellings can be derived by aggregating the above-stated identity 
over all values of z1. This yields a quality-adjusted equivalent of the equilibri-
um relationship depicted in Figure 2.1. 
16 As mentioned in Section 2.3, a higher taste for housing has the same effect on housing consumption as does 
higher income.
17 The identity (2.10) can also be derived in Rosen’s (1974) original model. Rosen obtained the demand and 
supply curves by differentiation of the ‘shadow prices’ of housing attributes (i.e. the βi and δ i in Equation (2.6)).
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With full information and no transaction costs, arbitrage ensures that equi-
librium extends to locations. If two households are better off living at each 
other’s location, then they can initiate a trade at prices that equal their will-
ingness to pay for each other’s dwelling. Prices are higher in areas where the 
willingness to pay is higher. In equilibrium, residential location demand – the 
sum of house-seekers relocating to an area and residents remaining in the ar-
ea – equals the housing stock on each housing submarket.18
 2.5  Exit choice and destination choice
All of the housing choices and the house price can ultimately be reduced to 
functions of the exogenous parameters, such as the specification of dwell-
ing and household characteristics (Rosen, 1974). In this deterministic setting, 
households exit, stay or – in the special case of homeowners who are indif-
ferent between the two choices – choose randomly between moving and stay-
ing. In a more realistic stochastic setting, households are more likely to move 
when the expected utility from moving exceeds the utility from staying. I as-
sume a logistic distribution, so the probability of an exit by a homeowner can 






























In this equation, eU stands for the exponential value of utility U.19 In the ab-
sence of transaction costs, a move is more likely to occur when the expected 
utility from living in the new home exceeds the utility from staying in the old 
home. Identity (2.12) can be used to construct discrete choice models for exit, 
destination, residential location and tenure choices. 
One consequence of the neoclassical axioms is that choices made in the 
past and choices that will be made in the future do not alter the optimality of 
choices made today.20 The likelihood to move depends upon neither the out-
come of the destination choice nor the parameters that govern it: the price 
18 The number of households usually falls short of the stock, as some vacancies are needed to accommodate 
movements into and out of dwellings (Wheaton, 1990). On the regulated Dutch social rental market, however, 
demand usually exceeds the stock due to below-market rents.
19 Note that, when the utility of staying equals that of moving, the likelihood to move is one half.
20 The independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA) – if a choice is made from a subset of a larger set, 
then the same choice would have been made if a larger or smaller set were available to the consumer – underlies 
much of the reasoning in neoclassical economics (Sen, 1970). See also Footnote 21.
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and attributes of the new home. One way of seeing this is by differentiating 



















































































The first term within brackets on the right-hand side of equation (2.13) is the 
change in future consumption if the quality of the old home were to improve. 
This term is recognisable as the first-order condition in the maximization of 
U with respect to z. Hence, it equals zero. The household simply adjusts its 
future consumption following the change in specification of the old home ż, 
such that its utility remains at the highest possible level. The change in the 
likelihood to move depends on the second term within brackets: the increase 
in utility from the higher sales price of the old home, minus the opportunity 
costs of not staying in this dwelling. Differences in exit rates can be explained 
by characteristics of households, along with the price (or rent) and attributes 
of their current or abandoned homes. 
A household’s duration of stay depends upon the same factors that govern 
the exit choice (Goodman, 2003). Destination choice refers to the selection of 
a new home from amongst a number of suitable vacancies. Arguments simi-
lar to those stated above can be offered to prove that the destination choice 
depends upon household characteristics, along with the price (or rent) and at-
tributes of the new home (McFadden, 1978).21 The main difference between 
the exit choice model and the destination choice model is that the push ef-
fects on home-owners and existing tenants are opposite in sign to the pull ef-
fects on buyers and new tenants.
21 There are several reasons why the destination choice need not be independent of the price-quality relationship 
of the old dwelling or the alternatives that are on the market. Greater availability of a particular type of dwelling 
increases the odds of obtaining this dwelling type (Timmermans and Van Noortwijk, 1995). Buyer taxes make 
moving costs dependent upon the value of the new home, which can alter the likelihood to move (Van Ommeren 
and Van Leuvensteijn, 2005). The withdrawal of equity from the old home to re-mortgage the new one is yet 
another mechanism connecting exit and destination choices (Bridges et al., 2004). In Chapter 5, I show how a 
good price-quality relationship of the old home causes tenants to be better informed, which leads to endogenous 
improvement in the price-quality relation of the new home.
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One standard assumption in revealed preference modelling is that utility is 
separable in its elements. Utility in the exit choice model is written as a linear 
or quasi-linear function of price, housing attributes and household character-

















In this equation, zk denotes the K attributes of the dwelling and neighbour-
hood, p(z) the user costs (or rent) and hhl the L household characteristics (in-
cluding income or wealth).22
An exit model for social tenants similar to the one shown in equation (2.14) 
is estimated in Chapter 3, with rent replacing house price.
 2.6  Search on the housing market
The revealed preference models discussed in the previous sections have been 
the subject of a large number of empirical studies. Some of these applications 
have tried to clarify the impact of neighbourhood quality on housing choices 
and house price. The attributes that define neighbourhood quality, and there-
by a large part of the user and exchange value of the dwelling, can be clas-
sified under the broad headers of accessibility, amenities, physical, environ-
mental, socio-economical and demographical features. Table 2.1 presents a 
non-exhaustive list of attributes that have been identified as determinants of 
house price and of the exit, residential location or destination choices. The 
listed variables can be thought of as the push factors and pull factors of the 
neighbourhood.
Three observations can be made upon surveying the empirical literature. 
First, some attributes may prove relevant on one housing market, while fail-
ing to produce significant estimates on another market and, when attributes 
are more universally valid, their coefficient values tend to have a wide spread 
(Atkinson and Crocker, 1987; Smith and Huang, 1995, Nelson, 2004). The task 
of measuring neighbourhood attributes and specifying their input in revealed 
preference models has proven more difficult than the task of defining the 
quality of the actual dwelling. Structural characteristics are in common use 
in advertisements, realtor’s listings and residential surveys. Households are 
22 Separability relies on the independence of the explanatory variables. This need not be guaranteed. In fact, 
residential sorting leads to interdependence between household characteristics, house type, location and the exit 
rate. This may cause problems such as endogeneity and heterogeneity. Throughout the regression analyses in 
Chapters 3 to 7, attention is paid to the possible or actual effects of these estimation problems.
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trained to think of them as objective standards for housing quality, as is ev-
ident from the explanatory power of structural characteristics of the dwell-
ing in residential satisfaction, residents’ subjective valuation of their hous-
ing quality (Landale and Guest, 1985; Lu, 1998 and 1999).23 In contrast, neigh-
bourhood attributes have no uniform standard of measurement. Accessibili-
ty, land use and environmental features and amenities are cast into distance 
decay or gravity functions that produce densities, distances or travel times 
23 Alternative approaches to modelling the relationship between attributes and housing quality that try to ex-
plain the ways in which households derive residential satisfaction from the structural characteristics include com-
positional models, conjoint models and decision nets (Timmermans et al., 1994).
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(Fotheringham, 1981).24 
Statistics on socio-economic, physical and demographic features are pro-
vided by statistical agencies as means of observation within specific census 
tracts, postal code areas, administrative neighbourhoods or other administra-
tive areal units. 
Residents’ perceptions of neighbourhood attributes need not have much 
in common with the way in which they are measured. Spatial displacement 
opens up the possibility that some households will not perceive a given at-
tribute. Rivers, railways, open spaces and roads ensure that Euclidean dis-
tances are at best an approximation for the real use of space. Differences in 
modes of transport and the directional bias of households make travel times 
less reliable as predictors of accessibility (Cooke and Ross, 1999). Neighbour-
hood statistics are often stock measurements for flow variables, such that the 
attributes could have changed value by the time that their measurements are 
published. Furthermore, the statistics discard the spatial variation inside the 
areal unit over which they are aggregated, and the unit’s artificial boundaries 
cut through the residential environment that some households experience 
(Openshaw, 1984). This ‘modifiable areal unit problem’ can affect the correla-
tion between the statistic and the concept (i.e. neighbourhood quality) that it 
is intended to explain (Amrhein, 1995). 
The attributes that shape neighbourhood quality can give rise to specifi-
cation problems when they enter revealed preference models as explanato-
ry variables. Complexity is inherent to all ‘soft systems’ that explain human 
choice behaviour in an uncertain environment (Stewart and Ayres, 2001). The 
socio-economic and demographic attributes that underlie the intangible, dy-
namic and largely unobservable social quality of an area may interact in a 
complex fashion (Marans and Rodgers, 1975). In an analysis of the Rotterdam 
owner-occupied market, Kauko (2002) showed that the effects of intangible 
(and some tangible) attributes on house prices change from one neighbour-
hood to the other. While the measurement and specification problems can 
obscure the strength and range of neighbourhood push and pull effects, they 
should affect the estimation of the exit choice and the destination choice in 
the same way. Measurement and specification problems do not explain why 
neighbourhood pull effects are more ambiguous than are the corresponding 
push effects. 
A further comparison between the neighbourhood push and pull effects in 
residential mobility models reveals two further inconsistencies. As a rule, the 
pull effects of socio-economic and demographic attributes tend to be weaker 
than the corresponding push effects (Dowding and John, 1996; Newton, 1997). 
24 Some geographers point out that households do not trade off housing quality for access to amenities or jobs, 
but that they ensure that the distance covered does not exceed a given threshold (Getis, 1969; Koenig, 1980).
[ 35 ]
In the most comprehensive destination choice model to date, some pull ef-
fects on the same attribute are present at more than one spatial level (Guo 
and Bhat, 2007).25 According to some geographers, it is the search for vacan-
cies that distinguishes the exit choice from the destination choice. In the geo-
graphical literature, it has been stated that households face access constraints 
with regard to information about the availability of vacancies. The cost of in-
formation-gathering leads to the adoption of spatial search strategies (Huff, 
1986) and stopping rules in order to reduce the duration of search (Flower-
dew, 1976). Among the search strategies, the area-based model assumes that 
households search for vacancies within a preferred geographical submarket 
(Smith et al., 1979). The search space is defined by key-activity places in the 
anchor points model, and the availability of vacancies of the preferred type 
in the constrained choice model (Huff, 1986). The household selects the va-
cancy with the seemingly best price-quality relationship from within its lim-
ited choice set, abandoning better alternatives outside of the search space or 
dwellings that become available in the future (Wolpert, 1966).26 The reason 
why geographers’ search leads to a different outcome than the standard eco-
nomic model is the less than complete information that households collect 
on the availability of vacancies. In my opinion, there should be little room for 
disagreement regarding the availability of vacancies if households have un-
limited access to advertisements for and listings of vacancies. 
The advertisement or listing of vacancies provides detailed information on 
the structural characteristics, price (or rent) and location of each dwelling. 
Once a suitable vacancy is found, inspection seems a necessary condition for 
acceptance (Barrett, 1973; Habib and Miller, 2005). After this visit, the house-
hold should have a reasonable idea of observable attributes, which include 
the actual dwelling, accessibility, amenities and services that cater to both in-
siders and outsiders, the physical features of the area and even less tangible 
aspects such as the area’s atmosphere (Kauko, 2007). The most likely candi-
dates for incompleteness then, are the amenities or services that cater to the 
local populace (e.g. local shops, primary schools) and, more importantly, the 
‘soft’ socio-economical and demographic attributes that shape the intangible, 
dynamic and largely unobservable social quality of the area.27 
Although the social quality of an area can be guessed through word of 
25 The neighbourhood pull effects addressed in the study by Guo and Bhat have a range of 0.4 kilometres or 
more. This range extends far beyond the range of the surroundings that residents experience, which lie some-
where between 0.1 and 0.25 kilometres (Coulton et al., 2001; Goetgeluk and Wassenberg, 2005).
26 In geographers’ search, households display ‘satisficing’ instead of optimising behaviour. This means that the 
household selects the seemingly best option from amongst the known alternatives, although this choice may not 
be optimal with respect to its preferences (Simon, 1991).
27 Social quality has two dimensions: social fabric and social climate (Adriaanse, 2007). Social fabric relates 
to the area’s demographic make-up, while social climate depends upon the frequency and nature of the social 
interactions amongst the residents.
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mouth or statistics, it must be experienced rather than observed to obtain the 
full picture. Living experience ensures that residents learn who their neigh-
bours are and how they interact with one another. This ‘inside view’ of resi-
dents probably comes closest to full information concerning the social and 
physical quality of the home surroundings. The spatial scale that residents 
have in mind for their surroundings is the block level, an area covered by a 
short walking distance from the home (Coulton et al., 2001; Goetgeluk and 
Wassenberg, 2005). 
The underlying demographic and socio-economic attributes remain hidden 
to the casual glance of outsiders. The quality of amenities and services that 
cater to the local populace may also go unobserved. As long as households do 
not observe all aspects of housing quality, they run the risk of buying or rent-
ing a lemon (Akerlof, 1970), a dwelling whose user value falls short of its price. 
A house-seeker must trade off the costs of information-gathering about 
the quality of offers against the reduced risk of ending up with a lemon. Spa-
tial search strategies do not simply reduce the costs of finding vacancies. 
They also limit the amount of information that needs to be collected on dis-
tant neighbourhoods. In adopting area-based or constrained choice strate-
gies, house-seekers need only become familiar with areas inside their search 
spaces. House-seekers can save further costs by searching close to key-activi-
ty places or by using the quality of nearby areas that they know well as an es-
timate of neighbourhood quality elsewhere. With friends, family or acquaint-
ances living in the area, house-seekers can obtain the inside view at a low 
cost. Indeed, many households search near their old homes (Barrett, 1976) 
and key-activity places (Huff, 1986; McHugh, 1984). The completeness of infor-
mation that residents transmit to house-seekers depends on their credibility 
as witnesses and whether they withhold information (whether deliberately or 
by accident). Inter-urban movers often initiate repeat moves (Short, 1978) and 
tend to pay more for dwellings than intra-urban movers do (Lambson et al., 
2004), thereby revealing their lack of knowledge of the geographical submar-
ket when they settled there. 
The scarce empirical evidence on search behaviour thus points towards the 
density and extent of the social network, the distance of the move and previ-
ous experiences in the area as grounds for utility gains following a move. It is 
a small step to assume these gains are made through superior knowledge of 
the unobservable attributes of the neighbourhood, given that advertisements, 
listings and inspection of the vacant dwelling and its neighbourhood are open 
to all. House-seekers must choose between various sources of information in 
order to learn about the unobservable neighbourhood quality, if their own ex-
perience is lacking. 
Own experience or reliable witnesses may yield a realistic picture of an ar-
ea at the appropriate spatial scale. Statistics and the quality of nearby areas 
further aid house-seekers in their assessments of neighbourhoods when own 
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experience or witnesses are absent. Information on a spatial object (such as 
the home surroundings) is incomplete when the content of the information 
is corrupted or when the scale of the object to which it pertains is ill-defined 
(Egenhofer and Sharma, 1993). Statistics on a given neighbourhood attribute 
are usually incomplete for a number of reasons: the statistics need not cor-
respond to the notion that residents have of the attribute; the statistics refer 
to a state in the past, their range usually extends beyond the home surround-
ings (i.e. the modifiable areal unit problem) and their range is fixed, while a 
fuzzy range is needed in order to cover the shifting contours of some of dy-
namic attributes (Openshaw, 1984; Peuquet, 2001). Extrapolation of the quality 
of a nearby area can lead to incomplete information, as the area might touch 
or even overlap with the home surroundings, although the two areas seldom 
match (Egenhofer and Sharma, 1993). 
Incomplete information is not without merits. Statistics and extrapolation 
may provide a house-seeker with an accurate picture of the average quality 
of an area, the range of which covers part of the surroundings of the offer. Al-
though this may lead to the overestimation or the underestimation of neigh-
bourhood quality at the exact location, such errors are random and could 
even be negligible, if local differences in neighbourhood quality are small. The 
interpretation of statistics, however, requires some degree of sophistication, 
given that even trained researchers find this difficult. Other sources of infor-
mation include the media, realtors and public opinion, all of which shape the 
common perception of the neighbourhood or, in other words, the neighbour-
hood reputation. 
A reputation in economics, psychology or computational sciences is the 
anonymous, social evaluation of an object (Sabater and Sierra, 2005), which 
is used to minimize the costs of gathering information about its attributes 
(Weizsacker, 1980; Aberer et al., 2006). Reputations do not depend on isolated 
attributes, but on the composite ‘brand’, ‘label’ or ‘name’ of the object (Bett-
man, 1979). These labels reveal something about the persistence (or persistent 
lack) of quality of an object (Stigler, 1961). In sociology, a neighbourhood rep-
utation is seen as the ‘shared voice’ about an area that is communicated in 
public opinion and the media (Suttles, 1972; Permentier, 2009). 
Combining the two notions, neighbourhood reputation is defined here as 
the outsiders’ view on the unobservable quality of the area (social or other-
wise), taking heed of the fact that, unlike in the inside view, the anonymous 
evaluator (or evaluators) cannot be identified. Neighbourhood reputations 
relate to such labels as ‘prestigious’ (Semyonov and Kraus, 1982), ‘pleasant’ 
(Kauko, 2007), ‘ethnic’, ‘working-class’, ‘middle-class’ or ‘unsafe’. These labels 
tell something about the way in which the general public views the social cir-
cumstances in an area and the socio-economic status of its inhabitants. 
Neighbourhood reputations are determined by socio-economical and de-
mographical attributes of the area rather than by its physical attributes. The 
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determinants of reputations seem almost self-explanatory: low income, high 
crime and an ethnic minority in the neighbourhood (Permentier et al., 2011) or 
reported crime in the media (Kaliner, 2008). In a rare economic study on the 
subject, the effect of cleanup of polluted sites on house prices was examined 
(Messer et al., 2006). The longer the cleanup was delayed, the greater the like-
lihood that prices did not return to levels at the date when pollution was first 
announced. The authors attributed this to the poor reputation of (formerly) 
polluted areas. 
Neighbourhood reputations are a potential source of bias. If reputations 
are indeed ‘simplified images expressed as sharp boundaries and exaggerat-
ed differences between neighbourhoods as noted by outsiders’ as sociologists 
assert (Suttles, 1972; Permentier, 2009), then reputations are prone to the an-
choring effect (i.e. putting too much weight on an isolated trait of a neigh-
bourhood; Ellen, 2000) and distinction bias (i.e. exaggerating differences be-
tween neighbourhoods; Bell et al., 2006) at the very least. 
Sociologists have focused primarily on negative bias in the form of the stig-
matisation (e.g. Forrest and Kearns, 1999; Hastings, 2004; Permentier, 2009; 
Wacquant, 2008). Exit rates are believed to be higher in stigmatized areas due 
to the ‘third-party effect’, the detrimental effect that stigma has on the well-
being of residents (Tsfati and Cohen, 2003; Permentier et al., 2008). Stigmas 
are maintained over a long period of time (Hastings, 2004). It is also possible 
for well-reputed neighbourhoods to be overrated. The presumed persistence 
of quality could have been overtaken by developments unknown to the out-
side world. The role of expectations in the construction of reputations means 
that neighbourhoods that are thought to be in decline are deemed less attrac-
tive, while the reputations of neighbourhoods that are believed to be in up-
turn are enhanced, even though actual circumstances need not confirm these 
expectations (Ellen, 2000). Gentrifying areas sometimes experience a sudden 
improvement in name (Ley; 1986, 1994).
The spatial scale of neighbourhood reputation depends upon outsiders’ 
notions of a meaningful areal unit. In the Dutch context, this is usually the 
scale of the administrative neighbourhood. Media, realtors, statistical agen-
cies, municipalities and public opinion agree on the size of neighbourhoods, 
as they have adopted the historical growth pattern of cities as a benchmark 
(Hortulanus, 1995). The successive ranking of competing neighbourhoods 
based on their respective reputations yields a ‘neighbourhood hierarchy’. This 
hierarchy is unequivocal in the sense that, although a household may not 
know the reputation of all city neighbourhoods, the ranking of reputations 
that it does know conforms to the hierarchy (Hortulanus, 1995; Permentier, 
2009). The hierarchy is non-binding, meaning that a household may be aware 
of a reputation without letting this knowledge influence its decision-making. 
Quantitative sociological research has little to say on the question how 
neighbourhood reputations are constructed and maintained. The most defin-
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itive answer given, relates to the spatial scale of reputations, that of the ad-
ministrative neighbourhood. The key assumption is that outsiders perceive 
that the odds of buying (or renting) a lemon are smaller in administrative 
neighbourhoods that are reputed to be pleasant or in upturn, as these labels 
point towards the ‘right type’ of residents and residential environment. 
Incomplete information is better than no information at all. This does not 
explain why house-seekers make use of reputations in their destination 
choices, if they are aware that the information can be biased. The next section 
reveals how the use of biased information in the destination choice is a viable 
alternative to the use of incomplete, unbiased information. 
  2.7  The meaning of neighbourhood reputations
Schelling’s tipping model of segregation is arguably the most important con-
tribution of computational modelling to the urban studies. This simulation 
model abstracts from the price and attributes of the dwelling and focuses on 
the role of the social distance to neighbours in residential mobility. The hu-
man predisposition toward affinity and sociability explains why similarities 
(or dissimilarities) in income, ethnicity, educational achievement or lifestyle 
act as push factors for residents and pull factors for house-seekers (Hawley, 
1968). Many households aspire to reduce social distance to neighbours, due 
to sympathy for their own in-groups (Bogardus, 1926) or negative feelings to-
wards out-groups (Durkheim, 1982). Households sort between areas according 
to shared norms and values, their wish to achieve a certain socio-econom-
ic status and their prejudices (South and Crowder, 1998; MacPherson and Sir-
mans, 2001; Gibbons, 2003; Cervero and Duncan, 2004; Guo and Bhat, 2007 and 
Clark and Fossett, 2008).28
In Schelling’s simulation model, each agent belongs to a group. Agents are 
first assumed to hold complete information on the group membership of all 
other agents. In the initial state of the simulation, each agent randomly oc-
cupies a box on a two-dimensional grid. The agent’s utility rises with the 
number of same-group neighbours. When the number of opposite-group 
neighbours exceeds a threshold, however, the agent becomes dissatisfied. 
In each run of the simulation, a dissatisfied agent is selected at random and 
allowed to move to a vacant box. In the next run of the simulation, another 
dissatisfied agent is selected. The simulation continues until the point that 
28  Despite the vast literature on ‘neighbourhood effects’, including the effect of neighbours’ housing consump-
tion on residents’ own consumption (Ioaniddes and Zabel, 2003), it is unclear whether the indirect benefits or 
costs of having the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ type of neighbours (in terms of health, school achievement, access to labour 
market and participation in crime) are real, or whether they reflect socio-psychological beliefs and attitudes and 
their effects on residential sorting (Galster, 2001; Dietz, 2002; Durlauf, 2004). 
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moves are unwanted, because all agents are satisfied, or further moves be-
come impossible, because all desirable destinations have been taken.
Complete information
I follow the algorithm of Pollicott and Weiss (2001) in order to formalise 
Schelling’s model. This algorithm surpasses others in its simplicity, without 
compromising Schelling’s results. The agent’s utility is calculated over a Von 
Neumann neighbourhood with a range of 1 under complete information (see 
Figure 2.5).29 The two categories of agents are of equal size, with whites re-
ceiving label (l) 1 and blacks receiving label -1. Each agent occupies a box in 
a twenty-by-twenty grid containing 400 boxes, 10% of which are vacant (with 
label 0). A white agent will want to move if less than half of the neighbours 
are white, whereas a black agent will want to move if less than half of the 
neighbours are black.30 The transition rule for the original version of the tip-
ping model is presented by (Pollicott and Weiss, 2001; Weisstein, 2008):
29 The number of neighbours decreases to three on the edges of the grid and to two in the corners. The con-
struction of a torus-like topology (i.e. a grid without edges) does not change the results (Fossett and Warren, 
2005).
30 This 50/50 rule mimics real-life residential sorting behaviour in the US. White flight is triggered when the per-
centage of whites falls below 50 %, with whites tending to relocate to areas in which at least 70% of the residents 
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In this formula, sij denotes the box in row i and column j of the grid, which is 
a member of the set of occupied boxes O. If the white agent’s utility, the sum 
of labels in the four adjacent boxes, is lower than zero, or if the black agent’s 
utility exceeds zero, then the box spq in row p and column q is selected at ran-
dom from the set of vacant boxes V. The utility in the vacant box must be 
equal to or higher than zero for a white agent to consider it as a suitable des-
tination, and lower than or equal to zero for a black agent. The agent moves 
to an empty box, while its old box sij is vacated. A subsequent run is initi-
ated in which another dissatisfied agent is allowed to move. The simulation 
continues until an equilibrium state is reached. Figure 2.6 presents a random 
configuration at the beginning of a simulation and the equilibrium at the end.
The final state of the simulation depicts what Schelling purported to show: 
discriminatory practices are not needed in order to explain residential seg-
regation. Even though households are content to live in areas with a mixed 
population, their atomistic actions lead to segregation in the aggregate. 
The dynamics of the tipping model are well understood (Vinkovic and Kir-
man, 2006). Agents who live in mixed areas or in the border regions between 
black and white clusters are more likely to move. Their destinations are in re-
gions that are more homogenous within the social fabric than their old loca-
tions were. The increased incidence of exits in mixed regions and the direc-
tional bias of movers fuel the segregated outcome. The direction of the first 
few moves has a large impact. Tipping can go either way: mixed areas be-
come predominantly white or black, depending upon which type of agent first 
settles in the vacant box, thereby shifting the delicate balance between the 
groups (Meen and Meen, 2006).31
31 Schelling’s outcome proves robust for a range of modifications; if one or both groups harbour same-group 
preferences (Fossett and Warren, 2005), if the grid is enlarged (Fossett and Warren, 2005), if there are three 
instead of two groups (Zhang, 2004), or when the number of empty boxes is increased (Vinkovic and Kirman, 
2006), results stays the same. Another modification is the pricing of locations based on the vacancy rate in the 
area. This does not alter the outcome, as long as the increase in utility from having more same-group neighbours 
is not offset by the higher price paid for more popular locations (Zhang, 2004).
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Schelling’s model illustrates what standard economic analysis predicts as 
well: residential segregation is the expected outcome on a free housing mar-
ket with complete information and zero transaction costs (Ekeland et al., 
2002).
Incomplete, unbiased information
House-seekers who cannot access inside information must rely on informa-
tion that is incomplete by definition. One way of modelling incomplete, un-
biased information is by increasing the range of the measurement of a spa-
tial object beyond the range of the object itself (Egenhofer and Sharma, 1993). 
Expected utility in the tipping model is now calculated over a Von Neumann 
neighbourhood with a range of 3 and 24 neighbours (see Figure 2.6). The as-
sessment can be either too high or too low for the neighbourhood around the 
vacant box. Because the overestimation or underestimation of utility is still a 
random figure, the information that agents use in their destination choices 
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As illustrated in Figure 2.7, the use of incomplete, unbiased information has 
little or no effect on the outcome: the segregated clusters resurface. The main 
difference with the full information regime is that the number of runs in the 
simulation is increased, as some agents overestimate utility at the new loca-
tion. Some of these agents initiate repeat moves, while their erroneous desti-
nation choices might trigger additional moves amongst the new neighbours. 
This result is not that surprising, as a thorough analysis of the work of Laurie 
and Jaggi (2003), who increased the vision of agents in both their exit and des-
tination choices, revealed that, under reasonable assumptions, segregation 
is the expected outcome in the incomplete information regime (Fossett and 
Warren, 2005). With due caution, the conclusion states that the use of incom-
plete, unbiased information leads to random overestimation or underestima-
tion of the quality of a location. Aside from increased turnover on the hous-
ing submarket, the sum effect on sorting is negligible, as moving households 
do not make mistakes all of the time, and even their mistakes can be mended 
in the course of time.32
Biased information
The use of neighbourhood reputations is the most likely cause of biased des-
tination choices. It is modelled as a barrier or invitation to enter certain areas. 
In keeping with the previous analysis, the bias affects the behaviour of white 
agents. Two eight-by-eight areas (64 boxes) are designated as white or black 
(see Figure 2.8). In the ‘white area’, white agents will be willing to move to an 
empty box if the expected utility is equal to or greater than minus one. All 
empty boxes in the ‘black area’ will be avoided by white agents if the expect-
ed place utility is equal to or lower than one. White agents structurally over-
estimate utility in the white area and underestimate it in the black area. In all 
other regions, the choices of white agents, like those of black agents, are still 
made under the assumption of complete information. The transition rule is 
now given by:
32 The fact that inter-urban movers often initiate repeat moves (Short, 1978) corroborates this statement.
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B denotes the vacant locations in the black area, and W denotes the vacant lo-
cations in the white area.
A glance at the outcome of the simulation in Figure 2.9 clearly shows that 
the use of biased information leads to a directed form of tipping. Although 
tipping under complete information can go either way (Meen and Meen, 
2006), the introduction of bias makes the white area turn predominantly 
white and the black area turn largely black.33 White agents see an increase 
33 The sum of labels in the white area in Figure 2.9 changes from 4 to 18, 0 to 19 and 0 to 12 in the simulations. 
The sum of labels in the black area is decreased from 3 to 2, 2 to -8 and 2 to -15.
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in suitable destinations in the white area and a compensatory drop in suit-
able destinations in the black area. This increases white agents’ likelihood of 
moving towards the white area, while they shun the black area. Black agents 
notice that vacancies are becoming scarcer in the white area, while oppor-
tunities to move to the black area increase, due to the directional bias of 
white agents.34 Small white pockets inside the black area that require just 
one same-group neighbour to turn into a stable ‘island’ break up because no 
white agent is willing to fill this vacancy. In contrast, black islands in white 
areas can remain stable, as black residency in and entry into the white area 
34 The introduction of bias among black agents would only reinforce segregation.
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remains feasible. The reputation of an area thus lends a directional bias to the 
residential sorting of households.
The importance of the simulation in the biased information regime can-
not be emphasised enough, as it provides a rationale for the use of reputa-
tions. Even though agents structurally overestimate utility at their destina-
tions of choice, the subsequent moves of same-group agents ensure that util-
ity conforms to their prior beliefs in the long run.35 The reputation of an ar-
ea as being in either upturn or downturn acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy.36 
The simulation proceeds in only one direction: from a random configuration 
to an equilibrium state. If some boxes are vacated in equilibrium, however, it 
is easy to see how reputations might also stabilise an area. Let group mem-
bership be defined by socio-economic status. When a high-income household 
moves, the likelihood that another high-income household will fill the vacan-
cy is greater in a well-reputed area than it would be in an ill-reputed area. 
When a low-income household moves, its place is more likely to be filled by 
a high-income household in a well-reputed area and by a low-income house-
hold in an ill-reputed area. Pockets of prosperity in ill-reputed areas break up 
in the course of time, while pockets of poverty can be sustained in a well-re-
puted area, as long as poorer households are content to stay there and are not 
forced into selling their homes. 
In a steady state, the neighbourhood reputation need not be biased at all: 
the average quality of the neighbourhood more or less conforms to the notion 
that outsiders have of it, although it may vary from one location to the other 
inside this area.37 The reputational bias leads to the same efficient sorting be-
tween areas as in the unbiased, incomplete information regime, with the ad-
ditional result that tipping can go in only one direction. The simulation thus 
demonstrates how biased reputations can be a viable alternative to the use 
of incomplete information in house-seekers’ destination choices. In Schell-
ing’s own words (1960, p. 57), neighbourhood reputation yields a ‘focal-point’: 
a solution that seems natural to people in the absence of communication.38 To 
paraphrase Schelling, a household with a high socio-economic status favours 
35 A similar prediction was made by Yinger (1976) in a standard economic model. 
36 A self-fulfilling prophecy is defined by the statement ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, pp. 571).
37 This runs counter the idea in sociology that reputations are an unfair depiction of circumstances in the area. 
An area might still be stigmatised because of its physical isolation, such that moves to the area by uninformed 
households will be rare (Koopman, 2006).
38 Schelling (1960; p. 57) defines focal points as solutions ‘for each person’s expectation of what the other 
expects him to expect to be expected to do’. As an example, he specified a focal point for two strangers who are 
supposed to meet in a city on a given day: they meet at central station at noon. Another example involves the 
payoff for choosing the same colour when agents must choose between three cards of the same colour and one 
card of another colour. They naturally select the unique card. Schelling’s focal point is a solution to the stag-hunt 
dilemma, as first described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: two hunters must cooperate to kill a stag, but if a hare 
comes along, both of them are inclined to kill the hare for themselves (Skyrms, 2004).
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prestigious and shuns ill-reputed areas, because it expects that other high-in-
come households expect this household to expect that they will also move to 
the same area.
The simulation describes the basics of residential mobility on the Dutch so-
cial rental market, where group-membership is likely to be based on the life 
stage or ethnicity of tenants. As in the simulation model, the exit choices of 
social tenants are governed by near-complete information on their surround-
ings, while their destination choices are based upon expectations of the new 
neighbourhood. Although the regulated rent does depend upon the location 
of the dwelling, the rental increase corresponding to a rise in neighbourhood 
quality is very small. Gains in neighbourhood quality are largely translated 
into a rise in utility (Van Ommeren and Koopman, 2011). The similarity be-
tween the simulation and mobility in the social rental sector breaks down 
with the selection of a dissatisfied tenant. The selection procedure is based 
mainly on queuing: social tenants outbid one another based on either their 
duration of stay in another social rental dwelling or their registration time as 
a house-seeker. Schelling’s results however, do not depend upon the order in 
which agents are selected to move.39 The simulation shows how social ten-
ants who are relatively ignorant about the quality of distant areas are drawn 
towards well-reputed neighbourhoods and that they shun ill-reputed neigh-
bourhoods, even though (unbeknownst to them) the neighbourhood quality 
can be good in some places within ill-reputed neighbourhoods. 
With several reservations, the simulation is also applicable to the Dutch 
owner-occupied market, where group membership is likely to be based on so-
cio-economic status. One requirement is that the higher price paid for living 
in well-reputed areas does not deplete the gains in utility when moving there 
(Zhang, 2004). There are several reasons why buyers expect to make gains 
upon moving to a well-reputed neighbourhood. First, households do not in-
crease their bids beyond what they think to gain from living in the area. Sec-
ond, price reflects the willingness to pay of the marginal buyer, so that other 
buyers in the area still make gains in utility (Bayer and Ross, 2006).40
Another requirement is that the house price is not used as a signal for the 
unobservable quality of the offer. The plausibility of th requirement is dis-
cussed in the next section
39 The tolerance towards opposite-group neighbours governs the outcome of the simulation and not on the 
transition rule (Zhang, 2004). Integration occurs when agents are content with having less than 35 % same-group 
neighbours (Fossett and Warren, 2005).
40 The argument runs as follows: if identical dwellings are offered at once, the buyer must outbid the household 
that can afford to pay for the last dwelling in the batch. Buyers with income that is higher than that of the margi-
nal buyer make gains in indirect utility (i.e. their consumer surplus). 
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 2.8  Informational asymmetry on the owner-oc-
cupied market
The use of incomplete information in the destination choice can generate an 
informational asymmetry in the exchange of dwellings. The asymmetry be-
tween informed sellers and uninformed buyers entails that dwellings are 
priced based on the buyer’s willingness to pay (Berliant and Yu, 2009). 41
Poorly informed buyers may use the sales prices of similar type dwellings 
as an ‘anchor’ for the bid prices for their offers, the quality of which they 
do not fully observe (Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Genesove and Christopher, 
2001). I assume that these buyers look for ‘anchors’ in the same neighbour-
hood, as the neighbourhood’s name provides a simple rule of thumb by which 
the unobservable quality can be linked to a known exchange value. Suppliers 
have no incentive to reveal the user value of offers to poorly informed buyers, 
if the unobservable quality of their offer is worse than that of nearby vacan-
cies (Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004). Well-informed buyers have an incentive 
to go along with this ‘cheating’, because they can still select the offers that 
are underpriced. In this ‘pooling equilibrium’ (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), 
the observable attributes are priced the same as they would be in the full in-
formation regime. The ‘price tag’ on the neighbourhood’s name on the other 
hand, acts as a substitute for the exchange value of the unobservable quality 
of the area. No supplier offers less than the common price for the unobserv-
able quality, while raising the price above this level leads to rejection, given 
that no information is conveyed to buyers by doing so. 
I discussed two strategies that poorly informed house-seekers can use to 
overcome the asymmetry and avoid paying too much. First, they might rely 
on the neighbourhood’s reputation. In the short run, they run the risk of se-
lecting a dwelling that is overpriced. In the long run, however, their destina-
tion choice proves them right, as other ill-informed households of a similar 
socio-economic stratum move to the area as well. Second, house-seekers can 
learn about the user value of an offer at an endogenous cost. They may visit 
the area, invest in social ties or connect to various other sources of informa-
tion (McLellan, 1977). The presence of well-informed and ill-informed house-
seekers complicates matters for sellers. The offer of a dishonest seller may 
be rejected upon meeting up with an informed house-seeker.42 The risk of re-
41 An existing homeowner will not offer a dwelling if its user value exceeds the sales price.  
42 Rejection need not occur when the sales price can be lowered during negotiations (Díaz and Jerez, 2009). In a 
static model such as the one described here, however, the price of all lemons that are matched to informed buyers 
would have to be lowered. The quality of the remaining offers would then increase, and some dwellings would 
again be overpriced. The process of downward revisions continues until the point at which the quality of all offers 
is revealed, unless all informed buyers have been driven off of the market. A separating equilibrium is restored in 
the first case, while a segmented market emerges in the latter case, with a separating equilibrium in the segment 
that caters to informed buyers and a pooling equilibrium in the segment that caters to uninformed buyers.
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jection could prevent sellers from overpricing offers. If no one is tempted to 
cheat, then the full information equilibrium is restored in what is called a 
‘separating equilibrium’ in information economics (Spence, 1973). The price 
(or market rent) will then be the same as it would be in the full information 
equilibrium. 
If the posited information gap between suppliers and at least some house-
seekers is to be visible in the pull effects of the neighbourhood, then the 
house price or rent should not act as a signal for the unobservable quality of 
the area. Signalling is not a problem on the Dutch social rental market: the 
regulated rent is set with too little regard for neighbourhood quality (Van Om-
meren and Koopman, 2011). Because signalling might be a problem for the 
house price models in Chapters 6 and 7, I must still show that there are fea-
sible conditions under which a ‘mixed equilibrium’ exists (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976), in which all specifications of dwelling are priced the same, de-
spite the fact that some buyers know the specification of an offer and reject 
it when its falls short of a desired level. A number of search models for the 
housing market are in existence that paint a realistic picture of the matching 
and negotiation process when sellers hold an informational advantage (Ber-
liant and Yu, 2009; Díaz and Jerez, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2009). I use a simple 
housing transactions model in order to demonstrate the feasibility of a mixed 
equilibrium in which the price contains a reputational premium. 
Pooling equilibrium
Assume that the house price is set by an ill-informed buyer’s assessment of 
the unobservable attributes, such that all specifications of dwellings in the 
model presented in Section 2.3 are priced the same. Let p* denote this pooled 
price. A homeowner (whose price-setting is followed by sellers who exit the 
submarket) can offer a dwelling for a price that is equal to the bid for the new 
home. The conditions for a move by a homeless person who becomes a first-
time buyer and for a move by an existing homeowner are as follows:
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In these equations, y-p* denotes the non-housing consumption and z denotes 
the housing consumption of a first-time buyer in formula (2.18a), while y and 
z denote housing and non-housing consumption of a transferring homeown-
er in (2.18b), and ż denotes housing consumption if the homeowner decides 
to stay in the original dwelling. The function f(z) is the (presumed) distribu-
tion of specifications on this particular submarket. 
The integration of utility over z yields expected utility E{U}. The exits by 
homeowners who leave the submarket altogether and the exits by transfer-
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ring homeowners define the pool of offers and thus the shape of the distribu-
tion function f(z). The distribution function is skewed to the left in deprived 
and/or ill-reputed submarkets, as the average quality of offers is (deemed) 
lower in these areas.43 According to formula (2.18a), a homeless person ac-
cepts an offer, if the expected utility from occupancy exceeds the utility from 
being homeless. Formula (2.18b) tells that the exchange of the old home for 
the new home prompts a move, as long as the homeowner expects to im-
prove upon the specification of dwelling.44 The homeowner is thus more like-
ly to move when living in an inferior specification of dwelling or when home-
owners who exit the submarket altogether lived in good specifications. 
The house price equates the exits from the submarket with the entries by 
formerly homeless parties. The pooled price can be raised until the point at 
which the marginal first-time buyer’s willingness to pay is exhausted. The re-
maining homeless are either forced to remain homeless or to move to a less 
attractive submarket. The pooled price is therefore lower in ill-reputed areas, 
as the marginal buyer’s willingness to pay decreases with the expected qual-
ity of offers. The number of homeless who are willing to buy is also lower in 
ill-reputed areas, as the expected benefits of moving are lower in these are-
as. Finally, turnover is lower in ill-reputed areas, as fewer homeowners in the 
area expect to improve upon housing quality when they move. All in all, the 
model produces sensible results for the pooling equilibrium, thereby building 
confidence that equally sensible results can be obtained for the mixed equi-
librium. 
Mixed equilibrium
Now assume that (2.18a) holds for some of the homeless and that (2.18b) 
holds for at least one homeowner. The first assumption is a necessary con-
dition for a mixed equilibrium to emerge: if none of the homeless are willing 
to move, then the pooled price remains undefined. The second assumption 
is superfluous, but it is imposed so that the behaviour of transferring home-
owners can be studied. Buyers are now allowed to learn about the user val-
ue of offers. One way of doing this would be to introduce an endogenous cost 
of information-gathering or search cost c to the model (Fishman and Sim-
hon, 2000). The buyer will incur the search cost and accept the offer if the us-
er value (minus the search costs) is at least as high as the benefits from be-
ing homeless or staying in the old home. A further requirement is that buyers 
who enter the negotiations do not transmit information to other buyers, so 
43 Suppose that the best and the worst specification are both available in two neighbourhoods. With the same 
upper and lower bound for z the average specification of dwelling E{z} must then be lower in the neighbourhood 
in which the fraction of inferior dwellings is higher (i.e. the ill-reputed neighbourhood).
44 I assume risk neutrality here. Under risk aversion, the average specification of the new home must be higher 
than the specification of the old home in order for a move to take place.
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that their rejections go unobserved. An existing homeowner’s move is made 
conditional upon the sale of the old home. If the homeowner rejects the of-
fer of another seller, the earlier agreement with the buyer of the original offer 
becomes void, such that the homeowner is allowed to stay in the old home.45
The case in which all buyers remain ignorant due to excessive search costs 
is not of interest here: the pooled equilibrium is then reinstated. When all 
buyers are informed, the complete information equilibrium is restored. I am 
interested in a mixed equilibrium in which some buyers become informed, 
while others remain ignorant about the specification of offers. The condition 
for a first-time buyer to be informed reads as follows:
(2.19a)











The benefits of being informed (left-hand side of formula (2.19a)) decrease as 
search costs increase. Faced with moderate costs, a homeless person will be-
come informed, provided that the expected utility from rejecting overpriced 
offers exceeds the utility from living in these lemons. This requires that the 
presumed fraction of lemons on the submarket (i.e. ∫=<
z
dzzfzzF )()( ) is 
sizeable enough for rejection to be considered as a viable strategy. The dis-
tribution function is skewed to the right in well-reputed areas. It is therefore 
less necessary for the homeless to inform themselves about the quality of 
well-reputed areas, as lemons are scarce in these areas. Now suppose that a 
fraction of the homeless (i.e. those with costs 0≤c≤c (y;p*) where c  (y;p*) turns 
(2.19a) into a strict equality) is informed. The informational advantage then 
enables them to reject the lemons (i.e. all z< z  ). 
A transferring homeowner is randomly matched to a buyer in the model.46 
If this homeowner meets up with an ill-informed buyer, it will be possible to 
complete the exchange. This will not always be the case if the transferring 
homeowner is matched to an informed buyer. A well-informed homeless per-
45 In an alternative arrangement of the matching process, the homeowner is allowed to buy a new home and 
wait to see if the offer is accepted (Wheaton, 1990). In this case, homeowners run the risk of being stuck with two 
dwellings. In this arrangement, homeowners have no need to be informed. The ability to hold on to the (superior) 
old home insures against the acquisition of a lemon.
46  In a model with non-random matching, the informed house-seeker first sifts out the lemons prior to making 
a bid. Results stay the same as described in the text, with one notable difference. If too many buyers become 
informed, then the remaining offers are probably lemons. Uninformed buyers may then decide not to enter the 
market. The number of informed buyers must therefore remain below a given threshold in order to prevent a 
separating equilibrium in this arrangement.
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son will reject an offer if occupancy does not improve upon homelessness. A 
well-informed homeowner will reject offers with specifications that are worse 
than that of the current home. The condition to be informed in the case of the 
homeowner who completes the exchange reads as follows:
(2.19b)





&   
Condition (2.19) states that the homeowner’s utility from rejecting overvalued 
offers (all z<ż) must be higher than the expected utility from living in these 
lemons, if the homeowner is to become informed. Furthermore, the search 
costs should not be so high that the benefits from rejection are exhausted 
(i.e. 0≤c≤c (y;ż); where c (y;ż) turns (2.19b) into a strict equality). The condition 
then specifies that the likelihood to move decreases on two counts when the 
homeowner lives in a good specification of dwelling: the gains from moving 
are smaller and the homeowner is more likely to be informed, thus becoming 
more likely to reject offers. As with the homeless, homeowners have no need 
to be informed when moving to well-reputed areas, as lemons are deemed 
scarce in these areas. The final result worth mentioning is that the exact cost 
c (y;ż) that makes a homeowner indifferent between being informed or stay-
ing ignorant increases with the specification of the current home. The more 
that is at stake in the exchange of dwellings, the more can be gained from re-
jecting overpriced offers and hence the better informed a transferring home-
owner should be.
The simulation model presented in Section 2.7 revealed that tenants who 
are ignorant about the quality of distant areas are drawn towards well-reput-
ed neighbourhoods and that they shun ill-reputed neighbourhoods. Moves to 
ill-reputed neighbourhoods obviously do take place in cases in which tenants 
have few other options to obtain a dwelling or when the rent-quality relation-
ship of the observable aspects of the dwelling and neighbourhood are suffi-
cient. Table 2.2 summarises the results of the model for housing transactions 
in this section. It predicts an outcome for the owner-occupied market that is 
similar to the outcomes of the simulation discussed in the previous section. 
In the transaction model, however, the choice set is slightly richer than that 
included in the simulation model: some buyers are now able to acquire inside 
information, which allows them to reject the offers that are overpriced. 
Buyers who cannot distinguish between offers that are underpriced or over-
priced are similarly unlikely to move to ill-reputed areas voluntarily, and they 
also prefer to live in well-reputed areas. The main condition for the emer-
gence of a mixed equilibrium in which the sellers of lemons cheat at the ex-
pense of ill-informed buyers is for the neighbourhood to have an interme-
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diate reputation. Ill-reputed neighbourhoods attract few voluntary movers, 
while no one sees much benefit in learning about the quality of neighbour-
hoods in which lemons are deemed scarce. Buyers of dwellings in neighbour-
hoods with intermediate reputations can exploit their informational advan-
tage by accepting offers that are underpriced. 47   
Buyers who live in dwellings with a good price-quality relationship face 
greater risks in the exchange, thus having stronger incentives to become in-
formed. Similar results should hold for tenants who must transfer from an-
other social rental dwelling. On average, the destination choices of well-in-
formed buyers and tenants will be superior to those of ill-informed buyers 
and tenants, who bid the same amount for the offers but who usually receive 
less user value in return 
 2.9  Conclusions
The theoretical analysis in this chapter can be summarised as follows. The 
transactions model presented in Section 2.8 demonstrated that a vacancy is 
considered a suitable destination when the quality of the surrounding area 
is sufficient. The main reason why households nonetheless move to ill-reput-
ed areas is that they cannot obtain dwellings elsewhere or because the price-
quality relationship of the observable aspects of housing quality is sufficient. 
Selecting destinations in well-reputed neighbourhoods is a worthwhile strat-
egy for buyers or tenants who do not know the quality of the surrounding 
neighbourhood. The simulation model presented in Section 2.7 showed that 
house-seekers from a similar social-economic stratum perpetuate the social 
quality of a neighbourhood by moving there (or shunning it) as well. Neigh-
bourhood reputation thus acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy: the social qual-
ity of well-reputed (ill-reputed) neighbourhoods remains high (low), as long 
as households with a higher (lower) social-economic status believe that the 
neighbourhood’s name is well-founded and as long as they continue to move 
to (shun) the area. 
Buyers and tenants who move over short distances, who search near key-
activity places or who have social ties in the area retain inside information.48 
The inside information that they have of their surroundings is nonetheless 
of little use to them when moving to another neighbourhood. House-seekers 
who face considerable losses (in terms of utility, money or waiting time) up-
47 Comparable results were obtained by Chorus and Timmermans (2007) in a model for consumer choice under 
uncertainty. The authors concluded that the utility of acquiring information on a good is greater when the price-
difference with other goods is small and when brand loyalty is low. 
48 Moving entails a destruction of ‘information capital’. 
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on making erroneous destination choices have stronger incentives to be in-
formed about distant neighbourhoods.49 As demonstrated in Section 2.8, one 
such group includes households who must exchange another dwelling with 
a good price-quality relationship. Short-distance movers and transferring 
households should therefore be better informed than long-distance movers 
and first-time buyers or tenants are. The acquisition of inside information al-
lows them to discard the lemons among the offers. Ill-informed buyers and 
tenants pay the penalty: although they bid the same amount, they usually 
end up with offers that are overvalued on the social rental segment and over-
priced on the owner-occupied segment of the housing market. 
The informational asymmetry between residents and informed house-seek-
ers on the one hand and ignorant house-seekers on the other hand gives 
rise to a set of conjectures, which are tested in the regression analyses in the 
coming chapters (see Figure 2.10).
First, the incomplete (and possibly biased) information held by the average 
house-seeker can be opposed to the inside view held by residents. Informa-
tion on the neighbourhood can be incomplete when house-seekers adopt a 
spatial scale for the neighbourhood that is higher than the scale that resi-
dents have in mind for their surroundings. The estimated push effects of the 
neighbourhood in an exit choice model for social tenants in Rotterdam (Chap-
49 This constitutes another reason (see Footnote 21) for why the price-quality relationship of the old home might 
have an influence on the destination choice.
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ter 3) are compared to the pull effects in the demand for social rental dwell-
ings (Chapter 4). Residents should be well-informed, but some house-seekers 
might use information on too high a spatial scale i.e. neighbourhood repu-
tations. The first conjecture then states that the pull that a neighbourhood 
exerts on house-seeking tenants must be acted out over a larger area than 
the corresponding push effect. The demand for dwellings is measured by the 
number of responses to offers on the social rental market (Chapter 4), thus 
making it a stated rather than a revealed housing choice. In order to compare 
the push effects with the pull effect of the neighbourhood in a revealed pref-
erence model, the same analysis is carried out for the small group of tenants 
who accepted the association’s offer. 
The pull of a neighbourhood on successful candidates in the Dutch social 
rental sector is analysed in Chapter 5, in the context of investigating the wait-
ing time for a social rental dwelling. In accordance with the transaction mod-
el presented in Section 2.8, it is assumed that tenants who move over short-
er distances are better informed, as are transferring tenants or tenants with 
a longer duration of stay and therefore a higher rank in the distribution sys-
tem. The last two categories face higher risks when selecting an offer: trans-
ferring tenants must exchange another dwelling, while tenants with a longer 
duration of stay make a transfer and they abandon good housing opportuni-
ties in the near future. The purpose of this regression is to see how many new 
tenants were ignorant about the quality of the neighbourhoods to which they 
moved. If many tenants were unaware of the unobservable aspects of neigh-
bourhood quality, then, with some reservations, an affirmative answer can be 
provided to the first question of this thesis: ‘Is the posited knowledge gap be-
tween residents and uninformed house-seekers visible in their respective valuation of 
the neighbourhood on the social rental market?’
Search costs are probably higher for owner-occupiers than they are for so-
cial tenants, due to the very low transactions costs in the Dutch distribution 
system for social rental dwellings. This does not imply that the incentives to 
be informed are higher among tenants than among owner-occupiers, as buy-
ers face high opportunity costs when selecting a lemon. Buyers’ taxes, real-
tors’ fees, the cost of refinancing mortgage debt and moving costs make the 
resale of an unwanted dwelling a costly affair. The existence of an informa-
tional asymmetry on the social rental market in Rotterdam offers no guaran-
tee for the existence of a similar asymmetry on the owner-occupied segment. 
It will be hard to prove that buyers use reputations without further knowl-
edge of the way in which reputations are constructed and what the motives 
of buyers are behind their selection of a particular destination. A solution to 
this problem would be to investigate the posited relation between house price 
and neighbourhood reputation. Spatial patterns in house prices, or to be ac-
curate the assessment value of dwellings, in Rotterdam, are investigated in 
the third part of the thesis in order to answer the second key question of this 
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thesis: ‘does this informational asymmetry carry over to the owner-occupied market 
as well? In other words, do neighbourhood reputations affect house prices?’ 
One necessary condition for the emergence of an informational asymme-
try on the owner-occupied segment of the housing market is that the house 
price is not used as a signal for the unobservable quality of the area. All intra-
neighbourhood differences in the unobservable quality should be neglected 
in the price. In this case, dwellings in well-reputed neighbourhoods receive a 
reputational premium in the house price, whereas dwellings in areas that are 
lower on the neighbourhood hierarchy receive a discount. When crossing the 
administrative boundaries of a neighbourhood, a sudden jump in house pric-
es may be observed, which is unrelated to changes in the physical make-up 
of dwellings or the rate of tenure. The sorting of households between neigh-
bourhoods according to the reputational bias could explain these disconti-
nuities in price, especially when price hikes near neighbourhood boundaries 
are commonplace on the housing market. Second, a border adjustment may 
generate a sudden jump in the house prices, as the area has just changed its 
name. In Chapter 6, spatial house-price patterns in Rotterdam are investigat-
ed in order to detect jumps in the price near neighbourhood boundaries. The 
empirical part of this thesis concludes in Chapter 7, with a case study of the 





Part II Informational asymmetry
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 3  The exit choices of social 
tenants50 
 
 3.1  Introduction
The quality of the neighbourhood plays an important role in a household’s 
decision to leave its current home. A household’s exit choice can be consid-
ered the one housing choice in which the full information axiom of stand-
ard economic theory is most likely to hold. Daily living experience ensures 
that residents’ perceptions of their home surroundings come close to the ful-
ly informed view on the neighbourhood and its attributes that the archetypi-
cal neoclassical household is assumed to have as well. In this chapter, I ana-
lyse the exits and stays of tenants in order to obtain an estimate of this inside 
view on the neighbourhood within the context of the social rental market in 
Rotterdam. 
The regression model for tenants’ likelihood to move in 2002, 2003 and 2004 
serves as the benchmark for the regressions that follow in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that residents are likely to have highly ac-
curate perceptions regarding the scale of the push effects of the neighbour-
hood, whereas house-seekers are likely to have a larger scale in mind. In the 
exit choice model presented in this chapter, the range of the push effects of 
neighbourhood attributes then acts as a minimum bound for the range of the 
pull effects in the destination choice models. In addition to having a superi-
or notion of the scale of the neighbourhood, residents are in agreement about 
the size of the pull effects of neighbourhood attributes, while house-seek-
ers differ in opinion regarding the size of the pull effects of at least some at-
tributes. 
Before presenting the regression, I introduce and discuss the two measures 
of neighbourhood quality that are used throughout the thesis: neighbourhood 
satisfaction and the assessment value of the dwelling as a proxy measure for 
house price. Each of these variables expresses a different aspect of neighbour-
hood quality: neighbourhood satisfaction reflects the neighbourhood’s unob-
servable quality, while house price reflects its observable quality. The main 
advantage of using these composite measures is that it eliminates the neces-
sity of measuring and specifying the underlying attributes of the neighbour-
hood. The size of the estimated push effect of neighbourhood satisfaction 
acts as an upper bound for the pull effect of the same variable in the destina-
tion choice models. 
50 The analysis in this chapter is loosely based on Van Ommeren and Koopman (2011). The focus of that paper 
is different, however, as tenants’ valuations of the neighbourhood are secondary to their valuations of the structu-
ral characteristics of their dwellings and the role of the housing association in maintaining the quality of its stock.
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 3.2  Neighbourhood push and the likelihood to 
move
The demand for dwellings of a certain size and type is related to the life stage 
and career of household members (Kendig, 1984; Mulder and Hooimeijer, 
1999). Marriage, divorce, birth, old age, sickness, enrolment in higher educa-
tion, entering the labour force or job changes are all life events that some-
times entail the necessity to relocate. A household’s space requirements are 
coupled with a demand for other aspects of housing quality, as well as a shift 
in tenure, if the financial room allows it (Clark et al., 1984; Boehm et al., 1991). 
Given that long-term residents grow attached to their homes, a household’s 
duration of stay acts as an impediment to moving (Henley, 1998). Attributes of 
the neighbourhood that have been cited as push factors include a lack of so-
cial ties (Landale and Guest, 1985; Kan, 2007), dilapidation (Landale and Guest, 
1985), place detachment (Deane, 1990; Gustafson, 2001), high crime (South 
and Crowder, 1998), poor schools (Bartik et al., 1992), high taxes and low pub-
lic service levels (John et al., 1995), social distance from neighbours (Lahr and 
Gibbs, 2002) and poor neighbourhood reputation (Permentier, 2009).51
Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship between housing attributes and ex-
it choice. A household perceives the attributes in various residential environ-
ments before starting to assess neighbourhood quality (i.e. neighbourhood 
satisfaction; Speare, 1974) and overall housing quality (i.e. residential satisfac-
tion; Speare, 1974).52 If neighbourhood satisfaction falls short of a desired lev-
el, residential stress can occur, possibly prompting the search for a new home 
(Wolpert, 1966; Brown and Moore, 1970). In the residential survey that is used 
throughout this thesis, half of the Rotterdam tenants who responded in 2004 
stated that they would be willing to move within the next two years. In addi-
tion to overestimating their chances of obtaining a new home, the respond-
ents provided reasons for the willingness to move that prove instructive.53 Of 
all potential movers, 19.6% cited a desired change in tenure, 13.9% cited lower 
housing costs, 74% cited an improvement in the actual dwelling, 34.4% cited 
life events and 54.2% cited the quality of the neighbourhood. The share of po-
51 Permentier (2009) analyses exit choice according to the neighbourhood’s reputation as perceived by resi-
dents, mentioning that this measure correlates strongly with its reputation as perceived by outsiders. As shown 
later in this chapter, it is far easier for social tenants to exit areas at the bottom of the neighbourhood hierarchy 
(which consist largely of social rental stock) than it is to leave more attractive neighbourhoods. It thus remains 
unclear whether the estimated push effects of reputations pertain to the ‘third-party’ effect that the stigmatisation 
of an area has on the well-being of residents (Tsfati and Cohen, 2003) or to the role of choice constraints.
52 The distinction between street or block level, neighbourhood section (the area that residents identify as 
common ground) and administrative neighbourhood (or borough) in Figure 3.1 is based on the work of Suttles 
(1972), which was verified empirically by Birch et al. (1979).
53 Only 5.4% of Rotterdam tenants seeking housing in 2005 managed to find social rental dwellings in that year. 
The minimum waiting time for a social rental dwelling was about four years for a first-time tenant (COS, 2006).
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tential movers referring exclusively to neighbourhood push factors (i.e. safe-
ty concerns, social circumstances and accessibility), however, was 3.9%. Poor 
neighbourhood quality is thus an important push factor, but only in combina-
tion with life events and a deficient rent-quality relationship of the dwelling. 
For this reason, the exit choice model should include the rent and structural 
characteristics of the dwelling and household characteristics as explanatory 
variables, in addition to measures that express neighbourhood quality.
Regression models for the exit choices of households include hazard rate 
models for duration of stay (Henley, 1998; Van der Vlist et al., 2002), count 
models for exit rate (number of moves per dwelling within a given period) and 
discrete choice models for the dichotomous choice to stay or to move. Dura-
tion and count models make better use of information: they incorporate the 
date of the move or the number of moves that occur within a given period. 
On the other hand, discrete choice models are less demanding in terms of da-
ta collection, and they are easier to interpret. They suffice for the purpose of 
the regression in this chapter: the identification of the strength and range of 
neighbourhood push effects. The most easily interpreted discrete choice mod-




















The probability that a tenant will select a move from amongst the choice 
set A={stay; move} is a function of the K attributes of the actual dwelling zk, 
the logarithm of the rent log[r], the L household characteristics hhl and the 
M neighbourhood variables NBHm. An increase in one of the neighbourhood 
variables is expected to reduce the likelihood to move (δm<0). The equation 
inside the exponential function involves a trade-off between rent and neigh-
bourhood quality (Van Ommeren and Koopman, 2011).54 Differentiating the 
numerator in formula 3.1 with respect to the neighbourhood variable and set-
ting this derivative to zero yields the tenant’s willingness to pay for an in-







−=   
A tenant’s willingness to pay for an increase in neighbourhood quality is equal 
to the increase in rent needed to maintain the same likelihood to move. The 
average willingness to pay is an estimate of the user value of the neighbour-
hood for the existing tenant. This calculation returns in the next chapters.
The model (3.1) assumes that a tenant is able to move or stay. When in-
vestigating the Dutch social rental market, the role of choice constraints can-
not be neglected. First, some tenants are forced to move out of their homes 
due to eviction, restructuring of their housing units or such life events as di-
vorce, illness or old age. Second, some tenants find it hard to obtain anoth-
er dwelling, due to their low rank in the distribution system. Finally, some 
tenants may be near the end of their housing careers. Because of the finan-
cial, personal, institutional or other constraints on moving, some tenants do 
not respond to small changes in housing quality. Tenants who live in the best 
dwellings in the most attractive areas find it especially hard to continue their 
housing careers within the social rental sector, and they may also be imped-
ed from making a transition into owner-occupation.55 The larger the number 
of choice-constrained tenants is, the weaker will be the neighbourhood’s push 
effects on all tenants and, consequently, the lower will be the average willing-
ness to pay for the neighbourhood. 
54 The trade-off between rent and housing attributes is based on the work of Gronberg and Reed (1994), who 
estimated the marginal willingness to pay for skills from job-duration data.
55 Accessibility remains a problem for first-time buyers on the Dutch owner-occupied market (Renes et al., 2006; 
Neuteboom and Brounen, 2009).
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Choice constraints are irrelevant to the discussion, as long as the regres-
sion is meant to clarify how neighbourhood quality affects the average exit 
rate on a particular housing market. However, I am interested in the push ef-
fects on tenants who have the option to move, as I later compare the strength 
and range of these effects to the pull effects on tenants facing a largely un-
constrained destination choice. Tenant protection and the social task of the 
associations ensure that evictions are scarce in the Dutch social rental sector. 
The housing stock in the sample was not subject to restructuring. Following 
a divorce, the head of a household is allowed to stay in the dwelling. Invol-
untary moves due to an old age or illness and some involuntary stays due to 
a short duration of stay (a proxy for the tenant’s rank in the distribution sys-
tem) can limit the ability of some tenants to stay or move. This problem can 
be alleviated by extending the period in which a move is allowed to occur, as 
the constraints should become less binding as the tenant’s duration of stay is 
lengthened. As a further precautionary measure, the sample could be limited 
to tenants below a certain age (thereby reducing the incidence of involuntary 
moves) and above a certain duration of stay (thereby reducing the incidence 
of involuntary stays). 
 3.3  Data
The port city of Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands, with 
an estimated population of 600,000 in the municipality in 2005. The pop-
ulation was distributed across 305,000 households in 285,000 dwellings. 
The share of social rented dwellings in the housing stock was 53%. With 
over 23,300 rental units and 3,500 dwellings in socially-bound ownership in 
2005 Woonbron is one of the larger landlords on the Rotterdam market. The 
records of Woonbron in the years 2002 to 2005, tax assessment values in 1999 
and 2003, a residential survey conducted in 2004 (‘De Grote Woontest’ [The 
Great Home Test]) and population register data from the municipal statistics 
office allow for a thorough analysis of the social rental market in Rotterdam. 
The association’s records contain information on the structural characteris-
tics and rent of 16,000 dwellings in 26 of the 73 largely residential neighbour-
hoods on a total of 89 neighbourhoods. This cross-section of the city’s stock 
includes dwellings in ten administrative neighbourhoods in four administra-
tive boroughs, where the association owns a sizeable fraction of the stock (see 
Figure 3.2). In Rotterdam, boroughs consist of from one up to nine administra-
tive neighbourhoods. The remainder of property is dispersed over 16 neigh-
bourhoods. Some neighbourhoods rank in the top ten of the deprivation in-
dex for Rotterdam, which was first published in 2008 (COS, 2008). Nearly 98% 
of Woonbron’s property, however, was situated in ten neighbourhoods that 
ranked from place 14 to 53 on a total of 64 ranks in the index (from 1 – most 
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deprived – to 64 – least deprived).
The number of moves per dwelling and the date at which each move 
occurred are observed from the association’s records for three years. These 
observations are linked to the age, duration of stay and eligibility for rent-
al subsidies of tenants and population register data on household type at the 
beginning of 2002. 56
This yields 9,600 observations of household characteristics, housing at-
tributes and the occurrence of exits in 2002, 2003 or 2004. 
The structural characteristics of a dwelling include the number of rooms, 
56 Woonbron uses a two-tiered rental system. All households are eligible for social rental dwellings, even if their 
income is high. Households who are ineligible for rent subsidy pay the maximum rent, while other tenants receive 
a discount on the rent. Ineligibility for rent subsidy in 2005 are single households with an annual income higher 
than € 18,700 and households with an income higher than € 25,075. Less than 2% of Woonbron’s tenants fell into 
the high income category (see Table 3.3).
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the building period, five different categories of house size, three different 
house types, the presence of a lift and the maintenance label. A high label for 
maintenance indicates that the property was in prime condition, while a low 
label indicates that it was destined for renovation or demolition in the near 
future. The rent and assessment value of each dwelling are also observed. 
The use of neighbourhood variables may lead to the measurement and 
specification problems that were discussed in Section 2.6. Returning to Figure 
3.1, it becomes clear that direct valuation of neighbourhood quality by insiders 
and outsiders circumvents these measurement and specification problems. 
Before discussing the outsiders’ valuation of the location in the form of the 
house price residual, I address the experiences of residents with regard to the 
quality of life in the neighbourhood. A residential survey (‘De Grote Woontest’ 
[The Great Home Test]), which was conducted in early 2004 under the com-
mission of the municipalities and the associations in the wider metropoli-
tan region, contains neighbourhood satisfaction scores from 9,000 households 
in Rotterdam. Due to considerations of privacy, responses could not be iden-
tified as coming from either tenants or non-tenants of Woonbron. The sev-
en response options for the question ‘How do you rate your neighbourhood?’ 
ranged from ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to ‘extremely satisfied’, with an average 
score between neutral and mildly satisfied. While it could be argued that re-
spondents may have interpreted the term ‘neighbourhood’ to mean their ad-
ministrative neighbourhood rather than their surroundings, statistical evi-
dence proves otherwise. As shown in Table 3.1, most of the spatial variation 
in the 9,000 adjusted satisfaction scores (see below) occurs within 66 admin-
istrative neighbourhood. Spatial dependency is high as well; Moran’s I scores 
are highest for the four nearest neighbours (I=0.34), indicating that the scores 
are largely correlated with nearby observations.57 
The scores of individual respondents must be transformed into a measure 
of the shared experience of the quality of a neighbourhood. To obtain the no-
tion that all residents (including non-respondents) have of neighbourhood 
quality, the individual scores are first regressed on the characteristics of each 
respondent. Details of the linear regression on the survey scores are shown in 
the appendix titled Additional results.58
57 Moran’s I is a measure of spatial autocorrelation that ranges from -1 (complete negative autocorrelation) and 
1 (complete positive autocorrelation), with a value of 0 meaning no correlation whatsoever. The figure declines 
rapidly as the number of nearest neighbours increases.
58 Ordinal scores should really be estimated by means of an ordinal regression, for instance a multinomial logit 
model (Lu, 1999). The reason to use a linear regression lies in the fact that the scores are adjusted and ‘kriged’ 
(see below) to obtain an estimate of average neighbourhood satisfaction in 250 m² areas. Predicted scores from 
an ordinal model are less sensitive to changes in household characteristics. This leads to loss of information, 
especially when the number of scores in an area is low. See Permentier et al. (2011) for a similar approach taken. 
The robust estimation (using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent error terms) of the linear model and the 
multinomial logit model are shown in the appendix. Estimation results turn out very similar.
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The influence of relevant household characteristics (e.g. family type, ten-
ure, age and duration of stay) is first eliminated from the scores. The adjust-
ed scores tell how a specific household (a non-pensioner, single, aged below 
35 or above 65, with medium to lower education and a home-owner) rated his 
environment, given the type of dwelling that he lived in. 
In an effort to remove the remaining idiosyncratic bias in the adjusted 
scores, a kriging procedure is applied (see Footnote 10 and Figure 3.3).59 Nine 
different representations of neighbourhood satisfaction are obtained, starting 
with an average of the scores within a box of 250 m2 (2,700 ft2) and ending 
59 First, a two-dimensional grid is constructed with boxes of 250 m2. The average value of the adjusted satisfac-
tion scores is calculated for each box. The average per box is used to calculate weighted and unweighted averages 
with various ranges (see Figure 2.7). The spatial weights on the local average are based on a linear decay 
function, in which observations within a range carry double the weight of observations within the next range, 
such that all of the weights sum to one (see Figure 3.3). Adjustments are made when observations are missing in 
neighbouring boxes, as illustrated for the Von Neumann neighbourhood with range 1 in the lower panel of Figure 
3.3.
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with a weighted average that covers twenty-five boxes, or an area of 1.6 km2 
(0.4 mi2). One of the nine representations should capture the inside view on 
the area. The inside view contains the residents’ assessment of the area’s so-
cial climate and the quality and availability of amenities that cater to the lo-
cal populace. The various representations are tested for their relevance in the 
exit choice model in this chapter. Their relevance in the destination choice 
models is tested in Chapters 4 and 5.
Some attributes could be irrelevant to the inside view but still relevant to 
the exit choice. House price (or house price residual) is used to control for the 
remaining push effects of neighbourhood attributes. Municipalities in the 
Netherlands fund themselves in part by levying property taxes based on a 
percentage of the assessment value (or WOZ value) of the dwelling.60 Assess-
ment values in early 1999 and 2003 were provided by the municipal tax of-
fice, along with some structural characteristics of the entire Rotterdam hous-
ing stock (over 285,000 dwellings). Because several identical dwellings were 
appraised simultaneously, the data is limited to 106,000 unique assessments. 
A discussion on the suitability of the assessment value as a proxy measure 
for house price is postponed until Chapter 6. For now, the reader should bear 
in mind that I am talking about the assessment value whenever I mention 
house price.
The house price residual is the fraction of the price that is dependent up-
on the location of the dwelling (Bayer and Ross, 2006). It is obtained by means 
of a hedonic house price regression on the type, size and age of the dwell-
ing and neighbourhood-fixed effects. A robust estimation of a hedonic house 
price regression for Woonbron’s stock in 2003 is shown in the appendix. The 
sum of the neighbourhood dummy and the disturbance term for each obser-
vation in the estimated price equation is defined as the house price residual. 
This residual can contain the effects of measurement errors in the structur-
al characteristics, misspecification bias and the value of structural character-
istics that are observed by buyers but not by the researcher. It is assumed that 
the effects of the missing variables and the measurement errors are random-
ly distributed across the housing market, such that the house price residual 
acts as an estimate of the location’s assessment by outsiders (i.e. realtors and 
buyers). This measure has the additional benefit of eliminating the necessi-
ty of identifying or specifying the underlying attributes of the neighbourhood 
in order to obtain a working measure for the observable aspects of neighbour-
hood quality. 
If an informational asymmetry exists on the owner-occupied market, then 
the house price residual will be equal to the exchange value of observable 
60 WOZ or ‘Waardering Onroerende Zaken’ is the value of immovable property. 
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neighbourhood quality, possibly supplemented by estimation and misspeci-
fication bias and a reputational premium. Evidence of the close relationship 
between the house price residual and neighbourhood reputation is present-
ed in Table 3.1. About half of the variance in the 16,000 observations on the 
residual is due to differences between 26 administrative neighbourhoods, 
the scale at which reputations are manifested. If the correlation between the 
house price residual and the representation of neighbourhood satisfaction is 
investigated, then Pearson’s correlation coefficient turns out small and nega-
tive for representations with a low range, but it increases to 0.4 when satis-
faction is averaged at the administrative neighbourhood level.
To further investigate the relation between house price residual and neigh-
bourhood satisfaction at the administrative neighbourhood level, a non-para-
metric test is carried out for the correlation between these measures and two 
commonly used statistics for the social quality and socio-economic status of 
the neighbourhood: average household income and the share of owner-occu-
pied dwellings in the stock. The test for uniformity in the ranking of 66 ad-
ministrative neighbourhoods in Rotterdam is shown in Table 3.2.61 The rank-
ing of neighbourhoods based on house price residual and neighbourhood sat-
isfaction is apparently similar, as is ranking based on income or owner-occu-
pation. The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 tells that house price probably con-
tains a premium for each administrative neighbourhood, such that the push 
and pull effects of the price in residential mobility models may be the result 
of tenants’ desire to improve upon their socio-economic status or the fact 
that they associate high socio-economic status with neighbourhoods in which 
the quality of living is good.
Outlier analysis for the dataset in Table 3.3 reveals that some dwellings 
carried an excessive rent and that a few dwellings had very high prices. All 
dwellings with rents above € 800 per month and prices above € 250,000 are ex-
cluded from the estimation, leaving 9,537 observations. Based on these obser-
vations, a total of 1,933 dwellings (or 6.8% on a yearly basis) were vacated in 
2002, 2003 and 2004. Choice constraints were not so severe as to prevent ten-
ants with low rankings in the distribution system from moving or to prevent 
the elderly from staying. The exit rate among tenants with a low duration of 
stay is higher than average (23.4% for tenants with a duration less than 20 
61 The house price residual is calculated in Table 3.2 with the same data used in Chapter 6. Data on income and 
owner-occupation is provided by the municipal statistics office.
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months). The exit rate among tenants older than 70 years of age is only mar-
ginally higher than the average (22.8%). There is thus no immediate need to 
restrict the sample any further based on the tenant characteristics. 
Most dwellings lie within one of the ten neighbourhoods that are covered 
by the neighbourhood-fixed effects. The value of neighbourhood satisfac-
tion ranges from 4 (a neutral view) to 5 (a mildly satisfied view). Although the 
sample does contain some disadvantaged areas with scores of less than 4, 
most observations lie within areas that can best be described as the middle to 
upper-middle range of the social rental market and the lower-middle to mid-
[ 72 ]
dle range of the entire housing market.62 The sample thus covers neighbour-
hoods that are located largely in the middle of the neighbourhood hierarchy. 
The scope of the sample is important in the investigation of the destination 
choices of tenants, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. An intermediate to good 
reputation is a prerequisite for the presence of ill-informed, voluntary movers 
on a geographical submarket (see Section 2.8). 
 3.4  The likelihood of social tenants to move
The results of the estimation of a logit model for social tenants’ likelihood 
to move in Rotterdam in 2002, 2003 and 2004 are presented in Table 3.4. This 
and all other regressions in the thesis are performed using the EViews 5 soft-
ware package of the Quantitative Micro Software Corporation. The base mod-
62 Satisfaction scores greater than 5 (satisfied) can be found only in the most prestigious owner-occupied neigh-
bourhoods of the city, and in the garden villages which are poor, but very stable and popular white working-class 
areas. These outliers are not included in the dataset.
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el includes the dwelling’s structural characteristics and rent, as well as tenant 
characteristics as explanatory variables. The frame of reference in the model 
is a fictitious single-room downstairs apartment, built before 1945 with a size 
of less than 50 m2 and a low level of maintenance, inhabited by a low-income 
household that could not be identified as members of one of the dominant 
household types. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation is applied 
to control for heterogeneity in the model (White, 1980). 
The estimation outcome for the base model makes sense. Likelihood to stay 
proves greater for larger, newer, less expensive and better-maintained dwell-
ings. Moves occurred less frequently in single-family dwellings and more fre-
quently in upstairs than in downstairs apartments. The observed tenant char-
acteristics yield sensible results. Likelihood to move decreases with age, as 
older tenants are nearer the end of their housing careers (Henley, 1998). Like-
lihood to move increases with duration of stay, not so much because tenants 
became less attached to their homes in the course of time as because long-
er duration of stay led to a higher rank in the distribution system for social 
rental dwellings. The occurrence of life events may have triggered addition-
al moves as the duration of stay lengthened. Households with children moved 
less frequently than households without children. As expected, the small 
group of high-income tenants that should have been able to make a transi-
tion in tenure had a higher likelihood to move.
In Model I, the local averages for neighbourhood satisfaction are tested one 
by one, in order to identify the best representation (in terms of its z statistic) 
for the inside view on the neighbourhood. The second best representation is 
then added to the model to test whether both representations are significant. 
If both are significant, the third best representation is added to the model. 
If not, the third best representation is substituted for the second best repre-
sentation. The procedure continues up until the point that all representations 
have been tested for their relevance. 
The averages for neighbourhood satisfaction that are calculated for the 
boxes of 250, 500, 750 and 1,000 m2 are inferior to the locally weighted aver-
ages that cover the same ranges. Of all the representations, the average based 
on a Von Neumann neighbourhood with range 1 and a Moore neighbourhood 
with range 2 (see Figure 3.3) both prove significant. The first average covers 
an area of five boxes of just 250 m2, with one third of the value defined by 
the box in which the observation falls and the other two thirds defined by 
the four adjacent boxes. The low scale of this measure (0.3 km2) conforms to 
the residential environment of the block level. The average based on a Moore 
neighbourhood with range 2 covers a range of 625 metres in the northern, 
eastern, southern and western direction or an area of 1.6 km2 (see Figure 3.3). 
This scale conforms to the administrative neighbourhood for smaller neigh-
bourhoods and to entire neighbourhood sections for larger neighbourhoods.
Model II appends model I with the logarithm of the price of the dwelling, 
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which is assumed to control for observable neighbourhood quality. Later in 
this chapter, it is shown that house price and house price residual are perfect 
substitutes for one another in the estimation.. The use of house price in the 
model compares the neighbourhood’s user value for owner-occupiers and for 
social tenants.63
The inclusion of house price annuls the explanatory power of neighbour-
hood satisfaction based on a Moore neighbourhood; the latter measure has 
a coefficient value of 0.36 with a z statistic of 1.0. It is subsequently dropped 
from model II. None of the other representations of neighbourhood satisfac-
tion, apart from the average based on a Von Neumann neighbourhood with 
range 1, proves significant. House price is able to control for most inter-neigh-
bourhood differences in living quality. Neighbourhood satisfaction captures 
the push effects operating at the block level. This is probably due to those as-
pects of the neighbourhood that are known only to insiders. The low spatial 
scale confirms the stylised fact that residents’ living experience takes place 
within a short walking distance of their home (Coulton et al., 2001; Goetgeluk 
and Wassenberg, 2005).64  
The inclusion of house price also reduces the coefficients for some struc-
tural characteristics. One explanation is that price controls for unobserved 
attributes of the actual dwelling, the effects of which would otherwise enter 
the coefficients for larger and/or single-family dwellings. A more compelling 
explanation lies in the effects of residential sorting. Families opt for single-
family dwellings, while younger couples tend to live in apartments closer to 
the city centre (Kendig, 1984). Single-family dwellings in the dataset are lo-
cated in attractive areas: Pearson’s correlation coefficient for neighbourhood 
satisfaction and single-family dwellings is 0.30, as compared to -0.23 for up-
stairs apartments. Continuous house price is better suited to control for the 
influence of sorting between areas on the exit rate than is the dichotomous 
house-type variable. The estimated coefficient in the model might therefore 
slightly overestimate the actual push effect of house price.
The estimated coefficient on neighbourhood satisfaction in Model II is 
-0.77 and the coefficient on the price is -1.86. Table 3.3 tells that an increase 
of one point (4.93-3.92) was the maximum attainable rise in the inside view. 
Tenants were prepared to pay an additional € 51.20 (i.e. 0.77/5.64*371.33*1.01; 
see also formula (3.2)) on an average rent of € 371.33 per month (or 13.8%) for 
63 The rent is higher than tenants’ housing costs due to rent subsidies, while the subsidisation of interest pay-
ments on mortgage debt inflates the house price and hence the user costs of the owner-occupied dwelling. These 
problems are circumvented by expressing both rent and house price as logarithms.
64 The estimation results are in line with research on neighbourhood satisfaction. Hipp (2010) showed that 
neighbourhood satisfaction is mainly dependent upon attributes that work at a low spatial scale. Lee et al. (1994) 
found that neighbourhood satisfaction is an important factor in exit choice, although it does not contain all of the 
push effects of the neighbourhood.
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the maximum increase in the quality of life. If house price had increased by 
1%, then social tenants would have been willing to pay an additional 0.33% 
(1.86/5.64) of rent. This low figure reveals that the societal costs of investing 
in neighbourhoods are high. Each neighbourhood investment that raised the 
price level by € 1 increased the consumer surplus of tenants by a mere € 0.33. 
This is an indication of the misallocation of dwellings across the various seg-
ments of the Dutch housing market. The introduction of social rental stock on 
a geographical submarket limits supply in the lower ranges of the owner-oc-
cupied segment. The displacement of some low-income and middle-income 
buyers (others may still enter the social rental market) pushes up the average 
income of buyers and thus their willingness to pay for the neighbourhood.65 
Model II is able to explain 282 of 1.861 exits (15,1%) and 7.337 of 7.508 stays 
(97,7%), which explains its poor fit (R2=0.12). The low predictive power puts 
some perspective on the ability to model choice behaviour of social tenants: 
an awful lot of exits remains unexplained.
Robustness analysis
The following question concerns whether the outcome of model II is affect-
ed by estimation problems. Sorting between areas leads to interdependence 
between house type, location and household characteristics, and, potential-
ly more seriously, between the explanatory variables and the error terms. De-
spite a correlation between the explanatory variables, coefficients remain un-
biased, as long as all relevant characteristics and attributes are used as ex-
planatory variables. Unobserved variables which affect sorting, can create 
omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias is a special form of endogeneity 
in which the explanatory variables (including the coefficients of interest: the 
neighbourhood push effects) and error terms are correlated. Endogeneity can 
inflate the value and significance levels of the coefficients of interest in the 
model: the neighbourhood push-effects.
Sorting may create another endogenous relationship between the depend-
ent and explanatory variables in the model. For example, the exit rate is usu-
ally lower and residential location demand is higher in attractive areas. Stable 
demand can become a neighbourhood-quality characteristic in its own right. 
This further reduces the exit rate, increases demand and causes an endog-
enous rise in neighbourhood quality (Bartik, 1987). The opposite (i.e. endog-
eneity concealing a causal relation) is true when there is a negative feedback 
65 In urban studies, the term ‘displacement’ is usually used to refer to the exit of low-income households from 
gentrifying areas. (Marcuse, 1986). The displacement of high-income households has been the subject of studies 
that examine the externalities of zoning policies in the US (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002) and the Netherlands (Ver-
meulen, 2008; Dekkers, 2010). Part of the difference in willingness to pay may be due to the agglomeration bene-
fits of having high-income neighbours (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Other explanations for the gap in willingness 
of tenants and of owner-occupiers to pay are choice constraints for tenants, agglomeration benefits of having 
other owner-occupiers as neighbours or a difference in housing taste between tenants and owner-occupiers.
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at work. 
Endogeneity poses less of a problem in the relationship between house 
price and exit choice. Because price represents an assessment by outsiders 
(i.e. realtors’ appraisals), the dependent variable (i.e. exit choices of insiders) 
need not feed back into the price. A low exit rate in one year, however, would 
likely lead to higher satisfaction scores in the next year and a further endog-
enous fall in the exit rate in the same year. Furthermore, areas that experi-
ence high exit rates in one year usually experience higher rates in the next 
year as well. Two-stage estimation with instrumental variables can be used 
to counter endogeneity (Bowden and Turkington, 1984). The instruments that 
substitute for neighbourhood satisfaction in the model must be able to ex-
plain satisfaction, but they should be unrelated to the exit choice. This pos-
es a serious problem in the selection of instruments: the definition of neigh-
bourhood push effects entails that these are attributes which cause neigh-
bourhood dissatisfaction and lead to moves.66 Something can be salvaged 
by investigating the average exit rate in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 in the 
175 boxes of 250 m2 in the dataset. Pearson’s correlation coefficient tells that 
spatial exit rates in 2002 and 2003 were strongly correlated to one anoth-
er (r=0.80), but that exit rates in 2004 were largely independent from rates in 
2002 and 2003 (respectively r=0.06 and r=0.09). Model II is estimated solely for 
2004, thereby allowing a lag in the response of the exit choice to neighbour-
hood satisfaction which was measured at the beginning of 2004. Results from 
this model indicate that the pull effects of neighbourhood satisfaction and 
house price are the same as they were in the three-year period, although ten-
ants’ sensitivity to rent was slightly higher. The coefficient on rent (7.20 with 
a t-value of 13.8) remains within the upper bound of the coefficient shown in 
Table 3.4. 
In an attempt to control for omitted variable bias, several statistics from the 
residential survey are first averaged over clusters of 250 m2 and then append-
ed to model II. These variables include the share of different household types 
among all households, the share of different house types, the share of eth-
nic households, the share of low and high income categories and the share 
of unemployed or inactive households in the area. The share of single-parent 
households and inactive households in the area do (negatively) affect the ex-
it rate in model II. They do not affect the estimates of the coefficients or the 
willingness to pay for a one-point increase in neighbourhood satisfaction of a 
doubling of the price by much (14.1% and 32.0% respectively).
The analysis of the disturbances in Model II reveals the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation: Moran’s I is 0.19. The localised Moran’s I scores indicate that 
66 This calls into question the use of neighbourhood satisfaction as an ‘intervening’ variable in revealed prefer-
ence models for the exit choice (see for instance Speare, 1974; Landale and Guest, 1985 and Lu, 1998). 
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most autocorrelation is due to scattered observations in the 16 neighbour-
hoods where Woonbron owns little stock.67 Exits were rare in these isolated 
cases. Spatial autocorrelation, dependency of the error term in the model on 
error terms of nearby observations, leads to inflated significance levels (Anse-
lin, 1999). Spatially correlated disturbances are caused by spatial dependen-
cies in the exit rate (e.g. copycat moving), the effects of spatially correlated, 
omitted variables (Dean and Lawless, 1989) or spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 
1999). With regard to the latter, heavier constraints on moving in some are-
as can lead to spatial dependency in the exit rate. White’s estimation meth-
od controls for heterogeneity, but this ensures that the average push on all 
tenants is estimated accurately. The push on tenants facing an unconstrained 
exit choice may be higher. I address the issue of heterogeneity later on in this 
section.
The second model is first estimated without the scattered observations in 
16 neighbourhoods and with neighbourhood-fixed effects for the remaining 
10 neighbourhoods. The area dummies control for push effects that are man-
ifest at the administrative neighbourhood level and beyond (e.g. changes in 
supply in nearby areas or the ‘third-party effect’). They are a crude but effec-
tive way of addressing spatial autocorrelation (Bourassa et al., 2003 and 2007). 
The results for the structural characteristics are similar as those reported 
in Table 3.4, but Moran’s I drops to 0.09. The reduction in spatial autocorrela-
tion results in a willingness to pay of 13,9% of rent for a one-point increase in 
neighbourhood satisfaction and of 37,9% of rent for a doubling of the price. 
In the third robustness check, the house price residual is used instead of 
house price as an explanatory variable, in order to prove that the latter does 
more than control for the unobserved attributes of the actual dwelling. The 
same structural characteristics that are used in the exit choice model, explain 
the difference between house price and the house price residual (see the ap-
pendix). Hence, the estimation of the model with the house price residual in-
stead of price does not change the results presented in Table 3.4.
In addition to addressing endogeneity and spatial autocorrelation, it is im-
portant to address the problem of heterogeneity. Coefficients may change 
their value with each location, a problem known as ‘spatial heterogenei-
ty’ (Anselin, 1999). A model with fixed coefficients is then a valid descrip-
tion of behaviour on a geographical submarket, but not elsewhere (Bourassa 
et al., 2003). The most likely cause of heterogeneity is the spatial clustering of 
households that are unable to move. Geometrically weighted regressions and 
state-space models handle spatial heterogeneity quite well (Brunsdon et al., 
2002; Francke and Vos, 2004). I opt for another solution to this problem. 
A preliminary regression is conducted for the logarithm of duration of stay 
67 All of the spatial statistics are calculated with the Geoda software package designed by Luc Anselin.
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on tenant characteristics, structural characteristics, rent, neighbourhood var-
iables and neighbourhood-fixed effects. The age of the head of household 
proved the main force behind duration of stay, but duration also proved high-
er among tenants living in single-family dwellings in areas with high satis-
faction scores.68 Change in duration of stay (i.e. likelihood of moving within a 
given year) is affected by house price, although price proves irrelevant for du-
ration of stay.69 The most important outcome of the regression, however, is 
that moving was indeed more difficult for older, long-term residents living in 
attractive areas, especially for those living in areas in which the most sought-
after house type (i.e. single-family dwelling) was more prevalent. 
For further analysis, the sample is split according to neighbourhood satis-
faction and house type. This creates subsamples of 5,915 observations in ar-
eas with satisfaction scores lower than 4.4 and 3,454 observations in are-
as with scores equal to or higher than 4.4. Two more subsamples are creat-
ed which contain 2,027 observations involving single-family dwellings and 
7,342 observations involving apartments. In the estimation for the disadvan-
taged areas, the coefficients for rent, neighbourhood satisfaction and house 
price are the same as they are for the entire sample, but neighbourhood satis-
faction is insignificant. With regard to tenants living in attractive areas, there 
is no evidence that neighbourhood satisfaction has a push effect. This result 
should not be given too much weight, however, as much of the correlation be-
tween neighbourhood satisfaction and exit choice is eliminated by splitting 
the sample in half according to satisfaction. A compensatory increase is vis-
ible in the push effect of house price. Tenants living in attractive areas were 
willing to pay 46,1% of rent for a doubling of the house price.
Similar results are obtained when estimating the third model for the various 
house types. A loss in the explanatory power of neighbourhood satisfaction in 
the model with tenants in single-family dwellings is compensated by a strong-
er push effect of price. Tenants living in single-family dwellings were willing 
to pay 62,1% of rent for a doubling of the price. Other aspects of housing qual-
ity proved less important to tenants in single-family dwellings, while their 
sensitivity to rent was comparatively strong. Rent remains as a choice criteri-
on for tenants who are unable to improve upon their current housing quality. 
Tenants living in apartments responded in the same way to changes in 
housing quality as did tenants in the entire sample. The results of the estima-
tion for apartments is shown as model III in Table 3.2. The estimates lead to a 
willingness to pay of 15,1% of rent for a one-point increase in neighbourhood 
satisfaction and 31.2% of rent for a doubling of the house price.
68 A one-point increase in neighbourhood satisfaction increased the average duration of stay by 37%.
69 This counter-intuitive result can be explained by the fact that high-priced neighbourhoods in the dataset 
are dominated by new construction. The average duration of stay in younger residential areas had perhaps just 
caught up with duration of stay in established residential areas at the time during which the sample was drawn.
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The results presented above could lead to the erroneous conclusion that 
tenants living in single-family dwellings placed less weight on the quality of 
their actual dwellings and neighbourhood than did tenants living in apart-
ments. Tenants in single-family dwellings did place more weight on rent; if 
they had wanted to, they could have settled for less expensive dwellings in 
less attractive areas. The fact that they remained in more expensive dwell-
ings indicates that the lower willingness to pay observed among tenants in 
single-family dwellings must have been due to some factor other than indif-
ference with regard to housing quality. The most plausible explanation is that 
they found it difficult to continue their housing careers within or outside of 
the social rental sector. Their unwillingness or inability to improve upon their 
dwellings could explain their insensitivity towards changes in housing quali-
ty.70 The willingness to pay of tenants living in apartments is a better bench-
mark for the assessment of neighbourhood quality than is the willingness to 
pay of tenants in the much scarcer single-family dwellings. 
 3.5  Conclusions
The main result of this chapter relates to the validity of neighbourhood satis-
faction and the assessment value as measures of neighbourhood quality. The 
assessment value is a proxy measure for house price and it proved a suitable 
control variable for the observable quality of the neighbourhood, thus allow-
ing a reasonably accurate estimation of the inside view. The size of the push 
effect of house price is approximately equal to about one-third of the rent for 
a doubling of the house price. The inside view is best portrayed by a weight-
ed average for neighbourhood satisfaction with a range that conforms to the 
block level. In the model, neighbourhood satisfaction appears to capture the 
unobservable quality of the neighbourhood. The strength of the push effect 
of this inside view is equal to about 15% of the rent for the maximum attaina-
ble increase in the quality of life. The range on this push factor, which covers 
an area of 0.3 km2, serves as the minimum bound for the range of the pull ef-
fect of the inside view. In the following chapter, the estimated range and size 
of the push effect of neighbourhood satisfaction, as discussed in this chapter, 
are compared to the range and size of the pull effects of neighbourhood sat-
isfaction in two types of destination choice models. A word of caution seems 
appropriate; the low predictive power of the model reveals that social ten-
ants’ moving behaviour is surprisingly difficult to explain.
70 First-generation rent controls – the freezing of the contract rent during the rental period (Arnott, 1989) – 
might reduce willingness to move among long-term residents as well. The tenant’s duration of stay controls for 




 4  The demand for social 
rental dwellings 
 4.1  Introduction
Once a household has expressed the willingness to move, the search for 
a new home can commence. Households do not merely face constraints on 
moving that impede their ability to exit their current homes (e.g. financial 
constraints or a tight housing market). They also face constraints once they 
are able to move and trying to find new homes. In the search for a new home, 
a household must first gather information on the availability of suitable va-
cancies and then on the quality of the vacancies that are on offer. In Chap-
ter 2, I argued that the main source of uncertainty in the assessment of a va-
cancy lies in the unobservable quality of the neighbourhood. The observable 
quality of a neighbourhood can be assessed upon the inspection of an offer, 
whereas house-seeking tenants must make an individual effort to learn more 
about the unobservable quality of a neighbourhood. 
House-seekers who rely on different sources of information about the qual-
ity of distant neighbourhoods are assumed to hold different notions on the 
scale of the neighbourhood and on the strength of some of its pull effects. In 
this chapter, I examine the response to offers on the social rental market in 
Rotterdam (a proxy measure for the aggregate demand for dwellings), in or-
der to see whether different notions materialise in the choice behaviour of 
house-seeking tenants. I then compare the estimated size and range of the 
pull effects of the neighbourhood in this stated preference model with that of 
the push effects in the exit choice model discussed in Chapter 3. In particular, 
neighbourhood satisfaction should be less relevant in the destination choices 
than it is in the exit choices of tenants. The comparison of the push and pull 
of the neighbourhood should indicate the average house-seeking tenant’s dis-
advantage relative to an existing tenant, with regard to having knowledge of 
the neighbourhood. 
 4.2  Neighbourhood pull and housing demand
On a free market, the demand for and supply of dwellings are either in equi-
librium or adjusting towards an equilibrium state. On a regulated market, the 
controlled rent is usually too low to clear the market, such that excess de-
mand emerges (Arnott, 1989). Landlords who ask rent that is below the mar-
ket level must find ways to allocate dwellings among tenants. Three alloca-
tion mechanisms exist on the social rental market in Rotterdam. Some of the 
dwellings are offered directly to particular target groups.71 Most of the dwell-
71 In 2005, 22% of the vacancies on the social rental market in Rotterdam were offered directly to specific 
tenants (COS, 2006). This includes tenants living in areas that were undergoing restructuring, tenants who had 
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ings are offered through regular channels, predominantly on the internet, al-
though the offers are also advertised in a freely distributed paper. After regis-
tering as a house-seeker, the tenant has access to the offers of all the associa-
tions in the wider metropolitan region. On the internet search site, the tenant 
must first state preferences regarding rent, house type, number of rooms and 
administrative borough. Once a preliminary choice set is available, additional 
detail is provided regarding the quality, rent, location and eligibility require-
ments of each offer. In any two-week period, a registered house-seeker may 
respond to a maximum of three offers. 
Two allocation mechanisms are set in motion once the subscription period 
closes. The order of invitation in the queuing system depends upon the ten-
ant’s duration of stay in another social rental dwelling or the time that has 
elapsed since registering as a house-seeker. Requirements regarding income, 
age and household size are set for offers of a certain size and rent range in 
order to ensure that the elderly, low-income households and families with 
children stand a better chance of obtaining accommodations.72 In 2002, 
Woonbron (the association on whose housing stock the analysis in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 is based) created an experimental lottery for some of its vacancies, 
in order to increase the success rate for first-time tenants. In this system, the 
candidate’s rank is based on a random draw in the lottery. With the exception 
of apartments in assisted living facilities, no further eligibility requirements 
exist in the lottery. House-seekers can exercise one, two or three options on 
the same offer in the lottery, or on three different offers in the queuing sys-
tem. House-seekers who subscribe to an offer are invited by the association to 
inspect the dwelling, based on their rank in the queue or the draw in the lot-
tery. Acceptance of the offer makes the registration time of a first-time tenant 
or duration of stay of a transferring tenant void, thereby returning the candi-
date to the back of the queue for social rental dwellings. 
Rejection of an offer either by the association or by the candidate is a com-
mon occurrence. Of the 1,806 offers made by Woonbron in 2002, 2003 and 
2004, only 1.5% were accepted by the first candidate in line.73 Rejection by the 
association occurs if the candidate does not meet the eligibility requirements 
or does not show up for inspection. Invited candidates are free to reject offers 
if they are disappointed with them upon inspection. Upon obtaining a dwell-
ing (either within or outside of the distribution system), the candidate forfeits 
all other options. Given the high incidence of rejections, many house-seekers 
experienced threats made against them and asylum-seekers, former psychiatric patients or homeless people who 
were granted accommodations in connection with the social task of the association.
72 In 2005, 78% of all social rental vacancies in Rotterdam were offered through regular channels (i.e. the inter-
net site and the free paper), 29% carried eligibility requirements and 49 % carried no requirements at all (COS, 
2006).
73 The average number of rejections for an offer in the sample was 17, while the highest number of rejections 
for an offer was 149 before a candidate accepted the offer.
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seemed to have used their responses strategically. Invitations serve as a sig-
nal to candidates that they can upgrade their choices of specification in the 
next period. Tenants who are not invited learn that they must wait longer for 
the same specification of dwelling or downgrade their choices of specification 
in the next period, if they wish to obtain accommodation on short notice. 
The response then, is a stated housing choice rather than a revealed hous-
ing choice for candidates who reject an offer. Unlike sociologists, statisti-
cians, psychologists or environmental economists, who make frequent use of 
survey data in their research, many economists question the merit of stat-
ed choice analysis. One criticism is that a stated choice is subject to idiosyn-
cratic bias and highly dependent upon the survey design (Diamond and Haus-
man, 1994). Large samples are likely to reduce the bias in the response, and 
measurement problems call for a better survey design or post-survey adjust-
ments to the survey scores. A more serious objection is that a stated choice 
does not involve a real commitment on the part of the respondent.74 The ne-
oclassical framework discussed in Chapter 2 is not concerned with choic-
es that are non-binding, although this does not mean that the response to 
the offer cannot be fit into the framework.75 A model of net response to offers 
can still be derived with the aid of several assumptions concerning the unob-
served search and choice behaviour of tenants. 
Assume that all offers are made in the queuing system.76 Homeless tenants 
extend their period of homelessness, while existing tenants extend their du-
ration of stay in the old home up until the point d in time, at which they are 
better off living in the new home (Van der Vlist, 2001). A tenant will accept 
any offer that is made at time d, if the improvement in utility in the next pe-
riod outweighs the expected losses in utility in the coming periods due to the 
abandonment of future housing opportunities:
(4.1a)   
  1 1
1
( ; ) ( ;0) { ( ; ) ( ; )}(1 )
T
t d
d d d d d d
t d
U y − r z U y U y r z U y r zρ − + + +
= +
− > − − −+Σ  
(4.1b)   
0 0 1 1
1
( ; ) ( ; ) { ( ; ) ( ; )}(1 )
T
t d
d d d d d d
t d
U y r z U y r z U y r z U y r zρ − + + +
= +
− − − > − − −+Σ  
In these equations, zt is the specification of dwelling that is occupied from 
74 The discrepancy between stated and revealed choices is most evident in willingness to move when confronted 
with exit choice. De Groot et al. (2011) found that a third of households that stated that they were willing to move 
actually did move within the next two years.
75 Attempts to provide theoretical underpinnings for stated choices include McFadden (1986) for dichotomous 
choices in general and Timmermans et al. (1994) and Earnhart (2002) for housing choices in particular.
76 A similar outcome is expected in the lottery, for reasons that become clear in Chapter 5.
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time t onward, rt is the rent of this dwelling, ρ is the discount rate (0<ρ<1) and 
T is the final period that the tenant will spend in the new dwelling. The likeli-
hood of acceptance increases in the rent-quality relationship of the offer and 
decreases in the rent-quality relationship of future offers. Invitations serve 
as signals to candidates that their high ranking in the distribution system 
will allow access to better offers in the next period (i.e. zd+1>zd and/or rd+1<rd). 
Some high-ranking candidates reject offers because the value of future hous-
ing opportunities over current offers is positive. In some cases, however, can-
didates are ranked so low that conditions (2.18a) or (2.18b) do indeed hold. 
The important result is that all candidates who are next in line would have to 
accept the offer as well, as the value of future housing opportunities is lower 
for them than it is for the winning candidate. The net response to an offer (i.e. 
the number of responses minus the number of rejections) must be closely as-
sociated with tenants’ demand for this type of dwelling. 
Three factors can create a gap between the net response to and the demand 
for a social rental dwelling. First, tenants can exercise options on three differ-
ent dwellings in the queuing system or on one, two or three dwellings in the 
lottery. Second, if two identical dwellings arrive on the market at the same 
time, then the odds of obtaining this type of dwelling are also doubled (Tim-
mermans and Van Noortwijk, 1995). In theory, this makes the net response 
to an offer equal to three times the demand for the dwelling, divided by the 
number of offers that have the same specification (i.e. number of arrivals) as 
the dwelling in question.77A less trivial reason for the gap between the net re-
sponse to and demand for the offer involves the role of unobserved choice be-
haviour. Some house-seekers might be interested in an offer, but they could 
be absent during the subscription period. Uninvited candidates may also have 
rejected an offer (or be rejected by the association), even if they had been in-
vited. Neither the non-response of absentees nor the implicit rejections of the 
uninvited candidates are observed. The difference between the two figures – 
the implicit rejections and non-response work in the opposite direction – is 
treated as a random process in order to arrive at a workable model.78 
In Chapter 2, the demand for dwellings was derived. Demand depends upon 
the attributes of the actual dwelling and neighbourhood, housing costs and 
the characteristics of households that make up the target group for the speci-
fication of dwelling. Keeping all other attributes z* fixed, the demand for a so-
cial rental dwelling with specification (z1,z*) can be formulated as follows: 
(4.2) NzhhryznzzD ))),,,((),( *1
*
1 =  
77 Rational tenants are likely to exercise all three options, as the additional costs of a second and third response 
(possibly for the same offer) are negligible once the first option has been exercised.
78 This means that a particular target group is no more or no less inclined to respond to an offer and no more 
or no less likely to reject an offer than is any other target group.
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In this equation, N stands for the number of house-seeking tenants, hh for the 
characteristics that define tenants’ housing taste, y for tenants’ income and/
or wealth and r for the rent of the dwelling. The fraction of tenants n demand-
ing specification (z1,z*) rises with the quality of the dwelling (z1) and falls with 
the rent. The target group n*N can contain tenants who are heterogeneous in 
their characteristics and preferences. The tenant characteristics in relation-
ship (4.2) should not be viewed as features of any individual candidate, but as 
an exogenous demand shift parameter that expresses the taste of the target 
group as a whole.
The net response NR to an offer with specification (z,r) is equal to three 
times the demand for this type of dwelling, divided by the number of iden-
tical dwellings arriving on the market γ, plus a term ut, which represents the 
sum effect of the implicit rejections and non-response: 
(4.3) 
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Net response rises with the availability and quality of attributes of the ac-
tual dwelling z and neighbourhood NBH and drops when the rent r increas-
es. The demand shift parameteρ Φ captures the taste of the target group. The 
number of arrivals γ can act as an exogenous supply shift parameter, but it 
might vary with the specification of dwelling. Given that popular dwellings in 
areas with a better quality of life tend to be scarce, the number of arrivals for 
these types of dwellings is likely to be lower. The shape of the term ut can on-
ly be guessed. It is possible that the absolute difference between implicit re-
jections and non-response increases with the number of net responses. This 
leads to heterogeneity in the model.
Event data (e.g. net response) are best estimated with a count model. 
Among the different count models, the negative binomial model allows for 
a non-linear relationship between the dependent variable and the explana-
tory variables, and it allows for heteroskedastic disturbances due to hetero-
geneity or other reasons.79 The model uses structural characteristics and the 
logarithm of rent as explanatory variables, in addition to several institution-
al variables addressing the peculiarities of the distribution system. Structur-
79 The mean value of the event variable yi in the negative binomial count model is given by E{yi}=λi=exp(α+βxi), 
where α+βxi is the estimated equation. The variance is V{yi}= σ
2λi. The shape parameter κ=log(σ²) reveals the 
degree of dispersion of the disturbances compared to the mean. The data are underdispersed for values of κ that 
keep the variance below the mean, while higher values of κ refer to data that are overdispersed (Long, 1997). 
Underdispersion is preferable in this context, as it indicates that there is little positive spatial autocorrelation due 
to (spatial or non-spatial) heterogeneity (Haining et al., 2009).
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al characteristics include the primary choice criteria on the search-site (e.g. 
house type and number of rooms), secondary choice criteria (e.g. the size and 
building period of the dwelling, and the maintenance level), which can be ob-
served upon inspection. Institutional variables include the year in which the 
dwelling was offered as a measure of general market pressure, a dummy term 
which tells whether the offer was made within the queuing system or within 
the lottery, and two dummies for the eligibility requirements for the dwelling. 
The role of neighbourhood quality in the destination choice is illustrated 
in Figure 4.1. House-seekers have the same information on the rent, struc-
tural characteristics and location of the dwelling through the advertisement, 
but they must rely on external sources in order to learn about the quality of 
the neighbourhood. The outside view on the area, which is embodied by the 
house price residual, costs nothing to obtain and should be known by all. In-
spection yields additional information on the observable aspects of neigh-
bourhood quality. Inspecting the dwelling prior to the response might not pay 
off, however, given that most respondents will not be invited by the associa-
tion. Tenants who acquire more detailed information on the neighbourhood 
through their own experience, local witnesses or the use of neighbourhood 
statistics nonetheless run the risk that this information is incomplete. Incom-
pleteness may be due to the aggregation of information over a range that ex-
tends beyond the surroundings of the offer. If house-seeking tenants use in-
complete information in responding to offers, then the range of the estimated 
pull effects of the neighbourhood must exceed the range of the correspond-
ing push effects in their exit choices. Furthermore, neighbourhood satisfac-
tion (the inside view) should play a minor role in the destination choices of 
most house-seeking tenants.
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The regression is thus meant to shed light on the strength and range of the 
pull effect of neighbourhood satisfaction. Endogeneity should pose few prob-
lems in this particular estimation. The response to offers is probably higher 
in areas with a good living quality. With regard to the stability of the area, 
however, it makes little difference whether one or 500 tenants are standing 
in line, as long as one of them accepts the offer. The decision to respond can 
hardly be considered a constrained choice; a response is cheap and easy to 
make, and rejection is always an option. Tenants might still feel constrained 
in advance if they know that their rank is insufficient to obtain the type of 
dwelling that they actually prefer. Some low-ranking tenants may decide to 
wait, while others – presumably first-time tenants; see conditions (4.1a) and 
(4.1b) – can lower their standards to secure accommodations on short notice. 
The latter rational choice strategy could influence the estimation outcome, as 
hard-pressed tenants are more inclined to respond to offers that are attain-
able on short notice than they are to wait for offers that they actually prefer. 
This problem is discussed at the end of this chapter.
The unobserved non-response and implicit rejections can lead to heteroge-
neity in the model if they are correlated with the number of responses. An-
other cause of heterogeneity is linked to the dispersion of the observations 
across the city (see Figure 3.2). The boroughs in the sample differ in quali-
ty, reputation and social make-up.80 The relation between net response and 
neighbourhood quality may change from one housing submarket to the oth-
er, as the target group in each area can be different as well. The estimation 
method (i.e. Huber-White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors) 
controls for heterogeneity. This ensures that the average pull effects on all 
tenants are estimated accurately, although it might still lead to a misrepre-
sentation of the pull effect on each separate submarket. Rather than resorting 
to a spline regression (Poirier, 1973) or a threshold model (Hansen, 2000), both 
of which allow for structural changes in the coefficients of the neighbourhood 
variables with every submarket, I opt for a simple solution for addressing spa-
tial heterogeneity in the robustness analysis: separate regressions for sub-
samples of observations below and above a given threshold in neighbourhood 
satisfaction.
80 Although it is of a reasonable quality, the northwestern borough of Prins Alexander is known as a ‘white bul-
wark’ (Van der Zwaard, 2005), whereas the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the western borough of Delfshaven 
house primarily ethnic minorities. The southeastern borough of IJsselmonde is neutral in most respects, although 
the city’s entire south bank has a worse reputation than does the north bank.
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 4.3  Data
The data used in the estimation of the net response to offers in Rotterdam 
were taken from the record of the Woonbron association (see Table 4.1). The 
offers made by Woonbron in 2002, 2003 and 2004 are first cleansed of offers 
made directly to tenants. This leaves a total of 1,794 observations, 61% of 
which were offered through the lottery system. The vacant dwellings were sit-
uated in ten administrative neighbourhoods in four different boroughs of the 
city. In addition to the number of responses to and rejections of each offer, 
the dataset contains the structural characteristic of the dwelling (house size, 
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number of rooms, building period, house type, presence of a lift and mainte-
nance label), rent in 2002 and the assessment value as a proxy measure for 
the house price in 2003. The observations concerning house price fall short 
of those on the other variables, thus leaving 1,673 observations in the estima-
tion with price.
Institutional variables include the year of the offer, a dummy term for the 
distribution system (1 for the lottery, 0 for the queuing system) and dummies 
for the physical accessibility of the dwelling. In Rotterdam, stars are assigned 
to social rental dwellings in order to indicate how well the dwelling is adapt-
ed to the needs of the elderly and disabled. Dwellings with a three or four 
stars carried additional eligibility requirements regarding age and/or disabil-
ity status. High star labels could be expected to lower the net response to of-
fers, due to the reduction in the number of eligible candidates. The dataset 
from the association’s records is appended by nine different representations 
of the locally weighted averages for neighbourhood satisfaction. Finally, the 
average turnover (i.e. the share of moving households) in each administra-
tive neighbourhood and year is listed. The latter variable has been calculated 
from population register data from the municipal statistics office. The turno-
ver rate is intended as a control for exogenous shifts in supply (i.e. changes in 
the arrival rate of dwellings) within the area.
 4.4   Net response to social rental dwellings
The results of a robust estimation of a negative binomial count model for 
the net response to offers on the social rental market in Rotterdam in 2002, 
2003 and 2004 are listed in Table 4.2. The referential category is a single-room 
downstairs apartment, built before 1945 with a size of less than 50 m2 and a 
low level of maintenance. The estimation of the base model shows that the 
primary choice criteria (number of rooms, house type, rent and borough of 
the offer) played a decisive role in the net response to offers. Large single-
family dwellings with low rents proved most popular among tenants. A com-
parison with Table 3.4 tells that the ratio’s of the coefficients on number of 
rooms and house types with the coefficient on rent are similar for the exit 
choice and destination choice model, but that this correspondence does not 
apply to all structural characteristics. Secondary choice criteria (e.g. house 
size and age) proved unimportant.81 Tenants discarded poorly maintained 
dwellings and dwellings in disadvantaged neighbourhoods more often, possi-
81 The negative sign on the coefficient on dwellings larger than 90 m2 should not be given too much weight. 
Only 17 observations fell into this category, including five offers with a net response lower than 50 and one obser-
vation that had a net response of one (14 responses and 13 rejections).
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bly as a result of rejection upon inspection. As expected, dwellings designated 
for the elderly and infirm obtained fewer responses, while the net response in 
the lottery was higher than it was in the queuing system. On average, 42 more 
candidates responded to dwellings in the lottery (0.31*(153.38-17.18); see also 
Table 4.1). The shape parameter proves highly significant, thereby justifying 
the decision to use a negative binomial count model.82
The inside view on the neighbourhood is introduced in Model I. The best 
representation is calculated over a five-by-five Moore neighbourhood which 
conforms to the administrative neighbourhood for smaller neighbourhoods 
and to entire neighbourhood sections for larger ones. It is, however, just in-
significant; there is a 93% probability that it is different from zero. The large 
scale (about 2.5 times the range and five times the size of the inside view in 
the exit choice model) reinforces the conjecture that most house-seekers held 
incomplete information on the neighbourhood when they responded to of-
fers. This raises the possibility that neighbourhood satisfaction controls for 
82 The alternative for the negative binomial count model, the Poisson count model, assumes that the mean 
value of the event variable is equal to its variance (Gourieroux, 2000).
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aspects of neighbourhood quality in this model other than those for which it 
controlled in the exit choice model. Attributes that are known only to insiders 
must be acted out inside the administrative neighbourhood; otherwise, out-
siders would be aware of them as well. 
Model II introduces the natural logarithm of house price. The inclusion of 
the house price increases the value and significance of the coefficient for 
neighbourhood satisfaction. Based on the high scale for neighbourhood pull 
effects, both variables probably control for observable neighbourhood quality, 
whereas the largely unobservable quality of life at block level seemed to have 
little effect on the decision to respond. The inter-neighbourhood differences 
in the response rate are better explained when both variables are used in the 
estimation. The net response to offers depended on the primary choice cri-
teria: the rent, number of rooms, house type and borough of the offer. Some 
tenants also took account of the dilapidation of the dwelling (an effect that is 
captured by the maintenance label) and the administrative neighbourhood or 
neighbourhood section in which the offer was made. 
The estimated coefficient for price in model II yields a willingness to pay 
of 0.24% (0.58/2.41) for a percentage increase in the price. The willingness to 
pay for a one-point increase in neighbourhood satisfaction rises to € 45.47 
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(0.29/2.41*377.85), or 12% or rent.
This is about the same amount what existing tenants were willing to pay 
(14%, see Section 3.4). Despite the closeness of the willingness of residents 
and house-seekers to pay, the two figures should not be compared directly. 
Neighbourhood satisfaction probably explains inter-neighbourhood differ-
ences in net response to offers, whereas it controlled for intra-neighbourhood 
differences in the exit choice model. Apparently, some aspects of the observ-
able quality of the neighbourhood that were not included in the push effect of 
neighbourhood satisfaction are now concealed in its pull effect. 
Robustness analysis
The attributes of the neighbourhood whose range does not extend beyond the 
home surroundings seemed to have little or no effect on the decision to re-
spond to offers. This raises the question of whether the model fails to cap-
ture the unobservable neighbourhood quality and its effect on the response. 
The pull effects of attributes that go unobserved by the researcher but are ob-
served by tenants are likely to create large and spatially correlated distur-
bances in the estimation. The low rate of dispersion of the model (κ=-0,86, 
so exp(-0.68)=0.51<1) indicates that spatial autocorrelation is small (see also 
Footnote 78). The value of Moran’s I of 0.11, however, shows that not all of the 
spatial variation in the net response is accounted for by the neighbourhood 
variables. 
In the second robustness check, area-fixed effects are appended to model II. 
This is done in an attempt to reduce some of the spatial autocorrelation. Fur-
thermore, it may reveal what aspects the neighbourhood variables are meas-
uring. Estimation results are similar when borough-fixed or neighbourhood-
fixed terms are used in the model. The results of the estimation of model II 
with borough-fixed effects is shown as model III in Table 4.2. Neighbourhood 
satisfaction retains its explanatory power, but house price is insignificant. 
Neighbourhood satisfaction explains differences in the net response at the 
scale of neighbourhoods and neighbourhood sections. Price mainly controls 
for the inter-borough differences in the number of response. Net response 
ranged from an average of 239 in the borough Overschie to 123 in the large 
southern borough of Groot-IJsselmonde. A t-test for the equality of the mean 
net response between boroughs is rejected for all but one comparison (i.e. be-
tween Delfsha-ven and Prins Alexander). The poor name of the southbank of 
the city seems to be reflected in both lower house prices and unpopularity on 
the social rental market.
In the third robustness check, the number of moving households each year 
as a percentage of all households in the neighbourhood is appended to the 
model, in an attempt to control for the arrivals of vacant dwellings on each 
geographical submarket. Contrary to expectations, the turnover rate proves 
irrelevant. The fact that vacancies were in short (or abundant) supply did not 
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lead to a higher (or lower) response to offers in the area. Without knowledge 
of tenants’ motives for responding to offers, it is difficult to say whether they 
took account of local supply conditions or whether the turnover rate is an in-
adequate measure of the number of arrivals. After all, no distinction is made 
between moves in the social rental and owner-occupied segments of the mar-
ket. In the absence of strategic response by tenants, changes in local supply 
are likely to have generated large, spatially correlated disturbances. The mod-
erate spatial autocorrelation indicates that the arrival rate was either con-
stant over the three-year period or that most tenants understood that supply 
affects the success rate. The variance in the arrival rate (see Table 4.1) makes 
the latter explanation more plausible than the former, although it remains an 
educated guess.83
The relationship between net response to offers and neighbourhood quality 
may have undergone a structural change if tenants shifted their focus away 
from attractive areas and towards disadvantaged areas (or vice versa). The use 
of different search areas by tenants with a different housing taste or differ-
ent levels of awareness of neighbourhood quality may lead to spatial heter-
ogeneity. In the final robustness check, the observations are split according 
to neighbourhood satisfaction scores. This produces a subsample of 876 ob-
servations with satisfaction scores less than 4.4 and a subsample of 902 ob-
servations with score of 4.4 and higher. The mean net response is identical 
in the subsamples.84 The explanatory power of the neighbourhood variables 
is low in the estimation for the sample in the deprived areas (see Model IVa). 
Neighbourhood satisfaction has an unexpected, negative sign. The results are 
quite different for tenants who opted for offers in attractive areas. The esti-
mation for areas with high satisfaction scores is listed as Model IVb in Table 
4.2.85 Tenants who responded to offers in attractive areas were willing to pay 
0.36% for an percentage increase in house price. The willingness to pay for a 
one-point increase in neighbourhood satisfaction jumps to € 188.11 (or 49,8%) 
of monthly rent. The higher willingness to pay for neighbourhood satisfaction 
among tenants who responded to offers in attractive areas probably reflects 
their greater awareness of or greater sensitivity towards the observable qual-
ity of the neighbourhood. None of the other representations of neighbour-
83 The number of offers in each borough is listed on the opening page of the internet search site, while the pa-
per lists the offers of each association in alphabetical order for each neighbourhood. This should reveal, at least 
to some extent, the areas in which the success rate is high and the areas in which it is low.
84 The hypothesis that net response differs between the subsamples can be rejected with a confidence level 
of 95% (t-value of 1.68). Three fourths of the observations in the first subsample are in Delfshaven, with the 
remainder in disadvantages sections of IJsselmonde and in Overschie. Nearly one third of the observations in the 
second subsample are in Prins Alexander, with close to two thirds in IJsselmonde and the remainder in Overschie 
(see Figure 3.2).
85 Because dwellings with a three-star label are rare in this particular subsample, this category is merged with 
the larger four-star category.
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hood satisfaction adds explanatory power to Model IVb once the representa-
tion based on a Moore neighbourhood with range 2 is used. This makes clear 
that the majority of tenants who responded in attractive areas differentiated 
between administrative neighbourhoods or neighbourhood sections, but that 
they were either just as indifferent towards or unaware of the living quality in 
the surroundings of the offer as the other tenants were. 
 4.5  Conclusions
This chapter investigated net response to social rental dwellings in Rotter-
dam. Willingness to pay for the neighbourhood proved even higher among 
house-seeking tenants who responded to offers in attractive areas than it was 
among existing tenants. In contrast, the willingness to pay for the neighbour-
hood demonstrated by tenants searching in disadvantaged areas was negligi-
ble. The average house-seeking tenant valued the maximum attainable rise in 
neighbourhood satisfaction at about 12% of the rent, which is similar to the 
assessment of the average existing tenant. This figure increased to 50% for 
house-seeking tenants who opted for offers in attractive areas. Tenants were 
willing to pay about one-third of what owner-occupiers were willing to pay 
in order to live in the same area. It is nonetheless premature to draw conclu-
sions from the comparison of the pull effects of the neighbourhood with the 
push effects discussed in Chapter 3. House price and neighbourhood satis-
faction controlled for the observable aspects of neighbourhood quality in the 
count model, whereas most respondents apparently neglected the unobserva-
ble quality of the area, for reasons that are as of yet unclear.
One of the most striking results of this chapter is the high range of the 
neighbourhood pull effects. The spatial variation in net response occurred 
at the scale of the administrative neighbourhood or entire sections of larg-
er neighbourhoods. This indicates that even within a highly transparent dis-
tribution system in which gains in neighbourhood quality can be substantial, 
few respondents took heed of differences in quality inside the administrative 
neighbourhood. This corroborates the first conjecture of Chapter 2, in which I 
stated that the range of neighbourhood pull effects must be higher than the 
range of the corresponding push effects. It remains unclear however, whether 
this difference in scale was the result of an informational disadvantage. 
Tenants who responded to offers in unattractive areas (i.e. areas dominated 
by apartments) may have done so because they cared little about neighbour-
hood quality or because of a greater need for accommodation. The next chap-
ter reveals that the waiting time for offers in unattractive areas was indeed 
shorter in 2005. Such strategic response behaviour could explain the observed 
sorting pattern as well: higher willingness to pay for neighbourhood quality 
triggers a response to offers in attractive areas, whereas lower willingness to 
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pay leads to a response to offers in more disadvantaged areas. The informa-
tional disadvantage of house-seeking tenants is not the only explanation for 
the estimation results in this chapter.
Furthermore, gathering additional information on neighbourhoods might 
not pay off, as the majority of candidates were not invited by the associa-
tion anyway. Strategic choice behaviour and the non-binding nature of the 
response obscure the exact strength and range of the estimated pull effects. 
Only when the destination choice is revealed is it safe to make statements 
about tenants’ preferences, the constraints they face or how well or ill-in-
formed they are. Revealed destination choices were made by candidates who 
accepted offers. In the next chapter, I analyse the bids of successful candi-
dates. This analysis is expected to reveal how useful the results of the stated 




 5  Waiting time for social 
rental dwellings
 5.1   Introduction
In the previous chapter, analysis of the response to offers by social tenants 
in Rotterdam pointed at the fact that a large number of tenants did not seem 
to care about differences in quality within the administrative borough when 
they responded to offers. While most house-seeking tenants can afford to re-
main ignorant about the quality of distant neighbourhoods, successful can-
didates pay an immediate penalty for such a lack of information. With long 
queues for social rental dwellings, tenants are effectively forced to remain in 
the chosen dwelling for a number of years. Unlike the response to an offer by 
most tenants, the destination choice of a successful candidate is clearly a re-
vealed housing choice.
In this chapter, I estimate a duration model of bids for vacant dwellings, in 
order to measure the pull that the neighbourhood exerted on successful can-
didates. The tenant’s bid is closely associated with the waiting time for an of-
fer. On the social rental market, the function of waiting time is similar to that 
of house price on the owner-occupied market. The purpose of the regression 
is to determine how many new tenants were aware of the circumstances in 
the neighbourhood. The notion that well-informed tenants have of the neigh-
bourhood is expected to come close to the inside view of residents. In con-
trast, the pull on less-informed tenants is expected to exhibit the same pat-
tern as seen in the previous chapter: a wide range on neighbourhood pull ef-
fects and weak pull effects for neighbourhood satisfaction.
 5.2  Neighbourhood pull and waiting time
According to standard economic theory, households try to maximise their 
lifetime utility. A homeowner moves when the expected utility of living in 
the new home (when the costs of moving are taken into account) exceeds the 
utility of staying in the old home (Nordvik, 2001). The homeowner’s duration 
of stay is dependent upon the same factors that govern the exit choice: the 
quality and user costs of the dwelling and the characteristics that define the 
homeowner’s housing taste (Goodman, 2003). The conditions for a move by a 
first-time buyer are usually less stringent, as homelessness usually produc-
es less utility than does occupancy of a dwelling. First-time buyers accept of-
fers that allow them to continue along their optimal consumption paths (Van 
der Vlist, 2001). For both types of buyers, the waiting time for the new home 
is equal to the duration of the search, extended by the time spent negotiating 
with the seller. Negotiations end when the sales price equalises the buyer’s 
bid to the seller’s offer. 
Duration of stay in the old home, waiting time for the new home and the 
bid for the new home acquire an entirely different meaning on the Dutch so-
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cial rental market. Until 2005, tenants in Rotterdam could use their duration 
of stay in another social rental dwelling as a ranking device. This provided ex-
isting tenants with such an advantage over first-time tenants (who had to re-
ly on their registration time) that the distribution system was transformed 
(COS, 2006). In 2002, the Woonbron association initiated a lottery for some of 
its offers, in which the candidates were drawn at random. In the queuing sys-
tem that most other associations continue to use, duration of stay was re-
duced by one quarter in each half-year period from 2005 onwards, such that, 
by the middle of 2006, registration time counted as the sole allocation crite-
rion.86 Registration time or duration of stay (or a fraction thereof) acts as the 
tenant’s bid for the offer. After accepting an offer, the winning candidate must 
re-register as a house-seeker, thereby voiding all accumulated registration 
time or duration of stay.
The decision to accept an offer is a revealed destination choice. Successful 
candidates prefer the offer to the many alternatives: other offers in the same 
period and their option on future offers in the queuing system. In the queu-
ing system, the waiting time for a dwelling stands in a straightforward rela-
tionship to the net response to an offer. This relationship is an application of 
Little’s Law from queuing theory. Little’s Law states that a steady state queue 
is equal to the average arrival rate of customers, multiplied by the average 
time a customer spends in the queue (Hall, 1999; Adan and Resing, 2002).87 
The ‘queue’ for a social rental dwelling can be defined as net response minus 
the sum of implicit rejections and absentee response (see Section 4.2). Ap-
plying Little’s Law, average time τ spent waiting for a dwelling with specifica-
tion (z, NBH) and rent r equals the steady-state queue for this type of dwelling 
(γ*(NR-ut)), divided by the increase in the number of house-seekers in the tar-
get group during each period ψ, divided by three (the number of options that a 
tenant can exercise):
(5.1)  
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Waiting time for a dwelling (actual or expected) depends upon the same var-
iables that govern demand for the dwelling: rent, housing attributes and de-
mand shift parameter Φ, as well as the number of new house-seekers in each 
period (see identity (4.3)). The function of waiting time is similar to that of 
86 During the first half of 2005, rank was based on 75% of the duration of stay for tenants living in a social rental 
dwelling, this changed to 50% in the second half of the year. Registration time acted as the ranking device for 
first-time tenants and for transferring tenants whose registration time exceeded (the fraction of ) their duration of 
stay.
87 In steady-state, the number of customers who enter the queue is equal to the number of customers served.
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house price on the owner-occupied market. The better the rent-quality rela-
tionship of an offer is, the more responses it will receive and the longer the 
tenant (who is in competition with other tenants) should be prepared to wait 
for it. Tenant characteristics and the rent and quality of the dwelling that the 
tenant leaves behind are irrelevant, as rank in the distribution system is de-
fined solely by the tenant’s registration time or duration of stay.
In a well-functioning distribution system, the bid of a successful candidate 
is equal to the waiting time for the dwelling. In the application of relationship 
(5.1), however, four problems arise. First, the arrival rate γ and the sum of im-
plicit rejections and non-response ut can not be observed. Second, the bid is a 
proxy for the waiting time for the dwelling. Third, the allocation criterion was 
in a process of transformation during the period of investigation. The fourth 
problem relates to the fact that the majority of offers was made in the lottery. 
I assume that the product of the arrival rate and the sum of implicit rejec-
tions and non-response is a random variable (i.e. E{γ*ut}=0). This assumption 
is in part validated by the irrelevance of the arrival rate for net response (see 
Section 4.4). With regard to the second problem, it is the waiting time of the 
candidate (i.e. the bid) that is observed and not the expected waiting time for 
the dwelling. Estimation in which the bid is substituted for the waiting time 
for the dwelling is feasible, as long as the expected value of the bid (taking 
heed of the transformation of the allocation criterion) is equal to the expect-
ed waiting time.88 In reality, the bid can be either lower or higher than the 
waiting time for the dwelling. 
The bid of the second candidate in line is leading for the waiting time for a 
dwelling (Klemperer, 2003); any duration of stay or registration time will do, as 
long as it is higher than that of the second candidate.89
At this point, I assume that tenants are more or less aware of their rank 
in the distribution system. The bidding process then has elements of an auc-
tion. Most auction designs (Vickrey auction, English auction and Dutch auc-
tion) lead to a price that is equal to the second-highest bid. Only in sealed-bid 
auctions (in which bidders are unaware of each others’ bids) does the price 
conform to the willingness to pay of the highest bidder (Klemperer, 2003).
The winning candidate is not allowed to retain this surplus upon accept-
ing the offer. When a tenant is first in line, it may take several periods before 
the desired specification is put on the market. The waiting time for the dwell-
88 If the measurement error in a dependent variable (i.e. the difference between the bid and the expected waiting 
time) is random, then the regression produces unbiased estimates (Greene, 1991).
89 At this point, I assume that tenants are more or less aware of their rank in the distribution system. The bid-
ding process then has elements of an auction. Most auction designs (Vickrey auction, English auction and Dutch 
auction) lead to a price that is equal to the second-highest bid. Only in sealed-bid auctions (in which bidders are 
unaware of each others’ bids) does the price conform to the willingness to pay of the highest bidder (Klemperer, 
2003).
[ 100 ]
ing could then act as a lower bound on the bid. On the other hand, the trans-
formation of the allocation criterion lowered all of the bids in the second half 
of the year.90  
Because I am interested in the role of neighbourhood quality in lengthening 
or shortening the waiting time for a dwelling, it is necessary to find a way of 
controlling for the potential surplus or shortfall in the bid.
In an attempt to control for the surplus or shortfall in the bid, I assume that 
the expected value of the tenant’s bid (θ) can be obtained by multiplying the 
waiting time by a factor f: 
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Factor f equates the expected waiting time with the expected bid. The instru-
ments in f should ideally be correlated with the bid and independent of the 
waiting time for the dwelling. Waiting time depends upon rent, housing at-
tributes and characteristics of the target group, but not on the tenant char-
acteristics hh: each tenant must bid the same amount of time regardless of 
tenant characteristics. Among the various tenant characteristics, age is like-
ly to be the best instrument. Because age was a good predictor for the dura-
tion of stay of residents (see Section 3.4), it must be correlated with the bid of 
a transferring tenant as well. It should also be a good predictor for the surplus 
or shortfall in the bid of a first-time tenant. The minimum age for registration 
is 18 years. Above this age threshold, age and registration time are identical. 
Age controls for the decline in the bids in the second half of the year, as well 
as for random ‘overpaying’ by individual candidates.91
Several institutional dummies Γ can be used as instruments as well. A dum-
my variable that distinguishes between first-time tenants and transferring 
tenants allows for a different degree of efficiency in the bidding of both cate-
gories of tenants. A dummy variable that distinguishes between the offers in 
the first and second halves of 2005 controls for any confusion that may have 
been created by the transformation of the allocation criterion. This dummy 
also controls for any increase or decrease in the arrival rate of house-seekers 
or any structural changes in the arrival of vacancies in the second half of the 
90 Let two transferring tenants with respective durations of stay of three and four years and a first-time tenant 
with a registration time of two years vie for the same type of dwelling. One offer is made in each year. The first-
time tenant must wait two years for a turn, such that the expected waiting time and bid amount to four years. 
Then suppose that the exchange value of the duration of stay is halved. The transferring tenant with a duration 
of stay of four years and the first-time tenant with a registration time of two years now have equal odds of win-
ning. The expected value of their bids is equal to 2.5 years (the mean of two and three years), and the expected 
waiting times are 4.5 and 2.5 years, respectively. The transferring tenant with a duration of stay of three years has 
a waiting time of five years, such that this tenant’s bid will be worth 3.5 years. The expected waiting time after the 
transformation is still four years, but the value of the bids has been reduced to 2.83 years.
91 Random ‘underpaying’ is obviously impossible, as an underpaying candidate would be passed over in the 
process
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year. A positive coefficient for the institutional dummies or tenant character-
istics (with the exception of tenant’s age) reveals which categories of tenants 
‘overpaid’, in the sense that their bids exceeded the bids of other tenants. Ra-
tional tenants must minimise the surplus of the bid (taking heed of the trans-
formation of the allocation criterion) over waiting time. A surplus is indicative 
of overpaying, meaning that the tenant could have obtained a better offer in 
the same period or could have responded earlier to obtain the preferred type 
of dwelling.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that some offers were made 
in the queuing system and others were made in the lottery. The estimation of 
the count model in Chapter 4 showed that net response lengthened by about 
30% in the lottery (see Table 4.2). Little’s Law states that the expected wait-
ing time for a dwelling should be the same, regardless of the distribution sys-
tem. Tenants’ ability to shift from the lottery to the queuing system, howev-
er, means that rational tenants select the lottery only if their rank is too low 
to obtain their desired specification of dwelling within the queuing system. In 
theory, the winner’s bid in the lottery will then be a random draw between ze-
ro and the waiting time for the same offer in the queuing system. In practice, 
the bid in the lottery should be closer to the waiting time for the dwelling. 
As a precautionary measure, or to compensate for the costs of moving, ten-
ants accumulate registration time or duration of stay before they become ac-
tive house-seekers. The minimum bound on the bid in the lottery is likely to 
be higher than zero. 
It is also conceivable that some tenants acted in a myopic fashion. Myopia 
entails that tenants respond in the same way to offers in the lottery as they 
would in the queuing system. The lottery was established three years prior to 
the period that is investigated here. Some tenants may have been unaware 
of the mixed distribution system. Tenants whose duration of stay or registra-
tion time was more than sufficient to obtain a dwelling in the queuing sys-
tem, might still have participated in the lottery, if less than three desirable of-
fers were available in the queuing system. It is therefore necessary to sepa-
rate the tenants who could switch between the two distribution systems (and 
for whom Little’s Law applies) from the tenants (presumably with low rank-
ings) who participated in the lottery because it was their only option to obtain 
a dwelling. This can be achieved by dropping all bids of three years and under 
from the sample.92 Another safeguard involves the use of a dummy term for 
offers that were made in the lottery. This dummy has a negative coefficient if 
the remaining candidates in the lottery had a lower average duration of stay 
92 Only two first-time tenants with a registration time less than three years and four transferring tenants with 
a duration of stay less than six or 4.5 years (depending on the date of the offer) managed to obtain dwellings in 
the queuing system. The average bid of the remaining tenants in the lottery (i.e. those with bids higher than three 
years) is indistinguishable from the average bid in the queuing system (8.25 as compared to 8.27 years).
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or registration time than did candidates in the queuing system. 
The duration model attempts to measure the effect of neighbourhood qual-
ity on the waiting time for a dwelling, through the effect on the bids of suc-
cessful candidates. Duration can be estimated with survival functions or 
hazard rates (i.e. the change in the survival function). I opt for a logarithmic 
transformation of the tenant’s bid to linearise the model. The duration model 
of the bid for social rental dwellings reads as follows:
(5.3)  
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The bid θ is a function of the waiting time for a dwelling (actual or expect-
ed), which is embodied by the structural characteristics of the dwelling z, the 
neighbourhood variables NBH and the rent r, as well as by the characteristics 
of the candidate and the institutional variables (Γ). The institutional variables 
include the dummy for offers in the lottery, the dummy distinguishing be-
tween first-time and transferring tenants and the dummy for offers made in 
the second half of 2005. A positive coefficient on any of the institutional dum-
mies or tenant characteristics (excluding age) reveals which categories of ten-
ants structurally overpaid for the offer.
Better housing quality and lower rent are expected to increase the waiting 
time for a dwelling. Tenants are also likely to realise that better neighbour-
hood quality increases their waiting time (i.e. δl>0). According to the conjec-
tures at the end of Chapter 2, the bids of well-informed tenants are expected 
to reflect the gains in utility that accompanies knowledge of the inside view 
on the neighbourhood. These tenants might then substitute gains in housing 
quality for a shorter waiting time. Both choices have the same effect: reduc-
tion in the value of the bid. The pull that the neighbourhood exerts on well-
informed tenants must be acted out at a scale similar to that of push effects 
on existing tenants. In contrast, ill-informed tenants must perceive the pull 
effects at a higher scale than residents do. While the coefficient for house 
price could be the same for both types of tenants, well-informed tenants are 
likely to pay more attention to neighbourhood satisfaction than ill-informed 
tenants are.
House-seekers are more likely to be informed when they face low costs of 
information-gathering or when the opportunity costs of selecting a lemon 
are high. According to some sociologists, long-distance moves destroy social 
capital, as the household’s social ties are severed in the process (David et al., 
2008). The focus on information in this thesis leads to a different interpreta-
tion: moves destroy social capital, as they reduce the informational advan-
tage that the household has as a resident. The inside view on the surround-
ings is of little use to the household if it is searching in distant neighbour-
[ 103 ]
hoods. Households who move over shorter distances retain inside informa-
tion, as do households who move to areas that they or their witnesses know 
well. Although the tenant’s place of origin and the presence of social ties in 
the area are unobserved, it is known whether the tenant moved within the 
administrative borough. A move within or outside the borough is used as a 
proxy for the distance of the move. Because tenants moving within the bor-
ough face lower costs of information-gathering, they should experience the 
pull effects of the neighbourhood at a low spatial scale.
Tenants who overestimate the quality of their new homes could initiate re-
peat moves (DaVanzo, 1983).93 An erroneous destination choice is especially 
costly on the Dutch social rental market, as the tenant’s rank in the queu-
ing system is lost upon acceptance. The tenant must remain in an unwanted 
dwelling for at least several years. Transferring tenants with high duration of 
stay should be informed for a number of reasons. First, their rank is high and 
their destination choices are risky, due to the exchange of their old homes.94 
Second, tenants with high duration of stay tended to live in popular dwellings 
(see Section 3.4), which is likely to be associated with further increases in the 
opportunity costs of moving. Finally, duration of stay is a proxy for the length 
of stay in the city and thus for own experience with neighbourhoods and the 
extent and density of the network of local witnesses. 
Some tenants may have accepted offers out of the need to obtain accom-
modations on short notice. According to the estimation presented in Chap-
ter 4, strategic choice behaviour was more prevalent among first-time and 
low-ranking tenants, for whom selectivity is a luxury. On the other hand, ten-
ants with high registration time or duration of stay have proven their abili-
ty to wait for the desired type of dwelling. The strategic destination choice of 
hard-pressed tenants could lead to insensitivity towards neighbourhood qual-
ity and a low estimate of the willingness to pay for the neighbourhood. This 
alternative explanation for the weak pull effect on first-time and low-rank-
ing tenants is discussed and disproven in the robustness analysis later in this 
chapter. At any rate, excluding the bids of three years and less from the sam-
ple helps to reduce the number of hard-pressed tenants in the sample.
Ill-informed and well-informed tenants react differently to neighbourhood 
quality. One way of modelling the different response involves the use of ran-
dom or fixed effects in the coefficients on explanatory variables (Kan, 1999). 
I opt for a simpler solution, splitting the sample into subsamples for tenants 
who moved within or outside of the administrative borough, transferring or 
first-time tenants and transferring tenants with a high duration of stay as op-
93 DaVanzo (1983) analysed migration between countries, finding that lengthening the stay in the host country 
led to the destruction of ties with the country of origin, thereby reducing the likelihood of return migration.
94 The value and quality of the old home may thus influence the destination choice (see Footnote 20).
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posed to tenants who ranked lower in the distribution system.95 The neigh-
bourhood pull effects must be stronger in size and smaller in range for in-
tra-borough movers, transferring tenants and tenants with high duration of 
stay than it is for inter-borough movers, first-time tenants and tenants with 
low duration of stay. Furthermore, the pull effects of neighbourhood satisfac-
tion must be more relevant in the bids of intra-borough movers, tenants with 
a high duration of stay and transferring tenants than they are in the bids of 
other categories of tenants.
 5.3  Data
The data used in the estimation of a duration model for the bids of social ten-
ants in Rotterdam are drawn from about 600 offers that Woonbron made in 
2005 (see Table 5.1). Dwellings that carried eligibility requirements regarding 
age or household size of the household are dropped from the sample, as are 
dwellings that have insufficient data on attributes or tenant characteristics. 
Structural characteristics include number of rooms, building period, house 
type and size, presence of a lift and the maintenance and star label of the 
dwelling. The data contain net rent, the assessment value as a proxy meas-
ure for the house price in 2003 and the nine representations of neighbour-
hood satisfaction in 2004. The data are supplemented by information on the 
intra-borough or inter-borough nature of the move, the date of the offer (i.e. 
the first or second half of 2005), the characteristics of the tenant and whether 
the offer was made in the lottery or in the queuing system.
The variables that define the dependent variable in the model are the ten-
ant’s duration of stay or registration time and the dummy that distinguishes 
between first-time and transferring tenants. The bid is calculated as the reg-
istration time for a first-time tenant and 75% of the duration of stay for a ten-
ant living in another social rental dwelling in the first half of the year or 50% 
of his duration of stay in the second half of the year, provided that this frac-
tion of the duration of stay exceeds the tenant’s registration time. All bids of 
three years and under are dropped from the sample, leaving 516 observations 
that are used in the estimation. The logarithm of the bid is well-behaved: it 
has few outliers and its shape is similar to that of a normally distributed var-
iable.96 Tenant characteristics include the age of the head of the household, 
95 Another solution would be to use a spline regression (Poirier, 1973), in which the coefficients undergo a 
structural change when the observation crosses a threshold in the distance of the move or in duration of stay. I 
decided against this approach, as the bid stands in a straightforward relationship to at least two of the criteria 
(i.e. registration time/duration of stay and first-time/transferring tenant) that act as thresholds.
96 The normality of the distribution of the bids is rejected with 96% certainty. The reason why the bid does not 
withstand the test for normality is that two intervals near the mean had no observations, while a large spike was 
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household income, size of the household and household type. 
Some households with dual earners had high incomes. Woonbron is one of 
the few housing associations that do not impose income requirements. Nev-
ertheless, more than 96% of new tenants in the sample fell into the target 
present at the mean. The erratic pattern in the distribution is probably the result of the low number of observa-
tions in the sample. 
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group for social rented housing, which the Dutch Ministry of Housing defined 
as households with a yearly income of less than € 33,000 in 2005. Compared 
to existing tenants, whose average age was 55 years (see Table 3.3), house-
seeking tenants were young. The average age of a first-time tenant was 28 
years. Nearly half of the first-time tenants were single, with single-parent 
families as the second largest category. Even transferring tenants were young 
compared to existing tenants. The average age of transferring tenants was 38, 
with single-parent families and couples with children as the largest catego-
ries. The observations are distributed over nine neighbourhoods in four bor-
oughs of the city. The large southeastern borough of Groot-IJsselmonde (see 
Figure 3.2) accounts for nearly half of the observations in the sample. 
 5.4  Bids for social rental dwellings 
Table 5.2 lists the outcome of a duration model of tenants’ bids for social 
rental dwellings in Rotterdam in 2005 using White’s method. Neither the size 
of the dwelling nor the maintenance label proves relevant. The model is fur-
ther simplified by considering the fact that dwellings built before 1990 were 
valued the same and that the coefficients for dwellings with three, four and 
five or more rooms are indistinguishable from one another. These categories 
are merged in order to economise on degrees of freedom. The frame of refer-
ence in the model then becomes a single-room or double-room downstairs 
apartment that was built prior to 1990.
The only tenant characteristic of importance is the age of the tenant. The 
negative coefficient for the tenant’s age indicates that the transformation of 
the allocation criteria led to the expected downward revision in all bids in the 
second half of the year. The tenant’s age suffices as a control variable for the 
surplus in the bid, given that none of the other tenant characteristics or insti-
tutional dummies is significant.97 No category of tenant overpaid: bids were 
not excessive in the second half of the year, and bids in the lottery (exclud-
ing bids of three years and under, as stated previously) were indistinguisha-
ble from bids in the queuing system. This is remarkable, since the vast ma-
jority of Woonbron’s offers in 2005 was made inside the lottery. Violation of 
Little’s Law should result in a large negative coefficient on bids made in the 
lottery. The base model uses a constant, dwellings with three rooms or more, 
dwellings built after 1990, house type, the logarithm of rent and the logarithm 
of age as explanatory variables. The overall fit of the model is very good, giv-
97 The coefficient for the dummy for transferring tenants has a value of 0.03 with a t-value of 1.12; the coefficient 
for offers made in the second half of the year has a value of -0.03 with a t-value of -1.01, and the coefficient for 
offers made in the lottery has a value of - 0.02 with a t-value of -0.76.
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en the low numbers of observations and explanatory variables. As expected, 
tenants’ bids proved higher for less expensive, larger, single-family dwellings. 
The negative coefficient on newer stock is puzzling. There are, however, just 
seven observations on dwellings built after 1990. Estimation without this vari-
able does not change the estimates on the other variables.
In Model I, house price and neighbourhood satisfaction are added to the 
base model. Given that both neighbourhood variables were measured pri-
or to 2005, endogeneity cannot be a problem. The best representation for 
neighbourhood satisfaction turns out to be the same measure that was used 
in the exit choice model discussed in Chapter 3: the average that is calculat-
ed over a Von Neumann neighbourhood with range 1. Representations with 
a higher range have similar coefficients (ranging from 0.22 to 0.24), but their 
significance levels are lower (t=3.7 at maximum, as opposed to 4.34 for the 
representation based on a Von Neumann neighbourhood with range 1). The 
low spatial scale on the selected measure reveals that, unlike the majority 
of house-seeking tenants, the winning candidates were well informed about 
their new neighbourhoods. Bids were indeed higher in more attractive areas. 
The coefficient of 0.26 leads to a willingness to pay for a one-point increase 
in neighbourhood satisfaction of € 88.29 (0.26/1.15*390.50) or 22.6% in month-
ly rent by new tenants. This figure is higher than the 12% that house-seeking 
tenants were willing to pay for a similar increase in quality (see Section 4.4). 
The coefficient of 0.61 for house price indicates that new tenants were willing 
to pay an average of 53% (0.61/1.15) of rent for a doubling of the house price. 
In the next stage of the estimation, the sample of tenants is split into sub-
samples. In Models IIa and IIb, the sampling is based on the distance of the 
move. There are few differences between inter-borough and intra-borough 
movers, although tenants who stayed within the borough were slightly old-
er, and the number of transferring tenants among this group was higher as 
well. The estimation indicates that the bids of intra-borough and of inter-bor-
ough movers were virtually identical. One conclusion might be that the dis-
tance of the move had little or no effect on tenants’ efforts to inform them-
selves about the new neighbourhoods. The alternative is that the distinction 
between inter-borough and intra-borough moves is simply a poor measure for 
the distance of the move. Two of the four boroughs in the sample (Prins Alex-
ander and Groot-IJsselmonde, see Figure 3.2) are very large, such that moves 
with these boroughs could have taken tenants over longer distances than was 
the case with moves between other boroughs.
The question of whether it made any difference whether the tenant ex-
changed another social rental dwelling is answered in Model III. Transferring 
tenants (who comprised 47% of all new tenants) were older than first-time 
tenants were (38.6 years vs. 28.6 years), and they opted more often for single-
family dwellings (23% vs. 7% of all offers). The third model shows that first-
time tenants paid less attention to the inside view than transferring tenants 
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did. Transferring tenants were probably either better informed or more con-
cerned with neighbourhood quality than first-time tenants were. The will-
ingness to pay of transferring tenants for a one-point increase in neighbour-
hood satisfaction was 30.7% of the rent, while they were prepared to pay 59% 
of what owner-occupiers were prepared to pay to live in the same neighbour-
hood. First-time tenants were willing to pay less: 17% of rent for a one-point 
increase in neighbourhood satisfaction and an additional 47% of rent for a 
doubling of the house price. 
The subsample used in Model IIIb is reduced further in Model IVb. The 
threshold is set at a duration of stay in another social rented dwelling of 
twelve years. . Transferring tenants with a high duration of stay (and hence 
a higher rank in the distribution system) were willing to pay an addition-
al 42.0% of the rent for a one-point increase in satisfaction, while their will-
ingness to pay for a 1% rise in the price was 0.63%. Given the high overlap 
of the subsample of lower-ranking tenants in model IVa with the sample of 
first-time tenants in model IIIa, it is not surprising that lower-ranking tenants 
seemed to pay less attention to differences in neighbourhood quality at the 
block level (i.e. a willingness to pay of 13% of rent), while they were willing to 
pay 47% of what owner-occupiers were willing to pay to live in the neighbour-
hood. 
Neighbourhood satisfaction probably controls for the same aspects in the 
duration model as it did in the exit choice model: amenities and services that 
cater to residents only, as well as the socio-economical and demographic at-
tributes. House price probably controls for the observable aspects of neigh-
bourhood quality and perhaps for neighbourhood reputation as well. Based 
on the similarity in scale on the pull effects of the neighbourhood in Models 
IIIb and IVb with the push effects in the exit choice model discussed in Chap-
ter 3, transferring tenants with a long duration of stay seemed to have the 
same intimate knowledge of the neighbourhood as existing tenants. In con-
trast, lower-ranking and first-time tenants either had less access to the inside 
view or were less partial to differences in neighbourhood quality. The 25% 
(≈0.42/1.00-0.16/1.21) of rent that high-ranking tenants as a group were willing 
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to pay more for an increase in satisfaction compared to low-ranking tenants, 
is an indication of the gains that their informational advantage brought. With 
an average bid of 7.7 years, this figure amounts to a reduction of two years 
and three months (or 25%) in waiting time for the desired type of dwelling. 
For low-ranking tenants, the loss incurred is closer to 20% (25/1.21) of their 
waiting time.
Robustness analysis
In the first robustness check, tenant characteristic are introduced into the 
third and fourth models as additional instruments. For example, the prefer-
ence for single-family dwellings among transferring and high-ranking ten-
ants could have led to a greater sensitivity towards the quality of life among 
this group. The only tenant characteristic to have any relevance, howev-
er, is the logarithm of the household income in the bids of transferring ten-
ants (Model IIIb). Higher income led to a small increase in the bid.98 This indi-
cates that some idiosyncratic overpaying may have taken place among high-
income tenants, but that no other category of tenants overpaid. More impor-
tantly, the coefficients for rent, structural characteristics and neighbourhood 
variables are unaffected by the inclusion of tenant characteristics. 
In the next robustness checks, borough-fixed effects, neighbourhood fixed-
effects and random effect are introduced to Models III and IV to address spa-
tial autocorrelation. The use of borough-fixed effects reduces the explanatory 
power of house price in all models, although it is still significant in the mod-
el for first-time tenants and in the model for transferring tenants with a high 
duration of stay.99 Borough-fixed effects make the pull of neighbourhood sat-
isfaction on first-time tenants and on low-ranking tenants void. The coeffi-
98 Tenants with higher incomes may have overpaid because of their lower sensitivity to rent or because they were 
planning to make a transition to tenureship in the near future. The estimation presented in Chapter 3 revealed 
that their exit rate was also higher.
99 In the estimation of Models IIIa and IVb with borough-fixed effects the coefficient for price has a value of 
respectively 0.25 (t-value of 2.16) and 0.23 (t-value of 1.96).
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cient on neighbourhood satisfaction remains closer to its value in the original 
model in the estimation with borough-fixed effects for transferring tenants 
(0.32 with a t-value of 2.46) and for high-ranking transferring tenants (0.29 
with a t-value of 2.22). The use of neighbourhood-fixed effects presents prob-
lems in the estimation of models III and IV, because many neighbourhoods 
contain just a few clustered observations. Estimation for the larger sample in 
model II with neighbourhood fixed-effects, however, produces a significant 
estimate for the inside view (0,24 with t-value of 2,62).
Neighbourhood satisfaction retains its explanatory power when random ef-
fects are used for each of the 81 boxes of 250 m² in the sample in which an 
observation can fall. The coefficient on neighbourhood satisfaction changes 
to 0.35 (t=2.86) in model IIIb and to 0.42 (t=3.73) in model IVb. Neighbourhood 
satisfaction remains just significant in models IIIa (0.22 with t=1.79), but is in-
significant in model IVa (0.12 with t=1.34) with random effects.
Unlike the push effect of price on existing tenants (as discussed in Chapter 
3), which probably depended upon the observable quality of the neighbour-
hood, the pull effect of price on house-seeking tenants is probably associat-
ed with aspects of the neighbourhood (possibly including its reputation) that 
spread beyond the confines of the administrative neighbourhood. 
Neighbourhood satisfaction captures the inside view and aspects that 
spread beyond the confines of the administrative neighbourhood. The use of 
fixed or random effects in estimation, however, does not annul its impact on 
the bids of transferring tenants in general and the bids of transferring tenants 
with a high rank in the distribution system in particular. Some of its explan-
atory power can be associated with their greater awareness of circumstanc-
es in the surroundings of the offers. Throughout the thesis, I assume that the 
weak pull effect of neighbourhood satisfaction on first-time and low-rank-
ing tenants is the result of their ignorance about the living quality. One ob-
jection to this interpretation is that irrational or constrained choice behav-
iour may lead to the same outcome. First-time and low-ranking tenants may 
have ignored the living quality at the block level in their bids, even though 
they could have been aware of this information. This explanation, however, 
runs counter to another assumption that I make throughout the thesis, that 
of ‘satisficing’ behaviour (Simon, 1991). In this assumption, the choices of 
agents diverge from the optimum of standard economics, not because they 
act irrationally, but because they are choice-constrained or ill-informed. None 
of the evidence thus far pointed towards irrational behaviour among tenants. 
The apparent understanding of the transformation of the allocation criterion 
and the fact that no group of tenants structurally overpaid for bids point to-
wards rational choice behaviour.
A more serious objection is that low-ranking and first-time tenants could 
have been in more pressing need of accommodations. This personal con-
straint could have made them less sensitive to neighbourhood quality, in the 
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same way that existing tenants living in the best type of dwellings proved less 
responsive to neighbourhood quality. One important piece of evidence casts 
doubt upon this otherwise plausible explanation. The destination choices of 
first-time and low-ranking tenants were different from those of transferring, 
high-ranking tenants in terms of desired house type (i.e. they preferred apart-
ments to single-family dwellings), but not in terms of the desired location.100 
If first-time and low-ranking tenants managed to obtain offers in areas to 
which transferring tenants and high-ranking tenants moved as well, then 
they would have had to wait longer than their transferring and high-ranking 
counterparts did for the same type of offer. First-time and low-ranking ten-
ants could have settled for lower quality in exchange for a move at a much 
earlier date. It is highly improbable that tenants refrained from responding 
and accepting offers that they desired when they were capable of obtaining 
the dwelling. The most plausible explanation for the relatively crude destina-
tion choices made by first-time and low-ranking tenants is that they faced 
higher search costs and lower opportunity costs than did the other categories 
of tenants. 
 5.5  Conclusions
The main result of the second part of this thesis is that many house-seekers 
on the social rental market adopted a much higher scale for the neighbour-
hood in their destination choices than existing tenants did in their exit choic-
es. This was already evident from the count model of net response to dwell-
ings (as discussed in Chapter 4), and it was confirmed by the duration model 
of the bids of first-time tenants and of tenants with low duration of stay (and 
hence a low ranking in the distribution system) in this chapter. The unobserv-
able quality of the neighbourhood, which is captured by neighbourhood sat-
isfaction, affected the destination choices of transferring tenants and espe-
cially those with a very high rank in the distribution system. The pull effect of 
neighbourhood satisfaction on these well-informed tenants was comparable 
in strength and scale to the push effect on existing tenants. 
Ill-informed and well-informed tenants were in agreement over both the 
push and the pull effect of house price. On average, tenants were willing to 
100  A t-test for the difference in the average satisfaction score for first-time and transferring tenants yields an 
insignificant value of 0.11, while a t-test for the difference in the average house price between the two groups 
yields 0.52. The differences between low-ranking tenants and tenants with a high duration of stay are even less 
pronounced: a t-value of 0.14 for neighbourhood satisfaction and 0.35 for the price. This result is interesting in 
its own right, as it indicates that efficient sorting between neighbourhoods (see Section 4.5) is a by-product of 
the choice of house type. The greater preference for single-family dwellings among high-ranking and transferring 
candidates guided them towards the most attractive neighbourhoods, from which they were less likely to leave 
(see Section 3.4).
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pay 30% to 50% of the value that owner-occupiers had in mind to live in the 
neighbourhood. The price served primarily as a control variable for the ob-
servable quality of the neighbourhood, such that the pull effect of the in-
side view on the neighbourhood could be estimated with some confidence. 
The willingness to pay for the maximum rise in the quality-of-life experience 
(a one-point increase on a seven-point scale) ranged from little under 15% of 
the rent for existing tenants to 25-30% for transferring tenants and more than 
40% for transferring tenants with a very high rank in the distribution sys-
tem.101 The pull of neighbourhood satisfaction on first-time and low-ranking 
tenants was acted out at the spatial scale of the administrative neighbour-
hood and beyond. Its pull effects on transferring and high-ranking tenants 
was acted out on the block level, probably as a reflection of the insiders’ ap-
praisal of the social climate and the availability and quality of local amenities 
and services.
The estimation thus seems to validate the first conjecture stated at the end 
of Chapter 2: first-time and low-ranking tenants did not seem to make use 
of the inside view in their destination choices. The inside view did prove rel-
evant to tenants with high opportunity costs (i.e. transferring tenants with 
high duration of stay), which is in accordance with the third conjecture of 
Chapter 2. The pull effects of the neighbourhood on high-ranking, transfer-
ring tenants approached the push effects on existing tenants in range and 
even exceeded them in strength. No evidence could be offered, however, for 
the second conjecture of Chapter 2: the supposed informational advantage of 
short-distance movers over long-distance movers was not visible in the esti-
mation outcome.
The size of the opportunity and search costs that tenants face is seen as 
the root cause of the informed destination choices of transferring, high-rank-
ing tenants and the crude destination choices of low-ranking and first-time 
tenants. Irrationality and choice constraints can produce the same outcome, 
but some of the results ran counter these alternative explanations. This does 
not preclude the possibility that some tenants remained ill-informed because 
they cared neither about neighbourhood quality nor about the time that they 
had to wait. In my opinion, neither rank in the distribution system nor occu-
pancy of another dwelling is likely to make a difference in the desire to ob-
tain a dwelling in the shortest possible time. There is no reason why tenants 
should decide to wait if they cannot improve upon the rent-quality relation-
ship of the dwelling. 
Despite the results in the affirmative, a word of caution seems in order. The 
exit choices of tenants proved hard to predict and their destination choices 
101 This difference might represent an estimate of the institutional, personal and financial constraints that 
existing tenants face in moving or of a difference in preferences among existing and house-seeking tenants.
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seemed to be guided more by search criteria than by some aspects of housing 
quality (i.e. house size and age). Obviously, the structure of the social rental 
market shaped some of my results and it may even have been partly respon-
sible for the validation of some of my conjectures. Estimation of the demand 
equation in Chapters 4 and bid function in Chapter 5 with a larger dataset, 
or estimation of a destination choice model (the pendant to the exit choice 
model) could provide a more definitive answer. Nevertheless, the evidence 
did not invalidate my answer to the question raised in the introduction: there 
seems to be a gap in knowledge about the quality of the neighbourhood be-
tween residents and house-seekers facing high opportunity costs for select-
ing a lemon on the one hand and house-seekers who face low opportunity 
costs on the other hand. More than half of all new tenants (i.e. those with a 
low rank in the distribution system and first-time tenants) were probably at 
an informational disadvantage.102
The research on the residential mobility of social tenants that has been dis-
cussed in the last three chapters has left one question unanswered. The pull 
effect of house price was acted out at the administrative neighbourhood lev-
el, which is the appropriate scale if house-seeking tenants are indeed guid-
ed by a reputational bias, as a result of their desire to avoid stigmatisation, 
to improve upon their residential status or because they equate the quality 
of an area with its reputation (see also Table 3.2). There is, however, no way of 
telling whether they actually relied on reputations without knowing the ex-
act motives behind the selection of a particular destination. House price may 
have simply acted as a control variable for local supply conditions or for some 
other unobserved factor. The third part of this thesis is devoted to the owner-
occupied segment of the Rotterdam housing market. This should determine 
whether house price contains a reputational premium and whether the larg-
er scale and lower size of the pull effects of the neighbourhood on low-rank-
ing and first-time tenants had something to do with their use of reputations 
in their destination choices. 
 
102 Remember that tenants with bids under three years were dropped from the sample. These tenants, most 
of whom participated in the lottery, proved even less responsive to neighbourhood quality. Inclusion of this 
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 6  Boundary effects in house 
price
 6.1  Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapters has shown that most social tenants 
in Rotterdam were not as well-informed about the quality of the neighbour-
hoods to which they moved as the tenants who already lived there were. Only 
the group of tenants facing considerable losses in the case of erroneous des-
tination choices, due to their high rank in the distribution system for social 
rental dwellings or the exchange of another dwelling, proved equally well-
informed as residents. This corresponds to one of the key questions that I 
posed in the introduction: there seems to be gap in knowledge between resi-
dents and the average house-seeker, and this gap is visible in their respective 
valuations of the neighbourhood. 
The average buyer in the same city could be equally poorly informed as the 
average tenant is about the neighbourhood. The use of incomplete informa-
tion in the decision to buy a dwelling should become visible in spatial house 
price patterns. If neighbourhood reputations are used as a proxy for the un-
observable quality of a neighbourhood, then house price must contain a repu-
tational premium in each administrative neighbourhood. Price may then sud-
denly shift in value when crossing the administrative boundary of a neigh-
bourhood, provided that the adjacent neighbourhoods are viewed in a differ-
ent light by outsiders. In this chapter, I use a hedonic price analysis to identi-
fy a large number of cases on the Rotterdam owner-occupied market in which 
crossing a neighbourhood boundary led to a jump in the assessment values of 
dwellings. 
 6.2  Neighbourhood reputation and house price
While the structure of the owner-occupied market is more conventional than 
is that of the social rental market in the Netherlands, it is far from a free 
market. Restrictions are commonplace on the owner-occupied market. Local 
and provincial governments designate land for residential, industrial, envi-
ronmental, commercial and recreational use. Targets are set (but not always 
achieved) for the number of social rental and owner-occupied dwellings that 
must be constructed in each municipality. Municipalities exchange the right 
to construct dwellings for the ownership of land, such that developers and as-
sociations who own plots of land are rewarded with a monopoly on construc-
tion. They cooperate with the municipality in public-private partnerships in 
the design, development and construction of dwellings. In this context, asso-
ciations are treated favourably, as through the use of proceeds from the sale 
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of owner-occupied dwellings to finance future losses on the management of 
social rental dwellings.103 The planning of new construction does not follow 
the maxims of profit-maximisation. In fact, housing supply in the Nether-
lands is almost completely dependent upon set targets, with the price elastic-
ity of supply being close to zero (Vermeulen, 2008).104 Planning has achieved 
some of the social targets set by the Dutch government, such as the conserva-
tion of open space, the restructuring of deprived neighbourhoods and the cre-
ation of mixed-income neighbourhoods. Restrictive planning is not the only 
type of government intervention that affects the owner-occupied market. The 
municipality takes the difference between the sales price of newly construct-
ed dwellings and the construction costs and profit margin of the developer 
as a land-use tax.105 Property taxes are levied on homeowners as a percent-
age of the assessment value of their dwellings. Buyers face an ad valorem buy-
er tax, which decreases mobility on both the housing and labour market (Van 
Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn, 2005). In addition to being taxed in the hous-
ing domain, however, owner-occupiers are able to deduct interest payments 
on mortgage from their income taxes. This acts as a progressive subsidy on 
housing consumption. 
The focus on mixed-income neighbourhoods, the quota set for new con-
struction, the non-competitive stance taken by the parties involved in the 
construction of dwellings and the municipality’s reliance on budgetary wind-
fall gains have created a stock market on the owner-occupied market. New 
construction makes up a small fraction of the existing stock. The price of 
newly built dwellings is defined by the price of the existing stock, although 
construction can have an impact on the price in the case of large-scale de-
velopment (Boelhouwer, 2003; Boelhouwer et al., 2006). The low price-elastic-
ity of supply means that the tax deduction for mortgage debt has little effect 
on construction. Combined with the relaxation of mortgage lending that took 
place in the 1990s, the tax deduction mainly produced an inflated house price 
level (Boelhouwer et al., 2004). Restrictive planning practices may have added 
to this inflation by imposing a regulatory tax on the price of dwellings in ur-
ban areas (Dekkers, 2010). 
The below-market rents, rent subsidies, buyer taxes and high prices make 
the transition to tenureship particularly difficult for middle-income tenants. 
The accessibility of owner-occupied dwellings has been troublesome for first-
time buyers ever since the 1980s (Renes et al., 2006; Neuteboom and Brounen, 
103  In 2008, the value gap, the difference in value between letting out and the best alternative use (i.e. owner-
occupation) (Hamnett and Randolph, 1986), on social rental dwellings was estimated at 28% (CFV, 2008). 
104 The monopoly power shared by developers, associations and the municipality offers an alternative explana-
tion for the low price-elasticity of Dutch housing supply.
105 According to some estimates, the price of newly constructed dwellings exceeds the construction costs and 
profits by a margin of 30% (NVB, 2009).
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2009). The exit choice model discussed in Chapter 3 showed that tenants liv-
ing in popular dwellings found it difficult to continue their housing careers 
within the social rental sector, and perhaps outside of it as well. Several asso-
ciations, including Woonbron Rotterdam, responded to this problem by sell-
ing dwellings to their tenants (Gruis et al., 2002), but this accounts for a small 
fraction of the total stock. The Dutch housing market is thus a segmented 
market, with few transitions taking place between the social rental segment 
and the owner-occupied segment on either the demand or the supply side.106 
Each segment has its own suppliers (sellers and developers vs. associations), 
allocation criterion (price vs. waiting time) and target groups (low-income 
tenants vs. high and middle-income owner-occupiers).107
The segmentation of the market makes it difficult to draw any inference 
from the results of the previous chapters. The existence of an information-
al asymmetry on the social rental segment is no guarantee for the existence 
of a similar asymmetry on the owner-occupied segment. There is no reason to 
assume that tenants and buyers act fundamentally different when conduct-
ing residential search. However, differences in the organisation of the market 
segments can influence the ability or need of house-seekers to gather infor-
mation on the quality of offers. The fact that buyers use realtors’ services in-
dicates that they face higher search costs than social tenants do; these costs 
must be at least as high as the realtor’s fee (Benjamin et al., 2000). On the oth-
er hand, the opportunity costs of buying a lemon are fairly high. A repeat 
move is accompanied by a buyer tax that amounts 6% of the sales price, while 
realtor fees and the cost of refinancing mortgage debt increases the costs of 
moving by an additional 4-6% of the price (Van Ommeren and Van Leuven-
steijn, 2005). The high opportunity costs of buying a home could explain the 
stylised fact that Dutch homeowners move less frequently than tenants do 
(Van Ommeren et al., 2000; Van der Vlist, 2001).108
The lower willingness to move among Dutch homeowners suggests that an 
erroneous destination choice is costlier on the owner-occupied segment of 
the market, such that the incentives to be informed may be stronger among 
buyers than they are among tenants. The presence of ill-informed buyers is 
obviously a necessary condition for the inclusion of a reputational premium 
or downgrade in price, alongside the condition that house price is not used 
as a signal for the unobservable quality of the offer (see Section 2.8). Search 
models of the housing market provide some evidence that suggests the ex-
106 The rise in income levels, low real interest rates and relaxation of mortgage-lending criteria ensured that 
middle-income households still had access to the owner-occupied market in the long run (Renes et al., 2006).
107 For example, in the dataset analysed in Chapter 5, less than 2% of the tenants were ineligible for rent 
subsidies.
108 Larger home investments and stronger place attachment (Poterba, 1984; Henley, 1998) may also explain the 
lower willingness to move among home-owners as compared to tenants.
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istence of informational asymmetries (and thus the presence of ill-informed 
buyers) on the Dutch owner-occupied market (Droës and Hassink, 2009; De 
Wit and Van der Klaauw, 2010). 
Advances in the collection of transaction data have enabled the testing of 
search models that explain the outcome of negotiations over sales price be-
tween buyers and sellers.109 Most search models assume that sellers hold in-
side information that cannot be transmitted to buyers. In a ‘thin’ market, sell-
ers of dwellings with a good price-quality relationship lower the list price in 
order to attract buyers, who are more than willing to accept a good offer once 
they have inspected it (Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004). Sellers may also post 
a lower list price in order to reduce the offer’s time on the market, as well 
as the costs associated with temporarily holding two dwellings (Díaz and Je-
rez, 2009). On the other hand, sellers who can afford to extend the time on 
the market can increase the list price as a signal to ‘bargain-hunters’ that any 
surplus in the negotiations is likely to accrue to the sellers (Albrecht et al., 
2009). Within the Dutch context, applications of search models have shown 
that list price reductions shorten an offer’s time on the market (De Wit and 
Van der Klauw, 2010) and that ‘strong’ sellers (i.e. sellers with lower loan-to-
income ratios) post higher list prices, but that these sellers are also less accu-
rate in assessing the exchange value of dwellings (Droës en Hassink, 2009).110
Informational asymmetries between sellers and buyers thus do exist on the 
Dutch owner-occupied market. The focus in the search models is on the divi-
sion of the bargaining surplus between well-informed sellers and ill-informed 
buyers. The difference between the list and sales price can be large in some 
instances, but the mark-up on the sales price was only 5% for the one fourth 
of all offers whose prices had been reduced during negotiations (De Wit and 
Van der Klauw, 2010).111 Once a buyer enters negotiations, efforts to learn 
about the bargaining power of the opposite party do not constitute a vain en-
109 From their earliest usage by Courant (1978), who focused on residential segregation, search models have 
been used to explain stylised facts that have eluded the explanatory power of standard housing economics. This 
includes the role of realtors as intermediaries (Yinger; 1981), cyclical movements in house prices and vacancy 
rates (Wheaton, 1990), differences in the time on the market of identical dwellings (Genovese and Mayer, 1997), 
the relation between employment search and residential search (Rouwendal, 1998) and the rationale behind the 
use of rent controls (Arnott and Igarashi, 2000). Other applications of informational asymmetries on the housing 
market include bank lending when the likelihood of default on mortgage debt is unknown (Brueckner, 2000), 
landlords’ decision to let when tenants’ duration of stay is unknown (Ben-Shahar, 2001), tenants’ decision to rent 
when the service expenditure is unknown (James, 2008), buying and selling when faced with the seasonal ‘green-
ness’ of property (Nagler and Osgood, 2006), and the mentioning of externalities from flood zones or airports in 
disclosure reports (Pope, 2008).
110 Similar results were obtained in a standard regression analysis by Hoeberichts et al. (2008). The authors 
further showed that the more unique a dwelling is, the higher is its list price and the longer the time on the 
market, as sellers must first ascertain the exchange value of the offer.
111 The actual surplus depends upon the seller’s unobserved reservation price and the buyer’s unobserved 
maximum bid, rather than on the observed list price and sales price. The list price is the upper bound of the 
reservation price, whereas the sales price increases with the maximum bid (Haurin et al., 2010), such that the 
difference between the list price and sales price constitutes a proxy for the surplus.
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deavour, but the case for gathering information in the preceding search stage 
is much stronger. The duration model discussed in Chapter 5 revealed that 
tenants with intimate knowledge of the new neighbourhood can realise gains 
of 30% of rent in terms of housing quality or waiting time.112
Based on these results, one may assume that it is more important for buy-
ers to learn about the unobservable quality of an offer than it is for them to 
know about the characteristics of the opposite party in the exchange.
Berliant and Yu (2009) incorporated a similar belief into a spatial equilib-
rium model of the housing market. They theorised that an equilibrium can 
emerge in which the price of the dwelling need not reflect all available infor-
mation on its quality. Search costs prevent buyers from being fully informed 
about the quality of distant offers. Households that are aware of the quality of 
an offer need not be interested, and the actual buyer need not be informed. If 
the market is made up of geographical submarkets, the circumstances in one 
submarket do not feed into the price on another submarket. The equilibrium 
price then reflects the buyer’s ex ante assessment of the offer’s user value. 
The difference between this view and the price equilibrium specified in the 
neoclassical framework is that some buyers now overestimate the user value 
of the offer and overpay for their new homes. 
In Chapter 2, I extended Berliant and Yu’s argument by claiming the exist-
ence of a spatial dimension in the informational asymmetry. Differences in 
the unobservable quality of a neighbourhood are known only to insiders and 
well-informed house-seekers. Ill-informed house-seekers can use the price 
of similar dwellings on the same submarket as an anchor for their bids. The 
owners of dwellings that lie in the worst parts of a submarket imitate the 
list price of superior offers on the same submarket (Merlo and Ortalo-Mag-
né, 2004). The owners of dwellings in the more attractive spots are forced to 
lower their list prices in order to attract buyers if they cannot signal the su-
perior quality of their offers.113 In the aggregate, well-informed buyers benefit 
from the presence of ill-informed buyers, as it enables them to select the of-
fers that are underpriced on a geographical submarket. This induces them to 
remain silent about the user value of offers so that ill-informed buyers nev-
er learn about the actual user value, unless they buy the dwelling and start 
to live in it. It is thus theoretically possible that differences in the quality of 
locations are not revealed in the house price. In this way, price offers an ac-
112 List-price reductions raise the selling rate by 83% and lower the rate of withdrawal by 44%, such that the 
time on the market can be substantially reduced (De Wit and Van der Klauw, 2010). These considerations refer to 
the incentives of sellers and not those of buyers.
113 Signalling can occur if extending the offer’s time on the market is costlier to the owners of lemons. The 
owners of superior offers can then increase the list price as a signal to buyers (Díaz and Jerez, 2009). This 
solution for lifting the informational asymmetry seems farfetched. The user costs of temporarily holding two 
dwellings will be larger for the owners of better and thus more expensive dwellings, especially when interest on 
mortgage debt on a second dwelling is not tax-deductible, as is the case in the Netherlands.
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curate image of the user value of the observable aspects of housing quality, 
whereas the unobservable aspects are valued the same across the geographi-
cal submarket. 
The name of a neighbourhood helps house-seekers to divide geographical 
submarkets into smaller units; it is by far the simplest way to designate lo-
cations. One may assume that the house price residual – the fraction of the 
price that depends upon the quality of the location (Bayer and Ross, 2006) – 
and by extension the price contains a reputational premium in each adminis-
trative neighbourhood. Half of the spatial variation in the house price residual 
occurred at or beyond the level of the administrative neighbourhood (see Ta-
ble 3.1). The pull effect of the price on social tenants displayed a range that is 
compatible with the same scale (see Section 5.4). This suggests a correspond-
ence between outsiders’ notions of neighbourhood quality and house price. 
Furthermore, price has all of the characteristics of a reputation-based meas-
ure (see Stigler, 1961; Bettman, 1979 and Sabater and Sierra, 2005). It is a sin-
gle-valued measure set by anonymous parties, and it lends itself to the com-
parison of identical dwellings at different locations. At the same time, price 
is non-binding: informed buyers can relocate to ill-reputed (and hence low-
priced) areas if they know that the living quality is good there. 
The main problem in testing for a reputational premium in house price is 
that reputation is a social construct.114 Reputations are based on general traits 
that help outsiders to set a specific neighbourhood apart from ‘competing 
neighbourhoods’ (Hortulanus, 1995).115 For example, the crime rate is able to 
capture a trait such as ‘unsafe’, thus making it possible to differentiate one or 
two high-crime areas from other neighbourhoods, although it does not differ-
entiate between neighbourhoods in which the crime rate is low. There is also 
no attribute that captures such ambiguous traits as ‘prestigious’ (Semyonov 
and Kraus, 1982) or ‘pleasant’ (Kauko, 2007). Statistics on determinants of 
neighbourhood reputations, such as crime rates, average income or the share 
of ethnic households and owner-occupation in the area, are continuous, while 
reputations are based on ranks. The ranking of neighbourhoods based on per-
ceived differences in traits produces a ‘neighbourhood hierarchy’ (Hortulanus, 
1995; Permentier, 2009). A strong correlation between this hierarchy and the 
ranking based on the average house price residual would be direct evidence 
for the role of reputations in the destination choices of buyers.116 The exami-
114 Social constructs are categories that exist because people tacitly agree to act as if they exist (Pinker, 2002).
115 In an extensive analysis of house prices in Rotterdam, Kauko (2002) showed that the effects of most of the 
intangible attributes of a neighbourhood (and even some tangible attributes, such as housing density) on the 
house price can change from one neighbourhood to the other.
116 The ranking of neighbourhoods based on the notions of outsiders (i.e. residents of other neighbourhoods 
and realtors) has been used by sociologists. This hierarchy played a role in the quality-of-life experiences (Semy-
onov and Kraus, 1982) and exit choices of residents (Permentier, 2009). Circumstantial evidence for the role of 
reputations in the price can also be found in the literature on housing market segmentation. For example, Bour-
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nation of spatial patterns in the price is the next-best solution to prove that 
buyers use reputations when no hierarchy is available to the researcher.
In an innovative approach first considered by Black (1999) and extended by 
Bayer et al. (2007), the effect of school quality on house prices was derived 
from the coefficients for area-fixed effects in a hedonic house price equation. 
The attractive feature of this approach is that it allows the direct compari-
son of the house price residual at different locations, in much the same way 
that sellers and buyers can compare areas by using differences in the price of 
identical dwellings. House price is first regressed on the structural character-
istics of the dwelling and a large number of area-fixed effects. The area-fixed 
effects measure the average house price residual in the area. They also con-
trol for spatial dependencies in the missing variables, measurement errors in 
the dependent or explanatory variables, spatial heterogeneity and autocorre-
lation (Bourassa et al., 2007). Although this complicates the interpretation of 
the coefficients, the difference between the coefficients contains relevant in-
formation. Bias in the house price residual, which is due to spatial autocorre-
lation or spatial heterogeneity, changes gradually across the spatial plain. The 
difference between the coefficients of adjacent area dummies is then an ap-
proximation of the difference in price between the areas, provided that each 
dummy covers an area that is small enough, such that the built-in bias is very 
similar in both areas. 
Most attributes of a neighbourhood work in an isotropic fashion: accessi-
bility, amenities and environmental features are distance-based, such that 
the change in value from one area to the adjacent area is small and gradual. 
Three aspects of neighbourhood quality can make a discrete change in space: 
the social fabric of the area, housing quality (e.g. dominant house type, build-
ing period, architectural style) and neighbourhood reputation. The social fab-
ric is produced by the occupants of dwellings, and it can change from one 
housing block to the other. The social climate, however, which is the prod-
uct of the social fabric, is not confined to the same range: circumstances in 
one area affect the quality of nearby areas. Likewise, housing quality usual-
ly affects the physical quality of nearby areas through spillover effects (e.g. 
the view of the area). An abrupt change in the socio-economic, demograph-
ic or physical attributes of an area leads to a smooth adjustment in the house 
price residual. A sudden jump in the residual when crossing a neighbour-
hood boundary is probably the result of a change in the name of the area. The 
difference in the coefficients for the area-fixed effects on opposite sides of 
the border can be used to test for the presence of a reputational premium in 
house price. 
First, a hedonic house price regression is conducted for all observations 
assa et al. (2003 and 2007) found that submarkets, as defined by realtors, explain spatial house price patterns 
quite well. See Islam and Asami (2009) for an overview of the literature on housing market segmentation.
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that lie within a specified distance of the administrative boundaries. The 
structural characteristics of the dwelling are appended with boundary fixed-
effects, which divide each border zone into equal-sized segments by vary-
ing the range on the fixed-effects. Boundary-to-neighbourhood-fixed effects 
with a range similar to that of the boundary-fixed effects are appended to the 
model, but only on one side of the border. The coefficients for the neighbour-
hood-fixed and neighbourhood-to-boundary-fixed effects describe the spatial 
decay process that the house price residual follows near the border. I illus-
trate the approach below. The hedonic price equation (2.6) is adapted as fol-
lows:











In this equation, Pl stands for the house price in border area l, zk for the K at-
tributes of the dwelling proper and ηqΔl for the boundary-fixed and bounda-
ry-to-neighbourhood-fixed effects at M different bandwidths near one of the 
L (L=Σl) administrative borders. The dummy ηq can take on two values: ηq has 
the value 1 if Δl denotes a boundary-fixed effect, while ηq takes on the value 1 
or 0 (depending on which side of the border the observation lies) if Δl stands 
for a boundary-to-neighbourhood fixed effect. For the sake of simplicity, I as-
sume that the interaction term ηq is set to 1 in the high-priced neighbour-
hood.117 The coefficients δm measure the percentage increase in price with-
in each segment. The number of area dummies depends upon the number of 
zones L and range M. In the regression analysis, the bandwidths are set at 250 
and 125 metres from each border. The total number of area-fixed effects is 
thus equal to 2*2*L (i.e. two ranges, two area fixed-effects on either side of L 
boundary zones). 
Each panel of Figure 6.1 depicts four relevant patterns in the house price 
residual within a distance of 250 metres from the neighbourhood boundary. 
The coefficient for the boundary-fixed effect at a range of 250 metres (δ250) 
defines the average house price residual in the segment at a distance of 250 
to 125 metres from the border in the low-priced neighbourhood. It is set to 
zero in the figures for the sake of convenience. The sum of the coefficients 
on both boundary-fixed effects (δ250+ δ125) yields the average house price re-
sidual in the low-priced neighbourhood within a distance of 125 metres from 
the border. The average house price residual in the segment at a distance of 
250 to 125 metres on the high-priced side is defined by the sum of the coef-
ficients on the boundary-fixed and the boundary-to-neighbourhood-fixed ef-
fect at the range of 250 metres (δ250+ η1δ250). Finally, the average house price 
117 This is merely a matter of convention.
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residual in the high-priced area within a distance of 125 metres from the bor-
der is given by the sum of the coefficients on all four area-fixed effects (δ250+ 
δ125+ η1δ250+η1δ125).
The upper left panel depicts the sudden jump in the house price residu-
al that can be expected when a reputational premium is present. In order to 
conclude that the reputation of the area on the right side (i.e. the more ex-
pensive side) of the boundary is better than that of the area on the left, then 
the coefficient for the boundary-to-neighbourhood fixed effect at the range of 







Condition (6.2a) is a necessary but insufficient condition for identifying a 
jump in the house price residual; the quality of an area may influence the 
circumstances in the adjacent area through spillovers. The upper right pan-
el of Figure 6.1 depicts a negative spillover effect that emanates from the low-
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priced neighbourhood. This situation is compatible with a jump in the house 
price residual, as long as the fall in the house price residual due to the spillo-


















The opposite case, a spillover from the high-priced neighbourhood or ‘gold-
en edge’ on the low-priced neighbourhood, means that the coefficient on the 
boundary-fixed effect at the low bandwidth level is both positive and signifi-
cant. This case is depicted in the lower left panel of Figure 6.1, where it should 
be noted that the boundary-to-neighbourhood and the boundary-to-neigh-
bourhood fixed effect at the range of 125 metres cancel each other out (i.e. 
δ125 = -η1δ125). A ‘golden edge’ is compatible with a jump in the house price re-
sidual at the border, as long as the positive spillover effect does not exceed 


















A number of cases are conceivable in which the above conditions are not met. 
First, the house price residual need not make a jump if the two neighbour-
hoods are indistinguishable in terms of their reputation and composition. 
Second, either one of the spillover effects could be equal to or larger than the 
jump in the house price residual, such that conditions (6.2b) and/or (6.2c) do 
not hold. The case in which both spillover effects are larger than the jump in 
the house price residual is depicted in the lower right panel of Figure 6.1. This 
is the pattern that is predicted by the standard economic literature on house 
prices: the isotropic effects of neighbourhood attributes define the price of 
the location, such that the house price residual follows a smooth growth pat-
tern (Gelfand et al., 2004).119
118 Conditions (6.2b) and (6.2c) are approximations in the sense that it neglects the covariance term between 
the coefficients on the neighbourhood-to-boundary fixed terms. The covariance terms are very small compared to 
the variance in the coefficients on the area dummies.
119 House price can follow an anisotropic instead of an isotropic pattern; the gradient might be steeper in some 
directions, such that the growth or decay is not uniform in all directions (Gillen et al., 2001). Physical barriers, 
zoning restrictions and tax rate differentials have been cited in the literature as other causes f discontinuities in 
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The hedonic price model discussed in this chapter contains a small number 
of structural characteristics. The estimate of the house price residual is bi-
ased, if the unobserved structural characteristics are spatially correlated. An-
other ground for bias is the lack of controls for the spillover effects of the 
structural characteristics (i.e. the view of the area), which capture the effect 
that the quality of a dwelling has on the price of adjacent dwellings.120 Aside 
from the effects of missing variables, a change in social fabric may also lead 
to changes in neighbourhood quality, especially when actual or potential buy-
ers in the area happen to be well-informed. Cases with spillovers across the 
border must therefore be treated with caution, as they are indicative of (non-
reputational) bias in the house price residual. Several additional checks are 
employed to ensure that the observed jumps in the house price residual are 
not caused by the specification of the model.
Sudden jumps in the house price residual must occur near many neigh-
bourhood boundaries if the administrative neighbourhood is in common 
use as a subdivision of a geographical submarket. The set of border zones in 
which jumps occur should exclude cases in which the border is ‘hard’ (i.e. 
running along a physical demarcation line). Externalities from open spaces, 
railway, roads or rivers have an independent effect on house price (Mayeres 
et al., 1996; Strand and Vågnes, 2001; Theebe, 2004), which is difficult to disen-
tangle from a reputational premium. A final requirement is that institution-
al causes for residential sorting must not be confused with reputational bi-
as. The set of border zones should not contain cases in which the low-priced 
side of the border consists entirely of rental stock (whether social or private), 
while the high-priced side is exclusively owner-occupied. The administrative 
boundary of a neighbourhood acts as a social demarcation line that status-
driven buyers seldom cross, even when suitable dwellings can be found on 
the opposite (poorer) side of the border. 
  6.3 Data 
The municipal tax offices in the Netherlands assess the value of real estate 
in their respective municipality at regular intervals. Automated appraisals 
have become more commonplace, but real estate in Rotterdam was appraised 
by realtors in the period that I investigate. Realtors assessed the unobserved 
market value of each property, remaining as close as possible to its sales 
price at the date of the appraisal. The assessed market value was either based 
on the sales price of the object or on own discretion and objective criteria (the 
house prices (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002; Bayer et al., 2003). The latter explanations do not apply to the Rotter-
dam market, however, for reasons that are discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 7.
120 In house price models, these effects are usually controlled for by spatial lags (Anselin, 1999).
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type of object, its size, age and ‘market area’). In the latter case, three compa-
rable sales in the vicinity of the object had to be listed. The assessed market 
value was discounted back to its assumed value at a fixed date, to arrive at 
uniform assessment values for all property. 
Appraisals tend toward the centre of the distribution of sales price (Cornia 
and Slade, 2005). The assessment values of more expensive dwellings are usu-
ally deflated (Clapp, 1990). The assessment values of social rental dwellings 
were directly or indirectly based upon the sales of nearby owner-occupied 
dwellings, so their appraisals may be inflated. The negative impact of social 
housing in the vicinity is neglected in the appraisal when sales occur in own-
er-occupied sections of the neighbourhood. Changes in the assessment value 
in the Netherlands are however, virtually indistinguishable from changes in 
the sales price (De Vries et al., 2007), thereby justifying the use of the assess-
ment value as a proxy measure for the house price as long as it expressed in 
logarithmic form to some extent (Kochin and Parks, 2005).121
The assessment value and characteristics of 285,000 objects in 1999 and 
2003 were provided by the municipal tax office in Rotterdam. These are the 
same house price data that were used in Chapters 3 to 5. Dwellings with 
121 The capitalization of property taxes in the house price and the assessment value is another source of asses-
sor’s bias (Clapp, 1990). Yet another source of bias involves the use of conservative estimates by the municipal 
tax office in order to avoid litigation by taxpayers. 
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missing data and identical dwellings that were assessed as a batch are 
dropped from the sample, leaving 106,000 unique assessments. The next step 
is to eliminate observations located in villages, rural areas or non-residential 
areas (e.g. near the airport, recreational and industrial sites and port areas). 
The dwellings are geo-coded, such that the distance to the nearest adminis-
trative boundary can be calculated. All observations falling within a range of 
250 metres of a boundary are retained, thus leaving observations in 49 of the 
89 administrative neighbourhoods in Rotterdam in 2003 (see Figure 6.2).122 
Not all border zones in the selected neighbourhoods contain enough obser-
vations to conduct the price analysis. The New Meuse and Rotte rivers cut di-
rectly through the city, and parks, lakes, railroads and highways create large-
ly uninhibited areas near many boundaries. It is ultimately possible to iden-
tify 45 zones that have sufficient observations within a 250 metres distance 
of their borders. None of these zones exhibits a complete separation of rent-
al stock on one side of the border and owner-occupied stock on the opposite 
side. This leaves about 40,000 observations in the border zones, after the elim-
ination of dwellings with very low (i.e. less than € 50,000 in 2003) and very 
high (i.e. greater than € 750,000) prices. The statistics for the remaining ob-
servations are listed in Table 6.1. The dataset contains the price in 2003, along 
with the age, size and type of dwelling. The high maximum for house size is 
due to the fact that outdoors facilities are treated as part of the object in the 
appraisal. The house-type index is derived from the hedonic price equation in 
122 The town of Rozenburg to the southwest of Rotterdam was annexed in 2010, thereby adding two more 
neighbourhoods to the municipality.
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the next section.
Also listed are 19,000 non-unique observations of the income, education-
al achievement, tenureship and neighbourhood satisfaction (adjusted for re-
spondent characteristics; see Section 3.3) of households living in the border 
zones in 2004, which are taken from a survey conducted among 9,000 house-
holds in 5,800 six-digit postal code areas. The survey scores are averaged over 
a six-digit postal code area and then appended to the observations of dwell-
ings in 4,100 six-digit postal code areas. Despite the aggregation over the 
postal code area, the variance in the income, education, tenureship and sat-
isfaction remains large. Three fourths of the scores are taken from tenants, 
which is the same share comprised by rental stock in the entire stock in Rot-
terdam in 2003. The average household income of € 2,033 per month in 2004 
(Source: COS, Rotterdam Municipal Statistics Office) falls within the survey’s 
median income category.123 This provides some level of confidence that the 
adjusted survey scores, which are later used to investigate the role of the so-
cial fabric (income and education) and social climate (neighbourhood satis-
faction) in the estimate of the house price residual, as well as the role of insti-
tutional causes for sorting (owner-occupation), present an unbiased sample of 
border-zone residents and their characteristics. 
 6.4  Boundary analysis
Hedonic house price equation
In the preliminary stage of the analysis, a hedonic house price regression is 
conducted for more than 40,000 dwellings with the logarithm of the house 
price in 2003 as the dependent variable and twelve different house types 
(with apartments as the reference category), the age and age squared, the 
size and size squared of the dwelling and boundary-fixed and boundary-to-
neighbourhood fixed effects as explanatory variables. The outcome of the 
regression is listed in Table 6.2. It has a decent fit, given the low number of 
structural characteristics in the model. Newer dwellings were more expen-
sive than older ones were. This relationship is reversed at an age of 192 years 
(0.73/0.83*100), but the dataset contains no dwellings with such a high age. 
House price increased with the size of the dwelling, albeit at a declining rate. 
The coefficients for the house types make sense. They are used later as in-
put for the house-type index, which is used in the investigation of the role 
123 The eight income categories are as follows: less than € 775, € 775–€ 1,090, € 1,090–€ 1,590, € 1,590–€ 2,770, 
€ 2,770–€ 3,500, € 3,500–€ 5,000, € 5,000–€ 7,500 and greater than € 7,500 per month. The categories for educa-
tional achievement range from elementary school, lower secondary, medium secondary, medium tertiary, higher 
secondary and higher tertiary education (i.e. college-level) and university-level. Neighbourhood satisfaction 
scores are set along a seven-point scale ranging from extremely dissatisfied to extremely satisfied.
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played by the physical quality of dwellings in jumps in house price. A simple 
t-test is applied to the coefficients to ascertain whether some of the house 
types can be grouped together. The three most expensive types of single-fam-
ily dwelling remain separate categories, while the non-corner terraced dwell-
ing can be grouped with the most expensive multi-family dwelling, a portico 
flat with a lift. The seven remaining types of multi-family dwellings can be re-
duced to four categories.124 The house-type index ranges in value from 1 for 
the least expensive category (a gallery flat without a lift) to 8 for the most ex-
pensive category (a detached single-family dwelling). The main purpose of the 
regression, however, is to estimate the coefficients for the area-fixed effects, 
which serve as the building blocks for the boundary analysis presented in the 
remainder of this chapter.
Spatial patterns in the house price residual
The 180 coefficients for the area-fixed effects in the hedonic house price 
equation are now used to investigate spatial patterns in the average house 
price residual on the Rotterdam housing market. The value of the coefficient 
at a distance of 250 to 125 metres from the border on the low-priced side is 
first normalised to zero. The increase in the house price residual in the three 
remaining border segments is then derived from the sum of the coefficients 
on the area-fixed effects. The values for each segment are averaged based 
on the observed pattern in the house price residual. The grouping of the seg-
ments is defined by formulas (6.2a), (6.2b) and (6.2c), as depicted in Figure 6.1. 
Table 6.3 lists the average value of the house price residual in each segment 
for the four identified sets of border zones. 
124  Although porticos without a lift are more expensive than apartments are, the difference is so small (0.005% 
of the house price) that these categories are grouped together.
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Of the 45 border zones, 11 exhibit a pattern in the house price residual that 
is incompatible with a reputational premium. The house price residual re-
mains constant in six cases, while smooth growth is visible in five cases. The 
last set includes two border zones in the administrative borough of the city 
centre, which can thus be seen as a single geographical submarket. Interest-
ingly, this set includes three of the four borders that divide neighbourhoods 
with the same name, but with a different prefix (i.e. north/south, east/west 
and new/old). Buyers apparently fail to distinguish between neighbourhoods 
with the same name. The one exception is the Kralingen area just east of the 
city centre, the eastern side of which is considered one of the most prestig-
ious neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, while the western side is in the lower to 
middle layer of the neighbourhood hierarchy. This border zone is part of the 
set within which a discrete jump in the house price residual is visible. 
The house price residual thus makes a significant jump in three fourths of 
the 45 border zones. A sudden jump is visible in 22 zones, a positive spillover 
from the high-priced to the low-priced side of the border in nine zones, while 
three zones display a negative spillover. As illustrated in Figure 6.3, cases with 
positive or negative spillovers are characterised by a smooth growth of the re-
sidual, despite the fact that the size of the jump near the border exceeds the 
size of the spillover effect. While these cases might still be compatible with 
a reputational premium in the house price, the remainder of the analysis fo-
cuses on the 22 zones in which the house price residual jumps beyond any 
doubt. The average jump in the house price residual for this group of border 
zones is 17% (see the third row and seventh column of Table 6.3), with a mini-
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mum value of 5% and a maximum value of 38%.125
Spatial patterns in the physical quality of dwellings
The next step is an investigation of the role of the physical quality of dwell-
ings in jumps in house price. The missing structural characteristics and spa-
tial lags in the model may have inflated the estimates of the house price re-
sidual and the inter-neighbourhood differences in the residual. The average 
house price residual, age and size of the dwelling and average house-type in-
dex are first regressed on boundary-fixed and boundary-to-neighbourhood-
fixed effects in the 45 border zones. In the regressions with age and size as 
the dependent variable, which undergo a logarithmic transformation, the 
coefficients measure the percentage change in their value. Given that the 
house-type index is a dimensionless measure, the change in the coefficient 
is more relevant than the size. The means reported in Table 6.4 are obtained 
by averaging the sum of the coefficients for the area-fixed effects in each seg-
ment for the four sets of border zones. In Figure 6.4, these figures have been 
converted into percentage increases.126 The resulting spatial patterns in the 
average age, size and house type in each area can be compared to the pat-
terns in the house price residual shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4.
The information reported in the third row of Table 6.4 suggests that the 
physical quality of dwellings plays some role in the observed discontinui-
ties in the house price residual. The age of dwellings is higher on the high-
priced side of the border, whereas the housing stock in that area is composed 
of slightly less popular house types. The most important structural charac-
teristic (house size), however, is on average 7% higher on the more expen-
sive side of the border. The size of dwellings is probably related to the physi-
cal quality of the area, given that larger dwellings are usually found in neigh-
bourhoods with better architectural quality and more or better amenities. 
House size could also serve as a proxy for unobserved structural characteris-
tics (e.g. number of rooms and presence of a garden or bath). It is reasonable 
to assume that the estimated jumps in the house price residual are inflated, 
due to the missing variables in the model. At best, however, the large size of 
125 Differences between the neighbourhoods in the 22 selected zones amounted to an 8% increase in owner-
occupation in the area, a 17% rise in average household income and an increase of 0.3 in average neighbourhood 
satisfaction, on a scale from 1 to 7 in 2003 (source: COS, Rotterdam Municipal Statistics Office).
126 The percentage rise in the house price index in Figure 6.4 is obtained by dividing the figures in Table 6.4 by 
the average value of the house price index from Table 6.1.
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dwellings on the high-priced side of the border can account for only a fraction 
of the observed jumps in the residual. 
First, an increase in the size of dwellings occurred in only 11 of the 22 se-
lected border zones. Average house size remained the same in nine cases, 
while it was even smaller on the high-priced side in two cases. The increase 
in house size is thus simply not general enough to explain all of the jumps 
in the house price residual. Second, the increase in size is not large enough 
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to account for an average jump of 17% in the house price residual. The zones 
in which the residual did not jump can be investigated in order to develop an 
idea of the remaining bias in the estimate of the residual. The increase of the 
average house price residual was 7% in the 11 cases in which the residual re-
mained constant or experienced a smooth growth, while average house size 
increased by 12% in these cases (see the seventh column of Table 6.4). Based 
on this relationship, a 7% increase in house size in the 22 zones of interest 
may have led to an additional jump of about 4% in the residual (i.e. 7/12*7%). 
This figure indicates that the larger stock on the expensive side of the bor-
der could have accounted for one fourth of the 17% average rise in the house 
price residual at best. 
Roughly 75% of the jumps in the average house price residual in the 22 bor-
der zones remains unexplained. The improvement in physical quality is nei-
ther general nor large enough to explain the jumps in house price when 
crossing neighbourhood boundaries. Another noteworthy result in Table 6.4 
relates to the nine cases in which a positive spillover is visible. The quality 
of the structural characteristics within a distance of 125 metres of the bor-
der was even better on the low-priced side of the border than it was on the 
high-priced side. This suggests a possible explanation for a ‘golden edge’ on a 
deprived neighbourhood. The much better price-quality relationship of dwell-
ings on the low-priced side might attract some well-to-do buyers who would 
otherwise opt for dwellings in the adjacent, poorer neighbourhood. They can 
still make use of the amenities on the expensive side of the border, while 
profiting from the better price-quality relationship of the visible aspects of 
the dwelling and neighbourhood by living on the poorer side. 
Spatial patterns in the social quality of the neighbourhood
The sorting of owner-occupiers of different socio-economic strata between 
areas is known to be associated with the price of locations (Bayer and Ross, 
2006). The neighbourhood boundary must act as the social demarcation line if 
owner-occupiers are guided by a reputational bias in their destination choic-
es. The social fabric, which is measured by the average income of respond-
ing households, should exhibit a pattern that is roughly similar to that of the 
house price residual.127 In turn, the social climate must exhibit a smoother 
pattern of decay or growth across the border if it spills over to adjacent are-
127 The educational achievement of residents was also incorporated into the analysis, but it failed to deliver 
conclusive results. The erratic spatial distribution of students is probably responsible for this outcome. 
[ 136 ]
as. Earlier in this thesis, neighbourhood satisfaction has been shown to cap-
ture the inside view on the area quite well; it therefore seems an appropri-
ate measure for the social climate of an area.128  The change in owner-occupa-
tion is used to examine the role of institutional constraints in the estimate of 
the house price residual. The spatial patterns in the survey scores reported in 
Table 6.5 are once again obtained by regressing each of the scores on the ar-
ea-fixed effects and then averaging the coefficients in the regression for each 
segment and for the four sets of border zones. 
Judging from the small changes in neighbourhood satisfaction, the social 
climate hardly changes at all when crossing the administrative border. Resi-
dents’ perceptions of their surroundings are related to the assessment of the 
overall neighbourhood by outsiders (see Table 3.2), but the differences in liv-
ing quality within the neighbourhood seem to be lost on most buyers. This is 
another indication that buyers consider the neighbourhood at large and not 
the surroundings of the offer. Differences in income and owner-occupation on 
opposite sides of the border, which could be due to sorting between neigh-
bourhoods, are larger than the local differences on either side of the border. 
As expected, household income follows the same pattern as the house price 
residual (see also Figure 6.5). A small but gradual change in income is visi-
ble in cases in which the residual does not jump, while the spillovers in the 
house price residual are also visible in the income variable. More important-
128 This has been verified empirically by Hipp (2010), who showed that the socio-economic status of the micro-
neighbourhood has a much stronger impact on the satisfaction of residents with their neighbourhoods than does 
the status of the macro-neighbourhood or the physical features of the area.
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ly, a sudden jump in the house price residual is accompanied by a marked in-
crease in income. Looking more closely at the individual cases, household in-
come makes a small drop in just four out of the 22 selected zones, but these 
happen to be the same zones in which the residual makes a modest jump 
(from 4% to 8%). The general picture is thus that households of different so-
cio-economic strata are indeed sorting between administrative neighbour-
hoods in the cases in which the house price residual is seen to make a sud-
den jump. 
It is still too early to conclude that the sorting between neighbourhoods is 
based solely on a reputational bias among buyers. Table 6.5 lists the average 
changes in owner-occupation in the 22 selected border zones. The share of 
tenants and home-owners is a proxy measure for the division between so-
cial rental and privately owned stock, which is far more relevant in the Dutch 
context.129 The 15% increase in owner-occupation in the 22 zones suggests an 
institutional cause for sorting between neighbourhoods.130 A higher share of 
social rental stock on one side of the border inevitably leads to lower income 
levels and lower house prices in that area, due to the low income of tenants, 
regardless of the existence of a reputational bias among buyers. The role of 
the ownership structure in the area in the estimate of the house price residu-
al warrants closer examination, as does the role of the physical quality of the 
area.
Unexplained jumps in the house price
In a further examination of the spatial patterns in the house price residual, 
which extends beyond the procedure specified by Bayer et al. (2007), two re-
gressions are conducted for the 22 zones of interest. In the first regression, 
the average house price residual in each border segment and zone is re-
gressed on the average house-type index, size and age of the dwelling and 
the average income, educational achievement, neighbourhood satisfaction 
and tenureship of households within the same segment. This regression for 
66 observations (i.e. three segments in 22 zones) indicates the contribution of 
physical quality and tenureship to the house price residual, thereby explain-
ing the absence of area-fixed effects in the model.131 The second regression 
uses the average income category in each border segment as a dependent var-
129 The marginalised private rental stock in the Netherlands caters to low-income households that are unable to 
obtain social rental dwellings on short notice, as well as to ex-pats and ‘the new middle classes’ on the opposite 
side of the neighbourhood hierarchy.
130 Of the total housing stock in Rotterdam in 2003, 20% consisted of private rentals, 55% consisted of social 
rentals and 23% consisted of owner-occupied dwellings (Source: Municipal Statistics Office). The tenureship of 
the remaining 2% consisted of either private rental or owner-occupied dwellings.
131 The approach is analytically similar to appending the hedonic house price equation with a spatial lag for the 
structural characteristics and local averages for owner education, income, education and neighbourhood satisfac-
tion.
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iable, with the house price residual, the house-type index, the size and age 
of the dwelling and neighbourhood satisfaction as explanatory variables. This 
regression indicates whether sorting between neighbourhoods is due solely to 
differences in the tenureship rate and physical quality of dwellings or wheth-
er it is also due to a reputational bias.
Despite the simplicity of the models presented in Table 6.6 and despite the 
low number of observations, the overall fit is good and the estimated coef-
ficients are revealing. The outcome of the regression for income shows that 
tenureship is an important determinant of sorting. The importance of ten-
ureship is mirrored in the regression for the house price residual. A 15% rise 
in owner-occupation on the high-priced side of the border leads to a 3.9% rise 
in the house price residual (i.e. 0.15*0.26). 
Less expensive house types tend to lie on the high-priced side, although the 
decrease in housing quality may actually lead to an increase in the price lev-
el in that area. The higher prevalence of small single-family dwellings in the 
social rental sector explains this counter-intuitive result. The decrease of 0.08 
in the house-type index and the 7% increase in house size (see Table 6.4) on 
the high-priced side leads to an increase of 3.4% in the house price residual 
(i.e. 0.08*0.07+0.07*0.40).132 This suggests that just over 40% of the 17% average 
jump in the house price residual (i.e. (3.9+3.2)/17.2) in the 22 zones is the re-
sult of bias due to the poor specification of the model, while roughly 60% re-
mains unexplained. 
 
 6.5  Conclusions
The boundary analysis in this chapter is intended to prove that a reputation-
al premium in house price can be made visible. A change in neighbourhood 
name should lead to an abrupt change in both the social fabric of the area 
and the average house-price level. House prices did jump in half the inhab-
ited border zones on the Rotterdam market in 2003, even upon discarding 
the one fourth of the cases with positive or negative spill-overs. The prices 
jumped an average of 17% across the neighbourhood borders in these zones, 
where roughly 60% could not be explained by either an improvement in the 
132 Note the similarity with the estimate in Section 6.4
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physical quality of the area or a higher rate of owner-occupation. If the cases 
with spill-overs across neighbourhood borders are included as well, then the 
average house price residual jumped by 16% in three fourths of all inhabited 
border zones. These results validate the fourth conjecture stated at the end of 
Chapter 2. The administrative boundaries of neighbourhoods (and by exten-
sion, the neighbourhood name) may have an impact on house price and on 
sorting between neighbourhoods on the Dutch owner-occupied market.
Several shortcomings associated with the approach that I took, could cast 
some doubt on the results. First, the specification of the models in this chap-
ter was arguably too simple. The estimate of the house price residual could 
have been improved to some extent by including additional structural charac-
teristics in the hedonic price equation, but these data were unavailable. Sec-
ond, the impact of the tenure-ship rate and the physical quality of the area 
on the house price residual could be larger than the 40% mentioned in the 
text if more sophisticated measures of various neighbourhood attributes are 
appended to the model. For example, the level of owner-occupation serves 
as a proxy for the more relevant division between social rental and private-
ly owned stock. Realtors on the other hand, could have underrated the jumps 
near boundaries where differences in tenure ship were present. Finally, as-
pects that were not investigated may have been at least partly responsible for 
at least some of the jumps in the house price residual. For example, local sup-
ply conditions are neglected in the model.
Most importantly, the analysis is based on assessment values rather than 
on actual sales prices. Some of the jumps in the house price residual could 
have been the result of realtors’ definitions of ‘market areas’. Jumps in the as-
sessment values come naturally, if market areas are associated with adminis-
trative neighbourhoods. Notwithstanding this objection, there are few people 
who understand the housing market better than realtors (Yinger, 1981; Levitt 
and Syverson, 2008). Their role as middlemen of the housing market entails 
that they act as ‘informed outsiders’. Neighbourhood reputations are shaped 
by outsiders’ perceived (and possibly exaggerated) differences between neigh-
bourhoods. As such, possible assessor’s bias feeds back into list prices and 
eventually into sales prices, unless buyers are well-informed. 
The fit of the hedonic house price equation and the models for average in-
come and the house price residual in the border zones are good. It thus seems 
improbable that a better specification of the models in this chapter would 
have improved the estimate of the house price residual to such an extent that 
the jumps in the residual could be explained away by the missing variables. 
The fact that jumps in the house price residual are so common on the hous-
ing market also indicates the presence of a structural reason for the observed 
discontinuities in house price, regardless of assessors’ bias. The explanation 
that I offer here, the price-tag on the neighbourhood name, need not be the 
only reason for the observed patterns in the residual, but it does provide the 
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most feasible and viable explanation. 
Analysis of the spatial patterns in sales prices near the administrative 
boundaries of neighbourhoods could give a more definitive answer to the 
question that I raised. More evidence for the role of reputations in the pricing 
mechanism can be offered in cases in which it is known that neighbourhood 
quality was left unchanged, while the name of the area changed abruptly. One 
such case is the subject of the next section, in which I investigate the annex-
ation of a neighbourhood section by an adjacent, more affluent and thus bet-
ter-reputed neighbourhood. 
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 7  Boundary change and 
house prices
 7.1  Introduction
The hedonic price analysis presented in the previous chapter revealed that 
house price makes a jump near the boundary of the administrative neigh-
bourhood in three fourths of all the inhabited border zones in Rotterdam. 
These jumps in price could not be explained entirely by changes in neigh-
bourhood quality. Abrupt jumps are observed in half of the investigated bor-
der zones, thus corroborating the fourth conjecture stated at the end of Chap-
ter 2: house price seems to contain a reputational premium (or downgrade) 
in each administrative neighbourhood. This evidence remains circumstantial, 
however, in the sense that some unobserved factor could have been at least 
partially responsible for the discontinuities observed in house prices. 
A jump in house price that is the sole result of a change in the name of 
an area would offer much stronger evidence to support the conjecture that a 
neighbourhood’s name carries a price tag. This administrative action leaves 
no traces behind in the area, with the exception of a change in neighbour-
hood name in the advertisement and listing of vacant dwellings. In this chap-
ter, I use a repeat sales model to examine price changes in a section of a 
neighbourhood in Rotterdam that was annexed by an adjacent, better reput-
ed neighbourhood. If house price does contain a reputational premium, then 
the name change should have resulted in a sudden change in price. Further-
more, owner-occupiers living in the area should have anticipated this price 
hike well in advance, due to their informational advantage as residents, rela-
tive to buyers from outside of the area.
 7.2  Boundary change and repeat sales
The role that administrative boundaries of municipalities, boroughs and 
neighbourhoods play in explaining residential mobility and house pric-
es was first analysed by political economists. Tiebout (1956) saw ‘voting with 
your feet’ as an alternative to voting in elections on the level of taxation and 
public spending within a legal jurisdiction (Ross and Yinger, 1999). Local tax-
es also affect the cost of living (Dowding and John, 1996), while the quality 
of policing or school quality directly affects neighbourhood quality (Nechy-
ba and Strauss, 1998; Bayer et al., 2007). Zoning restrictions can also be tighter 
or looser depending upon the jurisdiction. In some cases, administrative di-
visions do affect supply and house prices (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002). Unlike 
the situation in the US and the UK, the division of Dutch cities into adminis-
trative boroughs and neighbourhoods has few real consequences. Local taxes 
are based on a head-of-household rate or a percentage of the property value. 
Public services are mainly administered at the national, municipal or individ-
ual level. Although boroughs do have some leeway in public spending, the lev-
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el of spending is comparatively low.133
The administrative neighbourhoods within a borough are used primarily for 
the aggregation of neighbourhood statistics and the designation of places in 
the advertisements of vacancies, media reports and the public opinion. The 
boundaries of municipalities are regularly redefined as a result of mergers or 
dissolutions, but adjustments in the boundaries of administrative neighbour-
hoods are rare. In one case in Rotterdam, urban redevelopment led to an ad-
justment of a neighbourhood boundary. The growth of container shipping in 
the second half of the 20th century led to the obsolescence of older ports near 
the city centre. One such area lay just south of the city centre, across the New 
Meuse river. The Kop van Zuid (Southern head) neighbourhood was built in 
stages during the 1990s, and it consisted of privately owned stock. From its 
humble start in 1995 with only 24 dwellings, it had grown into a neighbour-
hood with 3,700 dwellings by 2003. East of this neighbourhood is the neigh-
bourhood of Feijenoord, which remains one of the city’s most disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. In 1997, the city council decided that Kop van Zuid would be 
transferred from the city centre to the same borough as Feijenoord and that 
all sections of Feijenoord to the west of a railway tunnel would be a part of 
the new Kop van Zuid-Entrepot neighbourhood at the turn of the millennium. 
These westernmost sections include two social housing estates in the Peper-
133 The sum of the annual budgets of all fourteen boroughs in Rotterdam in 2009 was about 10% of the city 
council’s annual budget.
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klip and ODS-Gebied, as well as the Entrepot section and a number of dwell-
ings in the Landtong, which are a combination of owner-occupied and private 
rental housing (see Figure 7.1).134
The annexation of the westernmost sections of Feijenoord by the Kop van 
Zuid-Entrepot neighbourhood provides an experimental setting for analys-
ing the role of a reputational premium in house price. Feijenoord is an im-
poverished neighbourhood with the largest share of social rental housing in 
Rotterdam (95% of the stock in 2003, source: COS Municipal Statistics Office). 
The Kop van Zuid neighbourhood had been a success from its inception; it 
soon became the most affluent neighbourhood on the entire Southbank. In 
2003, the difference in the house price residual between the two neighbour-
hoods was 33%, the second largest price differential between adjacent neigh-
bourhoods on the housing market.135 In the same year, the average house-
hold income in the Kop van Zuid-Entrepot neighbourhood was 35% high-
er than it was in Feijenoord, and neighbourhood satisfaction score was also 
0.75 higher (on a seven-point scale). If the name of a neighbourhood adds to 
the house price, then the annexation of the Entrepot section by Kop van Zuid 
should have led to a marked increase in the price of dwellings within that ar-
ea. This annexation must have increased the value of social rental stock in 
the Peperklip and ODS-gebied as well, given that the only available measure 
for the value of this stock (i.e. assessment value) is directly or indirectly based 
on the sales prices of comparable dwellings in the vicinity.136
The standard method for analysing changes in house price at two different 
moments in time is the repeat sales method (Bailey et al., 1963). The following 
equation is estimated (Clapp and Giaccotto, 1998):
(7.1) ∑ −−− −+−=− tltltltttt NBHPLogPLog )()()( 11001 δδββ   
The change in the logarithm of house price is the sum of the overall price 
hike in the area (captured by the change in the constant term) and the 
change in neighbourhood value. In this equation, the neighbourhood vari-
ables NBHl are defined as area-fixed effects. A clever definition of the area 
dummies allows for a direct test for the effect of the name change on the ex-
change value of the area.
The Dutch Central Statistics Office (CBS) regularly classifies all six-dig-
it postal code areas into administrative neighbourhoods. The classifications 
for the years 1999 and 2003 are known for all the dwellings in the dataset. 
134 The Peperklip is a famous design by the Dutch architect Carel Weeber, which was completed in 1982.
135 This border was among the cases with negative spillover effects, as discussed in Chapter 6, due to the pres-
ence of the two large social housing estates (ODS-gebied and Peperklip) in the annexed area.
136 Transaction data for Feijenoord are scarce, due to the large share of social rental stock.
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The dataset is split into three subsamples: observations that were already a 
part of the Kop van Zuid neighbourhood in 1999, observations that remained 
a part of Feijenoord during the period 1999-2003 and observations that were 
first a part of Feijenoord in 1999 and then changed to the Kop van Zuid-Entre-
pot in 2003.137
A further division in the sample of the annexed area is made for dwellings 
that were built before the year in which the annexation was announced and 
dwellings that were constructed in 1997, 1998 and 1999. Sellers and buyers of 
the post-1997 construction were likely to have sold and bought their dwell-
ings at post-annexation prices. Each subsample receives an area dummy, 
with the value 1 if the observation fell into the annexed area and building pe-
riod in question and 0 elsewhere. The change in the coefficient for the dum-
my for older stock in the annexed area of Feijenoord is expected to be posi-
tive and significant (i.e. δt-δt-1>0 with a t-value greater than 1.96). The test as-
certains whether the change in coefficient value of the older stock in the an-
nexed sections is greater than the change in coefficient value of the younger 
stock in the same sections and of the stock in Kop van Zuid and Feijenoord. 
This test further reveals whether any increase in price was due to the name 
change or whether it was due to improvements in neighbourhood quality (e.g. 
better amenities). An improvement in neighbourhood quality should lead to 
a price increase for all the stock. The majority of residents in the western-
most sections of Feijenoord remained in their dwellings during the annexa-
tion, such that the change in social fabric is negligible.138 No changes occurred 
in the physical make-up of the annexed area either, other than the fact that 
construction was taking place and amenities were being established in the ar-
ea adjacent to Kop van Zuid. 
Feijenoord and Kop van Zuid are distinctly different areas, hence the evolu-
tion of prices could have been different. An area dummy is used for observa-
tions that were part of Kop van Zuid in 1999 in order to control for differenc-
es in the increase in price between both areas. Prices of single-family dwell-
ings and apartments may have evolved differently as well. With seven ob-
servations on single-family dwelling in Feijenoord, a dummy for this house 
type is likely to act as an area-fixed effect. The model is therefore estimat-
ed twice: once for the entire sample and once for apartments only. The date 
137 Dwellings in the Kop van Zuid-Entrepot neighbourhood that were built after 1999 are obviously dropped 
from the sample.
138 A total of 233 transactions occurred for the 1,235 privately owned dwellings (including the stock construc-
ted between 1995 and 1999) in the annexed sections between 1999 and 2003, 30 of which involved repeated sales 
(source: Dutch Land Registry Office). This indicates that 83.5% of all owner-occupiers in the annexed region in 1999 
were still living there in 2003, which corresponds to an annual exit rate of just 4.1%, which is low compared to the 
exit rate in other parts of the city (see Tables 3.3 and 4.1). Figures for the exit rate in the social rental sector could 
not be obtained, but it seems unlikely that these figures were much higher in the annexed sections than they were in 
the social rental stock elsewhere, given the comparatively high neighbourhood satisfaction scores in this area.
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of the first appraisal falls after the announcement date of the annexation. As 
such, the test ascertains whether the name change of the area led to a slow 
rise in house prices, as the only other economic study on this subject asserts 
(Messer et al., 2006), or whether prices adjusted immediately or not at all (i.e. 
coefficient is zero).
 7.3  Data
Table 7.1 lists data on the price, age, size and type of 1,600 dwellings in the 
neighbourhoods of Feijenoord and Kop van Zuid-Entrepot on a sum total of 
5,900 dwellings in 1999. House prices in 1999 and 2003 are based on the as-
sessment values of the municipal tax office (the same dataset that was used 
in the previous chapter). The prices are first cleansed of non-unique assess-
ments, largely serving to reduce the number of observations in the social 
housing estates in Feijenoord proper and the annexed sections of Feijenoord. 
The variance in the price, size and age of dwellings is large compared to that 
of the housing stock in the rest of the city (see Table 6.1). This is the result of 
the considerable difference in quality between the two neighbourhoods. The 
224 dwellings that were already a part of Kop van Zuid in 1999 had an average 
house price of € 148,000 in the same year, as compared to an average price of 
€ 62,000 for the 1,002 dwellings in Feijenoord proper. In 1999, the median age 
of dwellings in Kop van Zuid was one year, as compared to 89 years in Feije-
noord proper. The observations in the annexed sections of Feijenoord consist 
of 382 dwellings, the quality of which was superior to that of the rest of the 
neighbourhood. Of these dwellings, 245 were built before 1997 and 137 dwell-
ings were built during and after this year. The average house price in 1999 was 




 7.4  Repeat sales equation
A repeat sales equation is now estimated for the change in house price be-
tween 2003 and 1999 in the Kop van Zuid-Entrepot and Feijenoord neighbour-
hoods. The percentage change in house price of over 1,600 dwellings is re-
gressed on a constant and the area-fixed effects. 
The outcome of the first model in Table 7.2 shows that Feijenoord expe-
rienced an annual price hike of 4.7% (i.e. 100*(1.20¼-1)). The model further 
shows that the price gap between the stock in Feijenoord proper and the orig-
inal Kop van Zuid neighbourhood was reduced by a slim margin. Prices of 
the older stock in the annexed sections of Feijenoord, however, increased by 
about 6%. In the second model, observations on single-family dwellings are 
not used in the estimation. This model reveals that older apartments in the 
annexed sections of Feijenoord experienced a price hike of 8%. Social land-
lords and owner-occupiers who owned stock in Feijenoord and found them-
selves owning property in the Kop van Zuid-Entrepot neighbourhood experi-
enced an increase in house value. Owner-occupiers and landlords who bought 
new construction that was going to be a part of Kop van Zuid-Entrepot any-
way, paid the same price as buyers who were already living in Kop van Zuid. 
The near complete coverage of dwellings in the area makes it inevitable 
that error terms are spatially correlated. The second model is estimated with 
random effects for each of the 151 six-digit postal code areas in the sample in 
order to control for spatial autocorrelation. This reduces the estimate of the 
price hike of the older apartments in the annexed section of Feijenoord to 6%.
 7.5  Conclusions
The third part of this thesis was devoted to the identification of the reputa-
tional premium in house price. The hedonic price analysis presented in Chap-
ter 6 revealed that unexplained jumps in the house price residual near the 
administrative boundaries of neighbourhoods are common in Rotterdam. The 
boundary analysis left several doubts regarding the role of neighbourhood 
name in the price-setting mechanism. The repeat sales model discussed in 
this chapter analysed a case in which a residential area was annexed by an 
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adjacent, more affluent and better-reputed neighbourhood. Older dwellings 
that had originally been part of a disadvantaged neighbourhood and were lat-
er annexed by a more affluent neighbourhood experienced an average price 
increase of 6 to 8%. These dwellings were located in neighbourhood sections 
that experienced neither new construction nor a marked change in social fab-
ric. Improvements in the physical quality of the area do not explain the price 
increase, as the improvement should have affected the price of both the new-
er dwellings and the older dwellings. 
The evidence in this and the previous chapter corroborates the fourth and 
fifth conjecture stated at the end of Chapter 2. Neighbourhood name is a rel-
evant element of housing quality, and it is priced accordingly on the owner-
occupied market. The name of a neighbourhood is linked to its reputation, 
which was defined earlier as the notion that ill-informed outsiders have of 
the unobservable (mainly social) quality of the neighbourhood. The proof of a 
reputational premium in house price indicates that the pull effect of the price 
on social tenants in the count model discussed in Chapter 4 and the duration 
model discussed in Chapter 5 could have been a reflection of social tenants’ 
bias towards certain neighbourhoods. Buyers and social tenants in Rotterdam 
seem to share a similar preference for (or dislike of) neighbourhoods based 
on the name of the area (see also Table 3.2). The second key question of this 
thesis can thus now be answered in the affirmative: the informational asym-
metry on the social rental market carries over to the owner-occupied market; 
neighbourhood reputation has a price tag. 
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 8  Summary and discussion
 8.1  Summary
The full information axiom in the neoclassical economic literature for the 
housing market predicts that house-seeking tenants and buyers are just as 
well-informed as residents are about the circumstances in the neighbour-
hood. The pull effects of the neighbourhood on house-seekers should be more 
or less of the same size and range as the corresponding push effects on resi-
dents. The same attributes of the neighbourhood that explain residential mo-
bility should also be able to explain house price. In reality, assessing the role 
of neighbourhood quality in the exit choices of residents poses less of a prob-
lem than assessing its role in the destination choices of house-seekers. Some 
pull effects of the neighbourhood prove relevant on one housing market, but 
then fail to explain residential mobility on another market. Furthermore, 
neighbourhood attributes that are known to affect house prices in one area 
fail to make an impact on the price in other areas on the same housing mar-
ket (Atkinson and Crocker, 1987; Kauko, 2002).
The assumption that new tenants and buyers are well informed about the 
neighbourhoods to which they would like to move is abandoned in (among 
other contributions) search models for the housing market. This recent ad-
dition to the housing market literature states that most buyers and new ten-
ants are at an informational disadvantage relative to the suppliers of dwell-
ings (Wheaton, 1990; Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; Albrecht et al., 2009). Buy-
ers and new tenants can lift the informational asymmetry by acquiring more 
information on the quality of vacancies. Another strand of literature has in-
corporated a similar belief into an equilibrium model of the housing mar-
ket (Berliant and Yu, 2009). In this model, the equilibrium price is equal to the 
amount that a buyer is willing to pay for the dwelling, but ill-informed buy-
ers may overestimate the user value of a dwelling and therefore overpay for 
it. I extended upon this body of literature and geographical search theories 
(Brown and Moore, 1970; McLellan, 1977; Smith et al., 1979; Huff, 1986) by as-
suming that there is a spatial dimension to the informational asymmetry be-
tween some house-seekers and the suppliers of dwellings.
Residents know all there is to know about circumstances in the home sur-
roundings through their own experience. House-seekers learn about the 
availability and quality of vacancies through advertisements and through 
the inspection of the actual dwelling and neighbourhood. Several aspects of 
neighbourhood quality may still go unobserved. Who the new neighbours are 
and how they interact with one another remains hidden to a visitor’s casu-
al glance over the area. The availability and quality of local amenities and 
services may also go unnoticed. House-seekers can adopt several strategies 
to overcome their informational disadvantage. Geographical search theo-
ries assume that residential search takes place within a limited space, and 
house-seekers thus need to become acquainted with only a few areas. House-
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seekers can save further costs by searching in their own neighbourhoods, in 
neighbourhoods where their family and friends live or on their way to work. 
These strategies reduce the risk of ending up with a lemon (Akerlof, 1970), a 
dwelling whose user value falls short of its price. Not all house-seekers are in 
a position to obtain detailed information on their final destinations.
Ill-informed house-seekers can always fall back upon neighbourhood rep-
utation as a risk-reducing strategy. Sociologists have defined the reputation 
or name of a neighbourhood as the common view on the social circumstanc-
es in an area, which enables outsiders to make a simple (albeit not always 
correct) distinction between places and their inhabitants (Suttles, 1972). The 
agent-based simulation discussed in Chapter 2 revealed that reputations act 
as a simple rule of thumb in the destination choices of house-seekers. Given 
that a neighbourhood with a poor reputation is less likely to attract affluent 
households, it will be very hard to improve the social make-up of an ill-reput-
ed area. A neighbourhood whose name does improve inevitably starts to at-
tract more affluent households. Reputations thus act as self-fulfilling proph-
ecies: the social quality of the area adapts to the neighbourhood’s name. The 
use of reputations ensures that the destination choices of ill-informed buyers 
and tenants will prove right in the long run.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the social rental market in Rot-
terdam in order to test whether many tenants face informational constraints 
when searching for new homes. The spatial scale of reputations – which, in 
the case of the Netherlands, is the administrative neighbourhood (Hortula-
nus, 1995) – acts as a benchmark. If tenants use reputations in their destina-
tion choices, then they are likely to care less about differences in living qual-
ity within each neighbourhood than they do about the choice between neigh-
bourhoods. In contrast, well-informed tenants are likely to be able to find the 
best (and thus undervalued) destinations, even in ill-reputed neighbourhoods. 
If a similar informational asymmetry exists on the owner-occupied market, 
then buyers’ reputational bias should be visible in spatial house price pat-
terns. This study predicts that price is likely to make an abrupt change when 
crossing the border to another neighbourhood whose reputation is better or 
worse than that of the adjacent neighbourhood.
The exit choices of tenants of a not-for-profit housing association in Rot-
terdam are investigated in Chapter 3. Two measures of neighbourhood quali-
ty suffice to explain spatial differences in the exit rate. A neighbourhood sat-
isfaction score from a residential survey measures the quality of the neigh-
bourhood as experienced by residents. House price reflects the value that out-
siders to the area attach to the actual dwelling and, more importantly, to its 
location. Tenants’ stated demand for social rental dwellings is investigated 
in Chapter 4. Demand is measured by the number of tenants who responded 
to the association’s vacancies. On average, house-seekers are likely to be less 
informed about the quality of the neighbourhood than residents are. House-
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seeking tenants do not pay as much attention to neighbourhood satisfaction, 
while it is likely to be a relevant push factor on existing tenants,. This con-
jecture was confirmed in the estimation outcome of a count model of the re-
sponse to vacancies Chapter 4 in contrast to the outcome of an exit choice 
model in Chapter 3.
A responding tenant makes no commitment to live in the dwelling; rejec-
tion is always an option. Candidates who accept an offer do commit them-
selves: they lose their rank in the queuing system for social rental dwellings, 
meaning that they must stay in the dwelling for a number of years. The main 
result of a revealed preference model of the waiting time for social rental 
dwellings, as presented in Chapter 5, is that half of all new tenants knew little 
about the living quality near their new homes. The other half proved equal-
ly well informed as residents: the pull effect of neighbourhood satisfaction on 
these tenants was similar in scale – and even larger in size – than was the 
corresponding push effect on residents. Tenants with a low rank in the distri-
bution system and first-time tenants proved less informed than high-ranking 
and transferring tenants. High-ranking tenants face high opportunity costs; 
they must forfeit good, future housing opportunities. Transferring tenants al-
so face risky destination choices; they must exchange one dwelling for an-
other. The maximum loss in utility that a poorly informed tenant could suf-
fer amount to 25% of the rent or 20% reduction in the waiting time for the 
dwelling. The analysis of residential mobility on the social rental market thus 
answers one of the key questions of this thesis: there is a gap in knowledge 
between residents and at least some house-seekers, and this gap can be re-
vealed in their respective valuations of the neighbourhood. 
The analysis of the social rental market, which is the focus of the second 
part of the thesis, is followed by the analysis of spatial house price patterns. 
The purpose of this analysis is to prove that house price contains a reputa-
tional premium in each neighbourhood. This is predicted by a housing trans-
actions model, presented in Chapter 2. The spatial pattern in house prices 
near the administrative boundaries of neighbourhoods in Rotterdam is inves-
tigated in Chapter 6. House prices jumped in three fourths of all of the inves-
tigated cases when crossing neighbourhood border, while abrupt jumps were 
visible in half of the cases. Prices were an average of 17% higher on the ex-
pensive side of the border. Roughly 60% of the difference in price can be ex-
plained by improvements in physical quality or an increase in owner-occu-
pation, such that house price could be 10% higher or lower, depending up-
on which side of the virtual border the dwelling was located. The annexation 
of a neighbourhood section by an adjacent, more affluent neighbourhood is 
investigated in Chapter 7. The name change of the area led to an increase 
of 6 to 8% in the price of the older stock, even though no apparent changes 
took place in either the built environment or the social make-up of the area. 
Households that bought newly constructed dwellings in the same area during 
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and after the year in which the annexation was first stated anticipated the 
name change and were forced to pay this reputational premium in advance. 
The house-price analysis of the owner-occupied market in Rotterdam an-
swers the second key question of the thesis: there is an informational asym-
metry between informed sellers and uninformed buyers, which can be re-
vealed in spatial patterns of house prices. The evidence that I offered in 
Chapters 3 through 7 supports most of the conjectures that were derived in 
Chapter 2. One valid point of criticism, however, is that some of the evidence 
remains circumstantial. Alternative explanations can be offered for the resi-
dential mobility outcome as well. Likewise, a reputational premium may not 
be the only explanation for the patterns observed in house prices. Neverthe-
less, the empirical results are clearly at odds with the full information axi-
om, which predicts an optimal outcome for each tenant’s destination choice 
and the smooth adjustment of house prices across the borders of neighbour-
hoods. The use of neighbourhood reputations provides a viable, although pos-
sibly not the only, explanation for the empirical results. 
 8.2  Methodological insights
The outcome of the models of exit and destination choices, as discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, confirmed that households need not always face a free 
housing choice. The size and scale of the estimated push and pull effects of 
the neighbourhood depended upon the informational, financial, institution-
al or personal constraints that individual households were facing.139 Nest-
ed choice models that distinguish between forced or voluntary moves (Tim-
mermans et al., 1996), planned or unexpected moves (Kan, 1999) and a high 
or low possibility of obtaining a new home (De Palma et al., 2007) are better 
suited to estimating the effects of neighbourhood quality (or housing quality) 
on the exit or destination choices of households, as these models distinguish 
between households according to their ability to move. As an alternative, re-
searchers could resort to a simple discrete choice model, as I have done, by 
limiting the sample to households facing a free housing choice. The analy-
sis in the second part of the thesis considers the relative distance of the move 
and the presence of social ties in the new neighbourhood as selection criteria 
for moving households that are better informed and less choice-constrained. 
The agent-based simulation model of the housing market, as presented in 
Chapter 2, reveals that the relation between house price, the sorting of house-
holds between neighbourhood and the quality of neighbourhoods is very 
139 It has long been noted in the theoretical literature on residential mobility that the decision to move is a far 
more complex process than the revealed choice models assert (Priemus, 1986).
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complex. Several authors (e.g. Bayer and Ross, 2006) have already gone beyond 
this simple approach, treating the destination choice and the determination 
of house price as an integrated, endogenous process. This endogeneity might 
even go a step further, however, as the use of reputations entails that mere 
expectations about future developments within a neighbourhood can trig-
ger an increase (or decrease) in price, the selective arrival of households, im-
provement (or deterioration) in neighbourhood quality and a further rise in 
the price. The coefficients for socio-economic and demographic attributes of 
the neighbourhood in house price models have little meaning if the models 
fail to consider the endogenous relationship between house price and resi-
dential sorting.
The methodological insights that I have offered thus far strengthen the 
case for more advanced modelling practices. One result could simplify mat-
ters for housing market researchers. The aggregation of statistics on neigh-
bourhood attributes over an areal unit with arbitrary boundaries can lead to 
the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Openshaw, 1984). The spatial variation 
within this unit is lost, possibly affecting the estimated correlation between 
an attribute and the process that it sets out to explain. Households however, 
adopt the same aggregation bias when they make use of reputations or statis-
tics on the neighbourhood in their destination choices. A simple neighbour-
hood mean for socio-economic or demographic attributes (e.g. the mean in-
come level in the neighbourhood) may actually prove superior to advanced 
specifications and measurements of the same attributes as an explanatory 
variable in destination choice or house price models.
 8.3  Policy insights
National and local governments and not-for-profit housing associations inter-
vene in many ways on the Dutch housing market. For example, millions of 
euros are spent each year to improve the social and physical quality of neigh-
bourhoods, even though the measurement of the societal impact of these 
neighbourhood investments is still in its infancy. One important contribution 
of this thesis is the derivation of two monetary proxies that can be used to 
compute the Societal Returns on Investments for tenants in the cost-bene-
fit analysis of neighbourhood investments. The estimated push or pull effects 
of house price and neighbourhood satisfaction were converted into the will-
ingness to pay of tenants, which also serves as an approximation of the ten-
ants’ valuation of the neighbourhood. Suppose that investments take place 
that increase the average house price and neighbourhood satisfaction. by 1% 
This would yield a direct estimate for the benefits to owner-occupiers, while 
the benefits for tenants can be derived from the estimated willingness to pay 
of tenants for an increase in the price. The 1% increase in price is equivalent 
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to an increase of 0.3-0.5% in the rent depending on the type of tenant. In turn, 
the 1% increase in neighbourhood satisfaction amounts to an increase in the 
willingness to pay on the part of tenants, equivalent to 1% of the rent. 
The creation of mixed-income neighbourhoods is one of the key targets of 
the Dutch housing policies. Neighbourhoods that are a combination of social 
rental and owner-occupied stock have various benefits for low-income resi-
dents, while middle-income residents benefit by being allowed to continue 
their housing careers in their old neighbourhood.140 The same policy has been 
adopted in the UK, although the results have been less than satisfying. While 
the policy proved successful in the tight London housing market, it failed to 
produce the desired outcome (i.e. a durable increase in the price level) in so-
cial housing estates in other cities (Silverman et al., 2005). The agent-based 
simulation discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that this outcome is not that sur-
prising. A moderate desire to live among one’s peers is sufficient to produce 
the sorting of households between areas according to income (Schelling, 1969; 
Ekeland et al., 2002). The use of reputations reinforces segregation, because 
buyers are aware that the successful resale of the new home is contingent 
upon a lasting improvement in neighbourhood name. 
Government-sponsored gentrification of disadvantaged areas through the 
small-scale construction of owner-occupied dwellings and the piecemeal sale 
of social rental stock can also be hampered by a neighbourhood’s poor name. 
Policymakers appear to have only limited awareness that gentrification is 
more of a bottom-up than a top-down process. A possible trajectory for gen-
trification runs as follows.141 After the initial stage, in which a small group of 
‘pioneers’ prepares the area for further development (Ley, 1986), the dissemi-
nation of the improvement in living conditions changes the public’s expecta-
tions of the neighbourhood. The improved reputation sets off a chain reaction 
in which affluent households flock to the area, hereby co-producing the envi-
ronment to which the reputation was pointing in the first place. To force this 
type of process from the top down, governments and associations should not 
stop at social and physical investments. Reputation management might play 
a pivotal role in the upward trajectory of a neighbourhood. The target group 
for the owner-occupied dwellings must be made aware that the unobservable 
features of the neighbourhood (e.g. the social circumstances and quality of 
amenities) are indeed changing for the better. 
This gives the impression that the increased level of owner-occupation in 
140 Doubts have been raised concerning the alleged benefits of income-mixing in the Netherlands (Van Eijk, 
2010).
141 It is worth noting that the Dutch policy of income-mixing is also incompatible with the competing supply-
side view on gentrification (Smith, 1987). Because the rent gap in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is much lower 
than it is in affluent neighbourhoods, associations are more inclined to sell their stock in disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods, and governments are more prone to develop owner-occupied dwellings in these areas.
[ 155 ]
formerly disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the Netherlands is due to three 
reasons: the tightness of the owner-occupied market in most cities, the loca-
tion of neighbourhoods as spill-over areas for the city centre and a marked 
improvement in the neighbourhood’s name.142 Without these favourable con-
ditions, the owner-occupied stock in ill-reputed neighbourhoods cannot com-
pete with the stock in well-reputed areas, as dwellings must be resold at some 
later date. Nevertheless, several recipes are available for the successful mixing 
of households. The simulation model discussed in Chapter 2 has shown that 
small pockets of prosperity in poorer neighbourhoods may not be viable in the 
long run, but that small pockets of poverty inside affluent neighbourhoods can 
be stable as long as the small share of social rental stock does not affect the 
neighbourhood’s good name.143 Finally, a ‘golden edge’ can be created on the 
fringes of disadvantaged neighbourhoods that border on more affluent neigh-
bourhoods. A prerequisite for the creation of this micro-spill-over area is that 
the quality of the housing stock in the ‘golden edge’ is superior to the quality 
of the stock on the affluent side of the border.
The discussion in the previous chapters may have startled some non-Dutch 
readers, upon reading about the scope and scale of government interventions 
on the Dutch housing market. The high costs of the housing policy and the 
ambivalent results of some of the policies have prompted a discussion in po-
litical and scientific circles about the best ways to reform the Dutch housing 
market.144 Two major inefficiencies of the social rental sector have been iden-
tified in the literature that lead to potentially high welfare costs. First, below-
market rent has created excess demand in most urban areas, which has re-
duced the competiveness of the private rental sector and hence the supply 
of dwellings in the mid-price segment of the housing market. Second, rent 
controls are accompanied by the inefficient allocation of dwellings among 
tenants due to the absence of a pricing mechanism. The results presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, however, suggest that the second inefficiency is less im-
portant: social tenants do sort between dwellings and areas based on their 
willingness to pay for a particular house type and neighbourhood, whether 
they intend to do this or not.145 In addition, however, the welfare costs of two 
further inefficiencies could outweigh the costs of undersupply: choice con-
142 Gentrifying neighbourhoods that attract a relatively large number of short-distance movers need not rely on 
an improvement in reputation, as most movers to the area will be well-informed.
143 The use of vouchers for social tenants under Section 8 of the US Housing and Community Development Act 
applies the same rationale. Evidence suggests that this ‘stealthy’ way of relocating low-income households does 
not reduce the price level in affluent areas (Galster et al., 1999).
144 For example, see Besseling et al. (2008).
145 In this context, I should distinguish between the sorting of households between house types and between 
neighbourhoods. Previous research has shown that sorting between house types can be inefficient, with many 
small households tending to live in large dwellings and many large households living in small dwellings (Rouwen-
dal, 1989 and 1990).
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straints faced by existing tenants and the inefficient allocation of dwellings 
across the various segments of the housing market. 
The exit choice model discussed in Chapter 3 has shown that residents liv-
ing in the most popular house type (single-family dwellings) in attractive ar-
eas were indifferent to most aspects of housing quality. This is likely due to 
these tenants reaching the end of their housing career within the social rent-
ed sector. The wide gap in the user costs of renting and owner-occupation, 
however, effectively ends their entire housing career. A move into tenureship 
usually results in a reduction in housing quality, due to the low availability of 
owner-occupied dwellings for middle income households in most Dutch cit-
ies (Renes et al., 2006). Below-market rents, rent subsidies, ad valorem buyers’ 
taxes and inflated price levels (due to the tax deduction on mortgage debt) 
work together to maintain the gap in user costs. One proposal is to link the 
regulated rent to the price of the dwelling, so that neighbourhood quality and 
high demand are better reflected in the rent and the gap in user costs can be 
reduced (Besseling et al., 2008). As the analysis has shown, however, tenants 
were not willing to pay the full amount of what owner-occupiers are willing 
to pay in order to live in an area. A stepwise increase of the rent in popular 
areas should reveal the tenants’ actual willingness to pay for their neighbour-
hood, as choice restrictions are relaxed. 
The low willingness to pay for the neighbourhood among social tenants rel-
ative to owner-occupiers (as mentioned earlier, 30-50% of additional rent for a 
doubling of house price) is indicative of an overlooked inefficiency: the misal-
location of dwellings across the owner-occupied and social rental segments of 
the Dutch housing market (Van Ommeren and Koopman, 2011). Assigning so-
cial rental stock to low-income households in attractive areas and cities leads 
to the displacement of some middle-income buyers from the housing mar-
ket. The higher average income of the remaining owner-occupiers increases 
the average willingness to pay for the dwelling and hence the average price. 
Social rental stock may thus depress house values in the immediate vicinity 
while inflating the average price level on the housing market by limiting sup-
ply to middle-income buyers. The gap in the willingness to pay of social ten-
ants and buyers suggests that the greatest gains from the liberalisation of the 
Dutch housing market lie in the sale of social rental stock to middle-income 
households and the construction of owner-occupied dwellings for the same 
target group.
The latter observation is reminiscent of Milton Friedman’s adage: ‘there’s 
no such thing as a free lunch’. Two of the social targets of Dutch housing pol-
icy – ‘affordable housing for low-income households’ and ‘a sufficient sup-
ply of dwellings for first-time buyers and transferring households’ – appear 
to be incompatible. As low-income households take possession of dwellings 
in attractive areas, first-time buyers and transferring tenants are frustrated in 
their desire to start or to continue their housing careers. On the other hand, 
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social rental stock in attractive neighbourhoods may be the best recipe for a 
durable mix of households, although the financial costs (e.g. higher land val-
ue) and welfare costs (e.g. displacement of middle-income households) are 
comparatively high in these areas. The question that the government should 
address concerns which groups on the housing market deserve support and 
at what cost to society. Regardless of the choice that is made in this trade-off, 
Dutch policymakers should consider the potentially high welfare costs asso-
ciated with income-mixing on the housing market before presenting it as a 
means of combating the social ills of society.
The most important insight of the thesis however, is that the use of neigh-
bourhood reputations can lead to different outcomes for the destination 
choices of households and for house price. These exceptions to the rule can 
seriously impede the effectiveness of housing policies. Efforts to incorporate 
informational asymmetries into housing economics and the insight that it 
produces for policy analysis could gain further impetus from the improved 
data collection drawing upon internet search sites for vacancies. Researchers 
need no longer rely solely on revealed housing choices, but can use this new 
type of data to learn more about the residential search process. Such future 
research could reveal the relative correctness of the assumption that neigh-
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Samenvatting
De Neoklassieke economische literatuur over de huizenmarkt neemt aan dat 
kopers en huurders goed geïnformeerd zijn over de omstandigheden in hun 
nieuwe woonomgeving, wanneer zij hier naartoe verhuizen. In de modellen 
die verhuisbewegingen en prijsvorming op de woningmarkt moeten verkla-
ren, wordt de kwaliteit van de woonomgeving meestal benaderd door buurt-
kenmerken. De invloed van zo’n kenmerk op het besluit om ergens te vertrek-
ken moet dan ongeveer even groot zijn als de invloed ervan op het besluit tot 
vestiging elders. De kenmerken die deze verhuisbeweging beïnvloeden, moe-
ten ook terugkeren in modellen die de huizenprijs verklaren. In de praktijk 
blijkt dat sommige buurtkenmerken op de ene woningmarkt wel van invloed 
zijn op de vestigingskeuze, maar op een andere woningmarkt weer niet. Zelfs 
op dezelfde woningmarkt kan een kenmerk in de ene buurt de prijs wel, maar 
in een ander buurt niet beïnvloeden. De gebruikte verhuismodellen zijn ver-
der beter in staat om de invloed van de woonomgeving op de beslissing te 
vertrekken te verklaren, dan om de invloed ervan op het besluit zich ergens te 
vestigen te verklaren.
De aanname dat kopers en nieuwe huurders even goed geïnformeerd zijn 
over de kwaliteit van de woning of woonomgeving als verkopers en zittende 
huurders is losgelaten in onder andere zoektheorieën voor de woningmarkt. 
Deze theorievorming toont aan dat kopers een informatieachterstand bezit-
ten ten opzichte van verkopers en dat zij door het verzamelen van informatie 
beter voor de dag komen in de onderhandelingen over de prijs (zie o.a. De Wit 
en Van der Klauw, 2010). Binnen de ruimtelijke economie heeft de gedach-
te postgevat dat de prijs van een woning gelijk is aan het bedrag dat de ko-
per wenst te betalen voor de woning, los van de vraag of de koper goed op de 
hoogte is van de gebruikswaarde van deze woning (Berliant en Yu, 2009). In 
het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt voortgeborduurd op bovenstaande 
theorievorming en zoektheorieën uit de sociale geografie, door aan de infor-
matieachterstand van huizenzoekers een ruimtelijke dimensie te verbinden.
Een zittende bewoner weet uit eigen ervaring hoe de omstandigheden in 
zijn woonomgeving zijn. Huizenzoekers kunnen zich door advertenties van 
het woningaanbod en een bezoek aan de buurt op de hoogte stellen van de 
prijs of huur en zichtbare woning- en buurtkenmerken. Maar hoe de sociale 
samenhang in de buurt is, hoe interacties met toekomstige buren en buurt-
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bewoners verlopen en wat de meerwaarde van kleinschalige voorzieningen 
in de buurt is, blijft verborgen. Huizenzoekers kunnen op meerdere manieren 
de informatieachterstand ten opzichte van bewoners verminderen. Het inper-
ken van de zoekruimte tot plekken die men goed kent, zoals de eigen buurt of 
buurten waar bekenden wonen, staat centraal in zoektheorieën uit de sociale 
geografie (zie Brown en Moore, 1970; Smith et al., 1979 en Huff, 1986). De zoek-
strategieën leiden ertoe dat de risico’s van een verkeerde vestigingskeuze, in 
de zin dat de gebruikswaarde van de woning lager uitvalt dan de prijs of huur 
ervan, beperkt worden. Niet iedere huizenzoeker is in de omstandigheid dat 
hij voldoende informatie kan verzamelen over de grotendeels onzichtbare so-
ciale kwaliteit van zijn nieuwe buurt.
Een slecht geïnformeerde huizenzoeker kan altijd nog zijn toevlucht nemen 
tot de naam of reputatie van de buurt. Buurtreputaties zijn volgens sociologen 
breed gedeelde opvattingen over de sociale omstandigheden in een buurt, die 
buitenstaanders in staat stellen een simpel (maar niet altijd even correct) on-
derscheid tussen buurten en hun bewoners te maken (Suttles, 1972; Permen-
tier, 2009). Een simulatiemodel in hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de buurtreputatie 
ook als een simpele vuistregel werkt, die slecht geïnformeerde huizenzoekers 
in staat stelt om de risico’s van een verkeerde vestigingskeuze zoveel moge-
lijk te beperken. Een buurt met een slechte naam zal geen nieuwe bewoners 
van een beter allooi aantrekken, zodat de sociale omstandigheden daar net zo 
slecht blijven als de naam van de buurt al voorspelde. Een buurt waarvan ge-
dacht wordt dat hij in de lift zit, zal als vanzelf een beter slag bewoner aan-
trekken. De reputatie wordt zo een ‘selffulfilling prophecy’: de kwaliteit van 
een buurt voegt zich op den duur naar de reputatie. 
Om te toetsen of veel kopers en nieuwe huurders slecht geïnformeerd zijn 
over hun nieuwe woonomgeving, wordt in het tweede deel van dit proef-
schrift onderzocht of het gebruik van buurtreputaties door woningzoeken-
den op de Rotterdamse sociale huurmarkt zichtbaar kan worden gemaakt. 
De ruimtelijke schaal van reputaties, die van de administratieve buurt, vormt 
hier het aanknopingspunt. Als huurders zich laten leiden door reputaties in 
hun vestigingskeuze, dan dienen zij geen acht te nemen van de verschillen in 
sociale kwaliteit binnen een buurt, terwijl zij juist veel waarde hechten aan 
de keuze tussen buurten. Goed geïnformeerde woningzoekenden moeten in 
staat zijn om de beste locaties te vinden, zelfs in buurten die slecht bekend 
staan. Op de koopmarkt zal de prijs van de locatie – gegeven de zichtbare ver-
schillen in omgevingskwaliteit – binnen een buurt vrij constant moeten zijn, 
terwijl het prijsverschil tussen buurten – als gevolg van een verschil in repu-
tatie – soms sterk zal kunnen oplopen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt stilgestaan bij de verhuisbeslissing van zittende huur-
ders van corporatie Woonbron Rotterdam. Twee maatstaven, een rapportcijfer 
voor de buurttevredenheid als maat voor de (voornamelijk sociale) kwaliteit 
van de buurt zoals bewoners die ervaren en de huizenprijs als maat voor de 
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(voornamelijk fysieke) kwaliteit van de buurt zoals buitenstaanders (NB ko-
pers) die ervaren, blijken afdoende om de invloed van de woonomgeving op 
de verhuisbeslissing te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt het aantal reacties van 
woningzoekenden op het vrijgekomen woningaanbod onderzocht. De relatief 
slecht geïnformeerde woningzoekende huurders dienen zich in verhouding 
tot goed geïnformeerde, zittende huurders minder te laten leiden door de so-
ciale kwaliteit van de buurt, aangezien de meeste van hen hiervan niet op de 
hoogte kunnen zijn. Dit vermoeden werd bevestigd in een telmodel voor de 
reactiegraad op vrijgekomen sociale huurwoningen in hoofdstuk 4.
De reactie op een vrijgekomen woning is echter een vrijblijvende keu-
ze, waaraan nauwelijks kosten zijn gebonden. De winnende kandidaten on-
dervinden wel de consequenties van hun keuze, omdat zij achteraan de rij 
voor een nieuwe huurwoning moeten aansluiten. Uit een duurmodel voor de 
wachttijd op een huurwoning in hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dat de helft van de nieu-
we huurders wel lette op de buurt waarin de woning stond, maar geen no-
tie nam van de kwaliteitsverschillen binnen deze buurt. Zij weken daarin af 
van huurders met een hogere woon- of inschrijfduur – wat tevens hun rang 
in de woonruimteverdeling bepaalt – die hierdoor meer risico liepen in hun 
vestigingskeuze, aangezien zij hun opties op een betere, toekomstige woning 
inleveren. Doorstromers moeten hun oude woning inleveren, wat meer risi-
co’s met zich meebrengt dan de meer vrijblijvende keuze die starters maken. 
Huurders met een langere woon- of inschrijvingsduur en doorstromers bleken 
wel even goed op de hoogte te zijn van de lokale omstandigheden als zittende 
huurders. De maximale afname aan woonkwaliteit als gevolg van een slechte-
re locatiekeuze door starters en woningzoekenden met een lage rang ten op-
zichte van doorstromers en woningzoekenden met een hoge rang in de woon-
ruimteverdeling bedroeg 25% van de huur, een bedrag dat volgens de geschat-
te relatie tussen wachttijd en de huren equivalent is aan een verkorting van 
de wachttijd op een sociale huurwoning met 20%.
De analyse van de verhuisbewegingen op de Rotterdamse sociale huur-
markt wordt gevolgd door de analyse van woningprijzen in Rotterdam in 
het derde deel van het proefschrift. Het doel ervan is om aan te tonen dat 
de naam (of reputatie) van de buurt in de woningprijs verwerkt zit; een uit-
komst die voorspeld is door een model voor transacties op de koopmarkt in 
hoofdstuk 2. In hoofdstuk 6 is het verloop van de huizenprijs aan de grenzen 
van Rotterdamse buurten onderzocht. Het gebruik van buurtreputaties moet 
leiden tot een reputatiepremie in de prijs. In driekwart van de gevallen bleek 
dat de prijs inderdaad een sprong maakte wanneer een buurtgrens over-
schreden werd en in de helft van de gevallen was zelfs sprake van een abrup-
te sprong. De prijs in de ene buurt lag gemiddeld 17% hoger dan in de naast-
liggende buurt. Veranderingen in de woningkwaliteit en de verhouding huur/
koop kunnen 40% van dit prijsverschil verklaren. Een huis was dus gemiddeld 
10% meer of minder waard, afhankelijk van de vraag aan welke kant van de 
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buurtgrens het stond. In hoofdstuk 7 is de prijsontwikkeling in een buurtdeel 
van Feijenoord onderzocht, dat later geannexeerd werd door de Kop van Zuid. 
De naamsverandering van het buurtdeel leidde tot een prijsstijging van oude-
re woningen met 10%, zonder dat er veranderingen in de bebouwde omgeving 
of bevolkingssamenstelling optraden. De verkopers en kopers van woningen 
in dit buurtdeel die gebouwd zijn nadat de annexatie bekend was gemaakt, 
reageerden blijkbaar op de naamswijziging en verwerkten de reputatiepremie 
van 6% tot 8% in de woningprijs.
De bewijslast in hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 7 stemt overeen met de gevolg-
trekkingen uit de theorievorming in hoofdstuk 2. Maar men mag hier als be-
zwaar aantekenen dat de bewijslast tamelijk indirect is. Bij gebrek aan ken-
nis omtrent de exacte motieven die woningzoekenden hebben om zich ergens 
te vestigen, wordt verondersteld dat een informatieachterstand de basis legt 
voor het negeren van de kwaliteitsverschillen binnen de buurt. Andere ver-
klaringen (keuzerestricties, irrationeel keuzegedrag, desinteresse in de woon-
omgeving) lijken minder waarschijnlijk, maar dit bewijst nog steeds niet dat 
er geen alternatieve, betere verklaring denkbaar is voor de patronen in de ver-
huisbeweging. Het feit dat een buurtgrens van invloed is op de huizenprijs, 
suggereert wel dat er een prijskaartje aan de naam van een buurt hangt, maar 
ook hier kan bijvoorbeeld de woningtaxatie een rol gespeeld hebben.
Sommige uitkomsten in het proefschrift staan dus haaks op de aannames 
uit de economische woningmarktliteratuur wanneer uitgegaan wordt van vol-
ledige informatievoorziening. Woningzoekenden dienen volgens deze litera-
tuur te snappen dat zij voordeel halen uit een goede kennis van hun nieu-
we woonomgeving. Het negeren van deze informatie in de uitkomsten in dit 
proefschrift strookt niet met rationeel gedrag. Huizenprijzen op hun beurt 
dienen geen plotselinge sprong te maken bij ‘zachte’ buurtgrenzen, maar zich 
geleidelijk aan te passen aan de veranderingen in de woonomgeving. Het ge-
bruik van reputaties door kopers en huurders als alternatief voor volledige in-
formatievoorziening levert een aannemelijke, maar wellicht niet de enige ver-
klaring op voor het geobserveerde keuzegedrag van woningzoekenden en de 
ruimtelijke patronen in de huizenprijs.
Methodologische inzichten
Uit de modellen voor de vertrek- en vestigingskeuze in hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 
6 blijkt dat de ene verhuizing de andere niet is. De invloed van kenmerken 
van de buurt op het vertrek of de vestiging van een huishouden wordt niet 
alleen bepaald door de keuzerestricties die het individuele huishouden on-
dervindt (Priemus, 1986), maar ook door de informatieachterstand die het be-
zit. Verhuismodellen die een expliciet onderscheid maken tussen huishou-
dens op basis van een gedwongen of vrijwillige verhuizing (Timmermans et 
al., 1996), een geplande of onverwachte verhuizing (Kan, 1999), en de krapte of 
ruimte van de woningmarkt ten tijde van de verhuizing (De Palma et al., 2007), 
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zijn niet zozeer een methodologisch hoogstandje, als wel een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde om iets zinnigs te kunnen zeggen over de invloed van buurtken-
merken op de verhuisbeslissing. Als alternatief voor deze ‘geneste’ modellen 
kan de onderzoeker zijn analyse beperken tot een groep van huishoudens die 
geen keuzerestricties ondervindt. De uitkomsten geven aan dat een onder-
scheid tussen huishoudens op basis van de afgelegde afstand van de verhui-
zing en de aan- of afwezigheid van vrienden en bekenden in de nieuwe buurt 
eveneens relevante criteria zijn om zo’n onderscheid aan te brengen. 
Een simulatiemodel voor de woningmarkt in hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat de 
relatie tussen de huizenprijs, vestigingskeuze en buurtkwaliteit bizarre vor-
men kan aannemen. Sommige auteurs (bijv. Bayer en Ross, 2006) zagen in dat 
er een vicieuze cirkel bestaat tussen prijzen, vestigingskeuze en buurtkwali-
teit, zodat zij de prijsvorming en vestigingskeuze als een geïntegreerde keuze 
zijn gaan modelleren. Wanneer een huishouden met een hoog inkomen door 
het hoge prijspeil vermoedt dat huishoudens met een hoog inkomen zich 
naar deze plek begeven, wordt de buurt vanzelf een aantrekkelijke vestigings-
plek. Deze endogeniteit – de wederkerige relatie tussen afhankelijke en onaf-
hankelijke variabelen in het model – kan nog een stap verder gaan dan boven-
staande auteurs veronderstelden. Enkel verwachtingen omtrent de vestiging 
van andere huishoudens – welke mede gebaseerd zijn op de buurtreputatie – 
kunnen er al toe leiden dat prijzen veranderen. 
Waar bovenstaande inzichten de noodzaak tot geavanceerde modellering 
van de woningmarkt onderschrijven, vloeit er ook een uitkomst voort uit het 
proefschrift die tot een versimpeling van de modellen kan leiden. Statistieken 
voor buurtkenmerken worden vaak geaggregeerd op het niveau van postcode-
gebieden of administratieve buurten. Hierdoor verliezen de statistieken aan 
zeggingskracht, omdat het verschil in kwaliteit binnen deze gebieden verloren 
gaat. Dit zogenaamde Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Openshaw, 1984) hoeft 
echter minder problemen te veroorzaken in de woningmarktmodellen dan 
de gangbare literatuur veronderstelt. Als kopers of huurders zich verlaten op 
buurtreputaties, hanteren zij exact dezelfde ruimtelijke schaal voor de buurt-
kenmerken als de statistische diensten die de statistieken leveren. Buurtsta-
tistieken voor sociaaleconomische en demografische kenmerken (bijv. het ge-
middelde inkomen in een buurt of postcodegebied) kunnen dezelfde of wel-
licht een betere verklaringskracht bezitten dan geavanceerde maatstaven voor 
dezelfde kenmerken.
Beleidsmatige inzichten
De aanleiding voor dit proefschrift was de beleidsmatige vraag of wijkinves-
teringen van corporaties bijdragen aan de woningwaarde. Op deze vraag valt 
niet altijd een antwoord te geven, omdat de perceptie van een buurt (NB via 
reputaties) en de daadwerkelijke buurtkwaliteit weliswaar samenhangen, 
maar er geen één-op-één relatie tussen bestaat. Een betere buurtkwaliteit 
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hoeft niet per se tot een naamsverbetering en prijsstijging te leiden. Recent 
onderzoek is wel in staat geweest om de effecten van zichtbare, fysieke in-
vesteringen, zoals de aankoop van panden door corporaties, nieuwbouw en 
de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen, op een maatstaf voor leefbaarheid te 
ramen (Marlet et al., 2009).146 De regressieanalyses in het proefschrift leveren 
enkele kengetallen op die in maatschappelijke kosten-batenanalyses gebruikt 
zouden kunnen worden om de effecten van investeringen op de huursector 
te ramen. Voor cijfers voor leefbaarheid of buurttevredenheid op een zeven-
puntsschaal geldt dat een één-punts-verbetering een toename van het woon-
genot van huurders bewerkstelligt, wat een bedrag van ongeveer 15% van hun 
huur vertegenwoordigt. Sociale of fysieke investeringen die de leefbaarheid in 
een buurt met 1% doen toenemen, dragen dus bij tot een verhoging van het 
woongenot van huurders, welke door hen gewaardeerd wordt als ongeveer 1% 
van hun gezamenlijke huursom. Voor eigenaar-bewoners levert de waardestij-
ging van hun woning een indicatie op voor het effect van investeringen op 
hun woongenot. Een stijging van de gemiddelde prijs van koopwoningen in 
de wijk met 1% als gevolg van wijkinvesteringen zal het woongenot van een 
huurder doen toenemen met een bedrag dat equivalent is aan 0,3% tot 0,5% 
van de huur. 
Een van de doelen die overheidsinterventies op de woningmarkt rechtvaar-
digen, is de creatie van wijken die een mix zijn van sociale woningbouw en 
koopwoningen. Uit wijkmenging vloeien maatschappelijke baten voort voor 
lage inkomensgroepen, terwijl middeninkomens de wooncarrière in eigen 
buurt kunnen vervolgen.147 Hoewel eerdere ervaringen met gemengd bou-
wen in het V.K. tegenvielen, is het mengen van sociale woningbouw en eigen 
woningbezit een speerpunt geworden van het beleid in Nederland.148 De si-
mulatie in hoofdstuk 2 suggereert dat het succes van wijkmenging aan veel 
voorwaarden verbonden is. Ten eerste geldt dat op een vrije woningmarkt een 
lichte voorkeur om tussen gelijkgestemden te wonen al voldoende is om huis-
houdens te doen segregeren op basis van hun inkomen en maatschappelijke 
status (Schelling, 1969; Ekeland et al., 2002). Het gebruik van reputaties leidt 
tot een versterking van deze tendens, zelfs op een sterk gereguleerde woning-
146 De invloed van sociale investeringen kon niet geraamd worden door de auteurs vanwege meetproblemen 
en het feit dat de inzet van de corporatie juist verhoogd wordt als de leefbaarheid in het geding is. Als voorbeeld 
namen de auteurs de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen die 4% van de totale voorraad in een wijk vertegen-
woordigden in ogenschouw. Dit zou tot een verbetering van de leefbaarheid met 0,6% leiden, wat een gemid-
delde prijsstijging van € 10.000 per woning opleverde of 8% van de prijs, bij een gemiddelde WOZ-waarde van              
€ 124.000 in 2004.
147 Zie Van Dam et al. (2010) voor een overzicht van mogelijke baten en Van Eijk (2010) voor een recente kritiek 
op wijkmenging.
148 In het V.K. bleek dat met uitzondering van de krappe Londense woningmarkt, de bevordering van eigenwo-
ningbezit in voormalige sociale huurcomplexen nauwelijks bewoners van buiten de wijk aantrok (Silverman et al., 
2005). Deze uitkomst kan worden verklaard uit het belang van reputaties in het vestigingsgedrag van woningzoe-
kenden van buiten de buurt.
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markt als de Nederlandse. Ten tweede geldt dat gentrificatie, de verbetering 
van een buurt door de toestroom van hogere inkomensgroepen, zo zijn eigen 
dynamiek kent, die lastig van bovenaf afgedwongen kan worden. Als een wijk 
een betere naam verkrijgt, wordt ze vanzelf een aantrekkelijke vestigings-
plek voor eigenaarbewoners en particuliere huurders met een hoger inkomen. 
Maar om zelf via investeringen gentrificatie tot stand te brengen, dienen bui-
tenstaanders op de een of andere manier overtuigd te raken van de betere re-
putatie en leefomstandigheden in de wijk. 
De indruk ontstaat dat de verkoop van nieuwbouwwoningen en bestaan-
de huurwoningen in achterstandswijken vooral tot stand is gekomen door de 
krapte op stedelijke woningmarkten en een in potentie aantrekkelijke ligging 
van de betreffende buurt, bijvoorbeeld vlak bij het centrum. In het laatste ge-
val kan de slechte naam omzeild worden, omdat potentiële bewoners regel-
matig door de buurt komen. Zonder deze gunstige randvoorwaarden kunnen 
koopwoningen op lange termijn niet concurreren met woningen in meer aan-
trekkelijke buurten, omdat kopers weten dat hun woning in de toekomst weer 
doorverkocht moet worden aan een ongeïnformeerde buitenstaander. Tegelij-
kertijd levert het proefschrift enkele aanknopingspunten op voor menging die 
wel succesvol kan zijn. Allereerst bleek uit de simulatie in hoofdstuk 2 dat 
‘eilanden’ van sociale woningbouw in welvarende wijken duurzamer zijn dan 
de tegengestelde situatie, zolang de reputatie van het gebied niet ondermijnd 
wordt. De populariteit onder kopers kan dan onaangetast blijven. De analy-
se in hoofdstuk 6 leverde nog een recept op om eigenwoningbezit in een ach-
terstandswijk te bevorderen. De creatie van een ‘gouden rand’ op plekken 
waar de achterstandsbuurt grenst aan een aantrekkelijke buurt lijkt eveneens 
kansrijk. Een voorwaarde voor het ontstaan van zo’n overloopgebied is dat de 
woningkwaliteit uitstijgt boven de kwaliteit in de meer welvarende buurt. Ko-
pers kunnen dan profiteren van de voorzieningen in de welvarende wijk, ter-
wijl zij een goede en relatief goedkope woning in de achterstandswijk betrek-
ken. Ten slotte moet nog gewezen worden op het belang van reputatiema-
nagement of ‘branding’. Transformaties die gepaard gaan met een imagover-
betering van de buurt kunnen een broodnodige impuls geven aan de wijkver-
betering.
De hervorming van de Nederlandse woningmarkt is stevig op de politie-
ke agenda gezet (o.a. VROM-raad, 2007; Besseling et al., 2008). Er zou sprake 
zijn van een inefficiënte allocatie van sociale huurwoningen en een tekort-
schietend aanbod van private huur- en middeldure koopwoningen die hoge 
welvaartsverliezen met zich meebrengen. De koppeling van huren aan WOZ-
waarden is als beleidsmaatregel voorgesteld om deze verstoringen te beper-
ken. Allereerst mag worden opgemerkt dat de inefficiënte allocatie van wo-
ningen onder huurders niet direct zichtbaar werd in mijn analyse: huurders 
met een hogere betalingsbereidheid voor de buurt kwamen vaker op de aan-
trekkelijke plekken terecht, omdat zij nu eenmaal bereid waren om langer te 
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wachten op een woning.149
De uitkomsten in hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat de één-op-één relatie tussen 
de WOZ-waarde en de huur geen recht doet aan de waardering die zittende 
huurders aan de woonomgeving schonken. Voor iedere euro die een koper be-
reid was te betalen voor de locatie, was een sociale huurder bereid om 30 tot 
50 eurocent aan extra huur neer te leggen. Een deel van dit waarderingsver-
schil kan te wijten zijn aan een inefficiënte allocatie van woningen tussen 
de marktsegmenten (zie hieronder) of keuzerestricties, maar een ander deel 
kan voortkomen uit afwijkende woonvoorkeuren. Sociale huurders profiteren 
bijvoorbeeld minder dan eigenaarbewoners van het hogere voorzieningen- 
niveau dat meer welvarende buren met zich meebrengen. De één-op-één kop-
peling van huren aan de WOZ-waarde om een fictieve markthuur te simule-
ren, lijkt in de overgangsfase naar een geliberaliseerde huurmarkt ongewenst. 
Een stapsgewijze verhoging van huren in schaarstegebieden zal duidelijk ma-
ken wat de echte bereidheid van huurders is om te betalen voor hun woon-
omgeving, als keuzerestricties langzaam verdwijnen.
De uitkomsten in hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 wijzen op twee problemen in de 
sociale huursector, die wellicht grotere welvaartsliezen opleveren dan een te-
kortschietend aanbod of de misallocatie van woningen onder huurders. Het 
gaat om de slechte (niet-fysieke) bereikbaarheid van koopwoningen en de ge-
volgen ervan voor de doorstroming en de verkeerde allocatie van woningen 
tussen het huur- en koopsegment. Uit hoofdstuk 3 blijkt dat bewoners van de 
betere sociale huurwoningen (doorgaans eengezinswoningen) een relatief la-
ge bereidheid tonen om voor de woning- en omgevingkwaliteit te betalen. Dit 
hangt wellicht samen met een gebrek aan keuzemogelijkheden, omdat zij aan 
het einde van hun wooncarrière zijn beland. In veel steden is te weinig aan-
bod van geschikte koopwoningen voor lage en middeninkomensgroepen om 
de kloof tussen sociale huur en koop te dichten (Renes et al., 2006). De ver-
koop van sociale huurwoningen (al dan niet in maatschappelijk gebonden ei-
gendom), de afschaffing van de overdrachtsbelasting, huurdifferentiatie, meer 
ruimte voor private verhuur en afschaffing van de hypotheekrenteaftrek zal 
niet alleen het financiële gat tussen koop en huur dichten, maar – met uit-
zondering uiteraard van de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen aan zittende 
huurders – neemt ook een belangrijke belemmering voor doorstroming op de 
sociale huurmarkt weg. 
De lagere waardering die sociale huurders schenken aan de woonomgeving 
ten opzichte van kopers is mede het gevolg van een misallocatie van wonin-
gen tussen de huur- en koopsector (Van Ommeren en Koopman, 2011). De toe-
wijzing van sociale huurwoningen aan lage inkomensgroepen verdringt een 
149 Dit laat onverlet dat kleine huishoudens in te grote woningen kunnen wonen of vice versa, iets wat al twintig 
jaar geleden geconstateerd is voor de Amsterdamse sociale huurmarkt (Rouwendal, 1989 and 1990).
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deel van de middeninkomensgroepen van de stedelijke woningmarkt – een 
ander deel gaat goedkoop scheefwonen – zodat het inkomenspeil van de over-
gebleven kopers en de gemiddelde huizenprijs stijgt in vergelijking tot de uit-
komst op de vrije woningmarkt. Sociale woningbouw drukt weliswaar de wo-
ningprijs in de directe omgeving, maar heeft op de woningmarkt als geheel 
juist een prijsopdrijvend effect, omdat hiermee een deel van de koopvraag 
van de markt verdrongen wordt. Er ontstaan dan additionele welvaartsverlie-
zen, omdat de verdrongen middeninkomensgroepen moeten wonen op plek-
ken die niet hun eerste keus zouden zijn, terwijl men in principe bereid is om 
meer te betalen voor de woning dan de sociale huurders die op de betreffen-
de markt kunnen blijven. Een tweede strategie voor potentiële kopers is dat 
zij in de sociale huursector goedkoop gaan scheefwonen. Het grote verschil in 
de bereidheid te betalen voor de buurt tussen sociale huurders en kopers sug-
gereert dat de grootste welvaartswinst die uit de liberalisering van de woning-
markt te halen valt, ligt in het vertrek van lage inkomensgroepen uit en de 
komst van middeninkomensgroepen naar de meer gewilde (en dus duurdere) 
wijken en steden. 
De laatste observatie sluit naadloos aan bij het adagium van Milton Fried-
man: “there’s no such thing as a free lunch”. ‘Een betaalbare woonruimte 
voor mensen met een laag inkomen’ en ‘voldoende woningen voor starters en 
doorstromers’ staan als sociale doelen op gespannen voet met elkaar. Als la-
ge inkomensgroepen via sociale huur aantrekkelijke locaties innemen, wor-
den starters op de koopmarkt en doorstromers op de huurmarkt belemmerd 
in hun woonkeuze. Eenzelfde afweging geldt voor wijkmenging. Menging door 
sociale woningbouw in meer aantrekkelijke buurten is waarschijnlijk duurza-
mer dan menging via de bevordering van eigenwoningbezit in achterstands-
wijken, maar gaat gepaard aan hogere stichtingskosten bij nieuwbouw en ho-
gere welvaartsverliezen – die neerslaan bij starters en middeninkomensgroe-
pen – in de bestaande voorraad. Welke groepen op de woningmarkt de mees-
te overheidssteun verdienen en of wijkmenging in de huidige vorm moet wor-
den voortgezet, zal uiteindelijk een politieke afweging zijn. Maar voor een 
juiste afweging is het noodzakelijk dat beleidsmakers de maatschappelijke 
kosten die integratie op inkomen met zich meebrengen niet langer negeren, 
maar eveneens meenemen in de politieke afweging. 
Het voornaamste inzicht uit het proefschrift is dat het gebruik van buurtre-
putaties tot veranderingen in voorspellingen omtrent de locatiekeuze van 
huishoudens en prijsvorming op de huizenmarkt leidt. Dit betekent dat be-
leidsvoorstellen verkeerd kunnen uitpakken in díe uitzonderingssituaties 
waar de informatieachterstand van huishoudens een rol van betekenis speelt. 
Vervolgonderzoek zal moeten uitwijzen hoe groot de rol van perceptie in de 
verhuisbewegingen en woningprijzen eigenlijk is. Gedetailleerde informatie 
over het zoekgedrag van kopers zoals deze op woningzoeksites als Funda en 
Jaap geregistreerd worden kan hierbij helpen. De informatieverstrekking over 
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buurten op deze sites zou de buurtreputatie in de toekomst minder belangrijk 
kunnen maken, maar deze informatie kan op zijn weer beurt weer tot ‘selfful-
filling prophecies’ omtrent de aantrekkelijkheid van bepaalde locaties leiden. 
Gunstige informatie over een buurt, ongeacht de vraag of deze informatie cor-
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  Glossary of terms
Agglomeration benefits Benefits that households (or firms) derive from close  
   proximity to one another due to economies of scale  
   or network effects
Anchoring  Using the known value of a dwelling or location (or  
   one of its attributes) to value another dwelling or lo- 
   cation (or the same dwelling or location)
Anchoring effect  Putting too much weight on a single attribute of the  
   dwelling or neighbourhood during anchoring
Arrival rate of offers  Rate at which new offers become available on the   
   market
Arrival rate of tenants  Rate at which house seekers enter the distribution  
   system for social rented dwellings
Assessment value Assessed market value of a dwelling
Assessors’ bias  Structural overestimation or underestimation of   
   house price in the assessment of its market value
Bargaining surplus  Difference between list price and sales price of a   
   dwelling
Biased information Incomplete information on a dwelling or neighbour- 
   hood that leads to structural overestimation or un- 
   derestimation of their respective value
Bid   Payment that is offered for a dwelling by a potential  
   buyer or tenant
Complete information Full knowledge of a dwelling and its neighbourhood  
   and the characteristics of market participants inter- 
   ested in it
Destination choice Decision to settle at a new location
Directional bias  Preference for moving or searching in one direction  
   as opposed to other directions
Distinction bias  Exaggerating differences between neighbourhoods
Duration of stay  Time spent living in the current dwelling
Endogeneity  Correlation between explanatory variable and error  
   term in a model due to measurement and specifica- 
   tion errors, feedback effects, omitted variable bias or  
   spatial autocorrelation
Exchange value  Value of dwelling in an exchange
Exit choice  Decision to leave one’s current dwelling
Exit rate  Share of exits as a fraction of the total stock in an   
   area within a fixed period of time
Full or perfect information Complete information with additional knowledge of  
   other market participants’ (current and future) ac-  
   tions 
Gentrification  Up-scaling of formerly deprived, usually inner-city  
   neighbourhoods
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Heterogeneity  Structural differences in the choice behaviour of   
   market participants, for instance participants living  
   in different areas
House price residual Portion of house price that can be attributed to the  
   neighbourhood as opposed to the actual dwelling
Housing quality  The quality of the dwelling and its neighbourhood
Incomplete information Insufficient knowledge of a dwelling or neighbour  
         hood or the characteristics of market participants   
   interested in it
Informational asymmetry When one party in an exchange has superior infor- 
   mation
Isotropic  Equal in all directions
Kriging   A geo-statistical technique in which known values  
   at dispersed locations are connected; used for in  
   stance in elevation maps
‘Lemon’   An overvalued dwelling
List price  Price at which a dwelling is advertised
Market area  Area with a similar price for the location, used in   
   the appraisal of house prices
Market rent  Rent on a free housing market
Market value  Approximation of the price of the dwelling if it is   
   not for sale 
Mixed equilibrium Equilibrium in which some sellers and buyers are   
   equally well informed while some buyers are poorly  
   informed 
Modifiable areal   Statistical bias due to poor measurement of the  
unit problem  range of an area or of the spatial effects on one of   
   its attributes
Neighbourhood hierarchy Rank of neighbourhoods in a city based on their re - 
   spective reputations
Neighbourhood quality Objective quality of attributes in the neighbourhood
Neighbourhood satisfaction Residents’ subjective valuation of the quality of life  
   experience in own neighbourhood
Neighbourhood reputation Evaluation of social circumstances in an area and its  
   inhabitants by anonymous outsiders to the area
Offer   Payment that is requested for a dwelling by the seller
Omitted variable bias Bias resulting from missing, causal factors in the 
   model; this leads to compensation through over-   
   or underestimation of other, observed factors in the  
   model
Opportunity costs  Costs associated with not choosing an alternative   
   option
Place-utility  Utility that is derived from the neighbourhood
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Pooling equilibrium Equilibrium in which sellers are better informed   
   than buyers
Pull effect  Attractive force that causes households to settle in a  
   location
Push effect  Repulsive force that causes households to move   
   away from a location
Quality of life  General well-being of households
Red-lining  Restriction on mortgage lending in (usually de  
   prived) areas as opposed to restrictions on lending  
   to individuals
Random effects  Same means but different variances
Regulated rent  Rent set by (semi-)governmental bodies
Residential search Search for a vacant dwelling
Residential location choice Decision to stay on one’s home (as opposed to the   
   exit choice) or decision to settle in a new home
Residential satisfaction Residents’ subjective valuation of the quality of life  
   experience in their dwelling and neighbourhood
Sales price  Price at which the dwelling is sold
Search costs  Costs associated with information-gathering during  
   residential search
Search space  Bounded area in which residential search takes   
   place
Separating equilibrium Equilibrium in which all market participants (buyers  
   and sellers) have the same information
Signaling  Using a signal (e.g. price) to change from a pooling  
   equilibrium towards a separating equilibrium
Social network  Social structure made up out of individuals who are  
   tied
Social ties  Interpersonal ties to friends, family, colleagues and  
   acquaintances
Sorting   Process by which households of a specific group   
   cluster together as opposed to mixing
Spatial autocorrelation Dependency of error terms in a model on error   
   terms of nearby observations
Stock market  Housing market who’s prices are defined by the ex- 
   isting stock as opposed to newly constructed stock
Stopping rule  Decision rule when to stop searching for a dwelling
Stigmatisation  Negative bias attributed to an area or the persons   
   living there
Tenure choice  Decision to buy or rent a home
Third-party effect Letting other people’s opinion about oneself or one’s  
   place of residence influence one’s own behaviour
Transaction costs Deadweight costs associated with exchange (e.g.   
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   moving costs or buyers’ taxes)
Urban restructuring Policy-induced up-scaling of neighbourhoods as op 
   posed to ‘spontaneous’ gentrification 
User value  The value of a good to the owner
Vacancy rate  Share of vacant dwellings in the total stock within a  
   fixed period of time
Waiting time  Time spent waiting until a vacant dwelling is availa- 
   ble
Willingness to accept Minimum amount that a seller is willing to receive  
   for a good
Willingness to pay Maximum amount that a buyer is willing to pay for  
   a good
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  List of symbols 
z   housing consumption in general or in the new home
y   household income
p(z)   house price in general or price of the new home
U  utility
ż  current housing consumption 
p(ż)  price of the current home
u*  utility on optimal consumption path
θ(z,y,p)   bid function
φ(z,y,p)   offer function
e(z,y,p)   expenditure function
D(z)   aggregate demand for dwellings
n(z)   fraction of households demanding z
N   number of households
S(z)   supply of dwellings
hh   household characteristics
HS   housing stock
p*   pooled house price
c   information cost
r   rent or Pearson’s correlation coefficient (defined in the text)
NBH  neighbourhood variables
ρ   discount rate
Φ  demand shift parameter
τ   waiting time for dwelling
NR  net response to offers
γ   arrivals of offers
ψ   arrivals of house-seekers 
κ  dispersal rate
d   duration of stay
f  surplus (or shortfall) in bid
Γ  institutional variables
Δ  boundary-fixed effect
ηlΔ  neighbourhood-to-boundary fixed effect 
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